The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 52
Number 1 Volume 52, Number 1 (2022)

Article 1

Spring 3-9-2022

Parameters Spring 2022
USAWC Press

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and
Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Public Affairs Commons

Recommended Citation
USAWC Press, "Parameters Spring 2022," Parameters 52, no. 1 (2022), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3124.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

The US Army War College

QUARTERLY

PARAMETERS
VOL. 52 NO. 1 SPRING 2022

Contemporary Strategy & Landpower

In Focus: Civil-Military Relations
Guidelines for Politically Charged Societies
Patrick Paterson

Highlighting Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion
Danielle Holt and Susan Davis
Andrea M. Peters, Michael A. Washington,
Lolita Burrell, and James Ness

Understanding a Changing China
Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Critelli
C. Anthony Pfaff

Confronting Complex Security Dilemmas
Gerald J. Krieger
Meghan Fitzpatrick, Ritu Gill,
and Jennifer F. Giles

Educating Military Officers
Zhirayr Amirkhanyan
James R. McKay, H. Christian Breede,
Ali Dizboni, and Pierre Jolicouer

In the Spotlight:
Dealing with the Russians
by Andrew Monaghan

TOC
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/decisive

QUARTERLY

PARAMETERS

Mission Statement

The US Army War College has published The US Army War College Quarterly – Parameters,
a refereed journal for contributions concerning contemporary strategy and Landpower, since
1971. Parameters is a product line of the US Army War College Press, which publishes and
disseminates research and analysis for Army leaders and other defense experts in multiple
forms. The USAWC Press enhances the research and educational missions of the US Army
War College by producing policy-relevant works of scholarship to inform national security
decision making and to advance expert knowledge in such topics as grand strategy, military
and defense strategy, strategic leadership, military ethics, and the military profession.

US Army Leadership

Editorial Board Members

Secretary of the Army

Dr. Anne Louise Antonoff

Dr. Montgomery McFate

Chief of Staff of the Army

Dr. Tami Davis Biddle

Dr. Andrew Monaghan

Commandant

Dr. Hal Brands

Dr. Kathleen Moore

Director, SSI and USAWC Press

Dr. Douglas W. Bristol Jr.

Dr. Matthew Pinsker

Honorable Christine E. Wormuth
General James C. McConville
Major General David C. Hill
Dr. Carol V. Evans

US Army War College Press

Marine Corps University

US Army War College, DNSS
Johns Hopkins University

University of Southern Mississippi

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Director of Research and Analysis, C/O
Futures, LLC

Naval War College

Royal United Services Institute
US Army War College, CSL
Dickinson College

Dr. George E. Reed

Colonel (US Army, retired)
University of Colorado,
Colorado Springs

Editor in Chief

Mr. Jeffery L. Caton

Marketing and Production Editor

Dr. Samuel Charap

Dr. Bettina Renz

Managing Editor

Mr. Murray R. Clark

Dr. Nadia Schadlow

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Mr. Richard K. Leach
Ms. Lori K. Janning

Developmental Editors

Kepler Strategies, LLC
RAND Corporation

Colonel (US Air Force, retired)
At Large

University of Nottingham
Hudson Institute

Dr. Sibylle Scheipers

Dr. Erin M. Forest
Dr. Joe Hadley

Dr. Conrad C. Crane,

Mrs. Kristen G. Taylor
Ms. Stephanie Crider

Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin

Dr. Kalev Sepp

Mr. Mark J. Eshelman

Dr. Luis Simón

Visual Information Specialists
Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

Contributing Editors
Dr. Jacqueline N. Deal

Lieutenant Colonel, (US Army, retired)
US Army War College, SSI
American University

Colonel (US Army, retired)
US Army War College, DDE

Dr. David M. Finkelstein
Center for Naval Analyses

Long Term Strategy Group, LLC

Dr. T. X. Hammes

US Army War College, DNSS

Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff

US Army War College, SSI

National Defense University
Queen’s University, Centre for
International and Defence Policy

Dr. Jacob N. Shapiro

Dr. An Jacobs

Dr. Patricia M. Shields

Dr. Genevieve Lester

Princeton University

Texas State University

Nottingham Trent University
US Army War College,
De Serio Chair

Dr. Matthew C. Mason

US Army War College, SSI

University of St. Andrews

Dr. Andrew C. Scobell
US Institute of Peace

Naval Postgraduate School
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Dr. Samantha A. Taylor

Air Command and Staff College

Dr. Timothy L. Thomas

Lieutenant Colonel (US Army, retired)
MITRE Corporation

Mr. John F. Troxell

Colonel (US Army, retired)
At Large

Bert B. Tussing

Colonel (US Marine Corps, retired)
US Army War College, CSL

Dr. Marybeth P. Ulrich

US Army War College, DNSS

Dr. Katarzyna Zysk

Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Parameters is an official US Army Periodical, published quarterly by the US Army War College. The Secretary of the Army has
determined that publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.
Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by the Secretary of the Army in accordance with Army regulations.
Disclaimer: Articles and reviews published in Parameters are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed in
Parameters are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any
other agency of the US government.

TOC

Table of Contents
3

From the Editor in Chief
Antulio J. Echevarria II

Features
In Focus
5

Civil-Military Relations: Guidelines in Politically Charged Societies
Patrick Paterson

Highlighting Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
21

Interrupting Bias in Army Talent Management

41

Rethinking Female Urinary Devices for the US Army

Danielle Holt and Susan Davis

Andrea M. Peters, Michael A. Washington, Lolita Burrell, and James Ness

Understanding a Changing China
57

China’s Global Monopoly on Rare-Earth Elements

73

Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics

Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Critelli
C. Anthony Pfaff

Confronting Complex Security Dilemmas
89

Water Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?

105

Information Warfare: Lessons in Inoculation to Disinformation

Gerald J. Krieger

Meghan Fitzpatrick, Ritu Gill, and Jennifer F. Giles

Educating Military Officers
119

A Failure to Innovate: The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

133

Developing Strategic Lieutenants in the Canadian Army

Zhirayr Amirkhanyan

James R. McKay, H. Christian Breede, Ali Dizboni, and Pierre Joliocoeur

SRAD Director’s Corner
147

The People’s Republic of China’s Challenge to US Security
George Shatzer

In the Spotlight
155

Dealing with the Russians
By Andrew Monaghan

Reviewed by Bettina Renz
TOC

2

Parameters 52(1) Spring 2022

Book Reviews
Strategy
157

The Art of War in an Age of Peace: US Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint
By Michael O’Hanlon

Reviewed by Frank Hoffman

Military History
160

The Folly of Generals: How Eisenhower’s Broad Front Strategy
Lengthened World War II
By David P. Colley

Reviewed by Gregory L. Cantwell

Reviews and Replies
163

On “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan”
Eric Chan

The Authors Reply

Peter Harris and Jared M. McKinney

177

On “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security”
Charles J. Dunlap

The Authors Reply

Shannon E. Reid and Matthew Valasik

189

On “The Battalion Commander Effect”
Ralph Masi

The Authors Reply

Everett Spain, Gautam Mukunda, and Archie Bates

197

Contributor’s Guidelines

199

Cover Photo Credits

TOC

W

From the Editor in Chief

elcome to the Spring 2022 issue of Parameters. This issue consists
of an In Focus commentary, four article forums, and our inaugural
SRAD Director’s Corner. In our In Focus essay, “Civil-Military
Relations: Guidelines in Politically Charged Societies,” Patrick Paterson examines
eight essential principles of military subordination to elected civilian officials, each
of which purports to preserve a healthy balance in Western civil-military relations.
In honor of Women’s History Month, this issue’s first forum, Highlighting
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, provides two contributions by women authors
addressing issues of concern to women in the US military. The first contribution,
“Interrupting Bias in Army Talent Management,” by Danielle Holt and Susan
Davis, explains how systemic bias impacts the Army’s ability to assess talent;
it concludes with recommendations for reducing bias in the Army’s assignment,
promotion, and selection processes. The second contribution, “Rethinking Female
Urinary Devices for the US Army,” by Andrea Peters, et al., examines a study
conducted of female urinary devices employed during the annual Sandhurst
Military Skills Competition at the United States Military Academy to redress
the lack of education on, and use of, such devices; it then offers ways to improve
women’s urogynecological health and well-being during military deployments.

This issue’s second forum, Understanding a Changing China, features two
articles. The first article, “China’s Global Monopoly on Rare-Earth Elements,”
by Gustavo Ferreira and Jamie Critelli, offers a novel economic analysis of
American dependence on China for rare earth elements; it also discusses how
Western nations might exploit this dependence to break China’s global monopoly.
The second article, “Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics,”
by C. Anthony Pfaff, argues China’s rich tradition of wartime ethics allows
Western military leaders to understand Chinese strategic behavior better and
thereby to avoid misunderstandings.
Our third forum, Confronting Complex Security Dilemmas, offers essays on two
disparate security challenges: water scarcity and information warfare. In “Water
Wars of the Future: Myth or Reality?” Gerald Krieger assesses security challenges
in the Nile River Basin and proposes areas for future US investment and
cooperation. In “Information Warfare: Lessons in Inoculation to Disinformation,”
Meghan Fitzpatrick, Ritu Gill, and Jennifer Giles explore the modern history
of disinformation campaigns and propose ways to enhance the education of
US servicemembers to defend against such campaigns.
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Our final forum, Educating Military Officers, consists of two articles aimed
at furthering the education of military professionals. The first article, “A Failure
to Innovate: The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War,” by Zhirayr Amirkhanyan
analyzes the major problems faced by Armenia in its recent war against Azerbaijan.
The second article, “Developing Strategic Lieutenants in the Canadian Army,”
by James McKay, H. Christian Breede, Ali Dizboni, and Pierre Jolicoeur assesses
junior officer education at Canada’s military colleges.
As mentioned above, this issue also features our inaugural “SRAD Corner” in
which the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis Division of the US Army
War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, Colonel George Shatzer, reviews books
of possible interest to contemporary military strategists, especially those serving in
US Army and Joint positions. In this issue, he analyzes two books concerning
China’s challenge to American security: Rush Doshi’s The Long Game: China’s
Grand Strategy to Displace American Order and Elbridge A. Colby’s, The Strategy of
Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. ~AJE

TOC
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Civil-Military Relations:
Guidelines in Politically Charged Societies
Patrick Paterson

ABSTRACT: Current events warrant a review of US civil-military relations
doctrine. This special commentary examines eight principles of military
subordination to elected civilian officials and addresses the fundamental
question at the heart of civil-military relations theory and practice, namely,
what options, if any, does the military professional have when civilian
leadership disregards military advice? Examples drawn from US history can
provide an important framework for understanding the complex interrelational
dynamics at play.

Keywords: civil-military, apolitical, civilian, defense policy, US
Constitution, professionalism

C

ivil-military relations theories are well developed and readers can
examine the works of leading scholars to understand the origins
and importance of the interdependence of the armed forces and
elected officials. Space limitations prevent a lengthy literature review, but readers
interested in the theoretical issues behind the topic should consult the works
of US scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Richard Kohn,
Eliot Cohen, Peter Feaver, and Marybeth Ulrich. Of note, the 2009 edited
collection of essays published by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider,
American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and State in a New Era, is a
particularly valuable examination of US military and civilian practices.1 The
field lacks clear, practical rules military officers—particularly senior military
officers who work closely with civilian counterparts—can use to guide their
interactions with civilian leaders. This special commentary addresses that need.
The military’s responsibility is centered on the technical expertise and
operational requirements related to the application of military force. While the
military serves as a government organization that designs and executes military
operations, it does not determine their necessity.2 In other words, the role of the
military is to advise civilian authorities on how to employ the armed forces to
achieve the policymakers’ goals, not to make political decisions or to determine
1. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State
in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
2. Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 26,
no. 1 (Fall 1999); and Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
TOC
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when the military should be used. As other scholars have written, a military that
can choose its missions is not compatible with the principles of a democratic state.3
The working relationships between senior military leaders and civilian officials
are complex. Civilians often make the final decision on whether to employ the
armed forces, but they need input from experienced military officers to ensure the
force is applied in an effective manner. Since most US military operations
are foreign—domestic military operations are permitted only in exceptional
cases—the military must ensure it does not get ahead of its State Department
counterparts who are responsible for foreign policy.
Fundamental Rules of US Civil-Military Relations
There are eight generally accepted practices military officers should follow
when adhering to the expectations of US civil-military relations. Surprisingly,
these practices are not written succinctly in a military manual. Instead, they
can be extracted from top scholars on the subject, from biographies of senior
military officials, and from the advice senior military leaders provide in
interviews, essays, and speeches. This analysis of the basic concepts associated
with subordination to civilian-elected officials derives the fundamental
behavior expected of military officers, explains the rules, and provides examples
from US history.
While the eight practices sound simple, even unremarkable, they are difficult
to apply. Most security problems are multifaceted due to competing interests,
and they offer no clear or calculable costs-benefits analysis on how to proceed.
There are diplomatic, economic, and political consequences to each course of
action and assessing which one is most beneficial is a difficult task.
Remain Apolitical
The first key principle of the US military, and perhaps the most important
characteristic of professional armed forces, is to remain apolitical. The military
prides itself on being a disciplined, all-volunteer, professional force that is
subordinate to and respectful of civilian leadership. Due deference to the
president, the secretary of defense, and other elected civilian officials is part of
the military culture. Taking sides in Washington politics, which can be hyperpolarized, could damage the institutional reputation of the armed forces by
3. J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America: How Do We Know If
Anything Has Changed?,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David
Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 78–96; and Pat Paterson, “Measuring
Military Professionalism in Partner Nations: Guidance for Security Assistance Officials,” Journal of Military
Ethics 18, no. 2 (July 2019): 152.
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associating it with the dishonest and corrupt practices many Americans connect
with Washington policymakers. The political gridlock, disorder, and inefficiency
are anathema to military officers who value honor, order, sacrifice, and patriotism
over politics. According to public opinion polls, US constituents hold the military
in high esteem while regarding political parties and Congress with contempt. The
politicization of the armed forces could also taint the advice senior officers provide
to civilian members of the defense community because the military might be seen
as having a political agenda. Department of Defense regulation and the Hatch Act
forbid active-duty military members from political participation and campaigning
for candidates during election campaigns.4
Consider, the posture of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the president’s annual
State of the Union address. The chairman, vice chairman, and chiefs of staff of
the branches of the armed forces sit in a place of honor in Congress near the
front row. Rather than applaud when the president makes points, they do not react
and sit attentively but unemotionally in their chairs. Any reaction, if made, could
be construed as political advocacy.
Most senior military officers maintain this apolitical practice throughout
their active-duty service. General Joseph Dunford, the first chairman of the
joint chiefs of staff under President Donald J. Trump stayed out of the political
infighting in the nation’s capital. “I’ve worked very hard to remain apolitical
and not make political judgments,” he said. Taking a political position is just
“not in my lane,” he added.5 Dunford served as chairman from May 2015 to
September 2019 when he turned the position over to General Mark Milley.
When asked if he would remain silent on the political turmoil once he retired,
Dunford emphatically said, “I will not now nor will I, when I take off the
uniform, make judgments about the President of the United States or the
Commander in Chief. I just won’t do it.”6
Provide Candid Military Advice
The second fundamental practice is that senior military officers are required
to provide objective advice about military policy. The counsel should be
nonpartisan, nondeliberative, and, if required, include advice contrary to what
politicians want to hear or that goes against current policy. The information
4. Active-duty military personnel are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity. See
Department of Defense (DoD) Standards of Conduct Office, “Guidance on Political Activity and DoD
Support,” July 6, 2016; and DoD, “Political Activities by Member of the Armed Forces, DoD Directive
1344.10, February 19, 2008.
5. Dan Lamothe and Missy Ryan, “Top General Defends Behavior of U.S. Troops in a ‘Very Politically
Turbulent Time’ ” Washington Post (website), August 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
-security /top-general-defends-behavior-of-us-troops-in-a-very-politically-turbulent-time /2019/08/28 /8ef91
9ba-c9c1-11e9-8067-196d9f17af68_story.html.
6. Lamothe and Ryan, “Top General Defends Behavior.”
TOC
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should include an explanation of what the military operations will entail,
the military objectives, the number of personnel and equipment required
for mission success, and the limitations of such actions. The rule is to advise
on how to use the armed forces, not to advocate for a specific course of action.
Civilian decisionmakers should not feel the military is exerting undue influence
on one course of action over another.
Candidness is the key requirement. Former Defense Secretary Robert
Gates advised cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point, New
York, “If as an officer you don’t tell blunt truths—or create an environment
where candor is encouraged—then you’ve done yourself and the institution
a disservice.”7 Former Marine General Anthony Zinni says such counsel is a
military obligation regardless of the politics of the moment. “It is the obligation
to give unvarnished professional military advice, despite administrative
preferences . . . it is an obligation that comes with the uniform.”8 Retired Admiral
James Stavridis, the most prolific military author of recent history, advised
officers to express their opinions in military journals: “Don’t be afraid—have
the moral courage to vet your ideas responsibly and sensibly. In virtually every
case of which I am aware, even the most controversial articles are respected
as attempts to contribute.”9
Civilian Authorities Retain Control over All Aspects of Defense Policy
The third practice has to do with authorities. Many students of US national
security believe there are two distinct spheres of authority between civilian and
military officials. Civilian-elected officials oversee the larger strategic interests
of the country, including the decision of when to deploy the military, while
the armed forces make operational and tactical decisions if the military is called
to action.10
Theory is one thing while the practice can be entirely different. Today,
most scholars agree civilians have extensive control over nearly all aspects
of military policy. In other words, the relationship between civilian leaders
and military officers is not equal. Civilians have most of the
authority and can make decisions, even ones affecting the traditional
authorities of the armed forces: promotions, personnel assignments, and
operational and tactical issues, for example. Some authorities may be delegated
7. Thom Shanker, “Defense Chief Advises Cadets on Disagreeing with Leaders,” New York Times,
April 22, 2018, A18.
8. Anthony Zinni, Remarks at the Center for Defense Information, March 27, 2006. Also reported in
Marybeth Ulrich and Martin Cook, “US Civil Military Relations since 9/11: Issues in Ethics and Policy
Development,” Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 3 (2006): 169.
9. James Stavridis, “Read, Think, Write, and Publish,” Proceedings, August 2008, 16–19.
10. Paterson, ”Measuring Military Professionalism,” 151.
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to military officials, but civilians retain a veto power over military decisions.
Richard Kohn stated the issue succinctly when he wrote, “the military possesses
no autonomy of any kind not derived from civilian political institutions.”11
Strategic planning is based on assumptions and when those assumptions
are incorrect, military operations can go awry very quickly. As Peter Feaver
says, “the civilians have the right to be wrong.”12 When civilians make these
strategic errors, military servicemembers must accept the mistakes as part of the
difficulty of managing complex military operations in a democracy. An example
of this type of error is the 2004 US Marine Corps assault on Fallujah, Iraq. Three
days into the battle, civilian leaders in Iraq ordered the marines to cease operations
in order to seek a peaceful solution and to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. The
decision was unpopular with the marines who realized it arrested their operational
momentum and permitted the enemy to rearm and refortify their positions.
Marine Corps leaders dutifully complied but chided civilians about operational
interference. “I would simply say that when you order elements of a Marine
division to attack a city, you really need to understand the consequences of that,
and not, perhaps, vacillate in the middle of that. Once you commit to do that, you
have to stay committed,” said Lieutenant General James Conway, the commander
of US Marine forces during the operation.13
Provide Congressional Testimony Prudently
The fourth rule concerns the dual responsibility the military has to the
executive and legislative branches. According to the US Constitution,
the US military serves at the direction of the president (in his role as commander
in chief ) and certain designated officials in the executive branch. To maintain
the checks and balances so critical to the US system, Congress approves the
military budget, determines the size of the armed forces, provides valuable
oversight, and has the authority to declare war.
For these reasons, senior military officers can be called before the elected
leaders of Congress to testify on military strategy and operations. For instance,
the commanders of the regional and functional combatant commands,
such as US Central Command or US Cyber Command, provide testimony
on an annual basis to the Senate Armed Services Committee and House
11. Thomas E. Ricks, “Richard Kohn Fires a Warning Flare about a Joint Force Quarterly Article,” Foreign
Policy (website), September 29, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/29/richard-kohn-fires-a-warning-flare
-about-a-joint-force-quarterly-article/.
12. Peter Feaver, Armed Servants, 5.
13. Anne Barnard, “Commander Disagreed with Invasion,” Boston Globe (website), September 13, 2004,
http://archive.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/09/13/commander_disagreed_with_invasion/; and Rajiv
Chandrasekaran and Karl Vick, “US Opts to Delay Fallujah Offensive,” Washington Post, April 26, 2004, A1.
TOC
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Armed Services Committee as part of the dual accountability of the armed forces
according to the US Constitution.
The requirement to serve two co-equal branches of government—the
executive branch represented by the president and secretary of defense on one
side and the legislative branch represented by the armed services committees on
the other—can present serious civil-military relations problems. Since disputes
between the president, the secretary of defense, and senior military officers about
military strategy and operational decisions frequently occur, these differences
can often surface during testimony to Congress. Congressional opponents of the
president can exploit disagreements between the president and his military
advisers to their political advantage, portraying the president as being at odds
with his generals and admirals. President Eisenhower referred to the
requirement for congressional testimony as “legalized insubordination.”14
What should senior officers do when they are required to testify before
Congress on a policy the secretary of defense or the commander in chief disputed?
Their principal responsibility is to follow the institutional requirement to provide
candid advice and options to civilian leaders of the defense community and
National Command Authority.
Second, officers should avoid being led into politically explosive dialogue.
Congressional committees—particularly publicly broadcast ones watched by
voters—are public forums where political grandstanding often occurs. Few
actions are more impactful than for the public to hear generals and admirals
admit they do not agree with the president’s strategy or policy. With that in
mind, senior military officials must exercise tact, discretion, and agility when
testifying before Congress.
Senior military officers must understand the executive and legislative
branches are co-equal branches of the government and, regardless of either’s
political ideology, both serve important roles in the employment of the
nation’s armed forces. Testifying without whitewashing or misrepresenting
the facts should be the goal of all military officers. Congressional leaders have
an important right to hear unvarnished analysis about military capabilities
and operations. As Nielsen and Snider state, “honest and open testimony to
Congress is obedience to a constitutional principle and an officer’s allegiance
is not just to the state, but to the democratic nature of the state.”15

14. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 1 to December 31, 1958
(Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register: 1958), 122.
15. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State
in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 187.
TOC

In Focus: Civil-Military Relations

Paterson

11

Avoid Publicly Criticizing Defense Policy and Policymakers
Active-duty officers should not publicly criticize civilian defense officials
nor defense policy. To do so is a form of insubordination and disrespect
that may undermine the authority of the civilian leader and the confidence
other servicemembers have in him or her. Once a senior military officer has
provided complete advice to civilian leaders, the military officer must trust
the civilian policymaker to make the best decision possible. Furthermore,
it is against Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
for officers to use contemptuous words against the president, the vice
president, the secretary of defense, or the civilian service secretaries, and they
may be subject to court-martial for speaking in a derogatory manner about
civilian leaders. The rule is designed to maintain discipline within the military
services and ensure subordination to civilian authorities.
Remaining respectful to civilian counterparts is easier to do in theory than
in practice. Tensions between military and civilian officials are normal as they
wrestle with difficult decisions regarding force employment, budget, acquisitions,
and operations. Disputes over military courses of action are common, and
civilian officials often opt for strategies that run contrary to the military
leadership’s recommendations.
Senior military officers have been fired from their posts or forced to
retire for making disparaging remarks about civilian leaders. In June 1993,
Air Force Major General Harold Campbell was forced to retire after calling
President Clinton a “dope smoking, draft dodging” Commander in Chief.16
Admiral William Fallon, commander of US Central Command from 2007–08,
was forced to retire early when he spoke critically and publicly against the Bush
administration’s policy toward Iran. General Stanley McChrystal was forced to
resign after his personnel staff made derogatory comments about civilian leaders
in the Obama administration.17
Even If Retired, Avoid Criticizing Civilian Defense Officials
The sixth principle is the most debated. Should military officers remain
apolitical once they retire from active-duty service? Retired senior military officers
continue to wield political influence and are normally held in high esteem by the
public. Hence, conventional thinking is retired officers should avoid criticizing
defense policy or civilian defense officials just as they did while on active duty.
16. Eric Schmitt, “General to Be Disciplined for Disparaging President: The Rolling Stone Profile of Stanley
McChrystal That Changed History,” New York Times, June 16, 1993.
17. Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General: The Profile That Brought Down McChrystal,” Rolling Stone
(website), July 13, 2010, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-runaway-general-the-profile
-that-brought-down-mcchrystal-192609/.
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Following retirement, however, they are technically civilians, and unlike their
active-duty counterparts, no Department of Defense regulations prohibit them
from openly criticizing civilian defense officials. Certain categories of retired
military personnel are still accountable under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice though prosecutions are rarely pursued. Following the January 6,
2021, attack on the Capitol, in which many retired and active-duty military
servicemembers participated, this policy is in the spotlight again.
During the 2016 presidential election, retired Marine Corps General John
Allen campaigned for Hillary Clinton, and retired Army Lieutenant General
Michael Flynn spoke at the Republican National Convention in support of
Trump. The political advocacy of these and other retired officers prompted
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey to write
an editorial in the Washington Post reminding retired military officers “they
have an obligation to uphold our apolitical traditions.”18
Furthermore, retired former senior military officers frequently become
defense-policy guest experts on news shows. Their observations as “military
analysts” carry weight even though they do not officially represent the
Department of Defense. Retired officers can criticize current defense policy,
or they can become paid advocates for the same defense policy to bolster
public support for an administration’s defense strategy.19
Trump’s rhetoric during the 2016 presidential campaign drew criticism from
several retired officers before the November 2016 election. In March 2016, about
122 senior foreign affairs officials—eventually labeled “never Trumpers”—signed a
letter stating in unequivocal terms that Trump was unfit to hold the office of the
president. In August 2016, an additional 50 officials signed another public letter
declaring him unfit.20
One of the first retired flag officers to criticize Trump was Admiral William H.
McRaven, former commander of Special Operations Command. In February
2017, a little more than a month after Trump’s inauguration, McRaven said,
“the President’s attack on the media is the greatest threat to our democracy
18. Martin Dempsey, “Letters to the Editor: Military Leaders Do Not Belong at Political Conventions,”
Washington Post (website), July 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/military-leaders-do-not
-belong-at-political-conventions/2016/07/30/0e06fc16-568b-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_story.html.
19. David Barstow, “Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand,” New York Times (website),
April 20, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html; and James Golby et al., “Brass
Politics: How Retired Military Officers Are Shaping Elections,” Foreign Affairs (website), November 5, 2012,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-11-05/brass-politics.
20. War on the Rocks Staff, “Open Letter on Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders,”
War on the Rocks (website), March 2, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/open-letter-on-donald-trump
-from-gop-national-security-leaders/; and David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, “50 G.O.P. Officials Warn
Donald Trump Would Put Nation’s Security ‘at Risk,’ ” New York Times (website), August 6, 2016, https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/us/politics/national-security-gop-donald-trump.html.
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in my lifetime.”21 In August 2018, McRaven wrote a scathing Washington
Post editorial criticizing Trump for what he considered unethical and truculent
policies, stating, “Through your actions, you have embarrassed us in the eyes of
our children, humiliated us on the world stage and, worst of all, divided us as
a nation.”22 While he was referring to the revocation of the security clearance
of former Director of National Intelligence John Brennan, he was also upset
about some Trump policies—the Muslim travel ban, the revocation of security
clearances of former officials who had criticized the president, his referral to the
press as the “enemy of the state,” his unexplainable support for Vladmir Putin,
and his backing of White supremacists in Charlottesville, Virginia.
McRaven—at least, initially—was one of the few retired officers to castigate
the president publicly. For example, following his resignation as secretary of
defense on December 20, 2018, retired General James Mattis was reticent to
speak out against the president.23 He preferred to remain silent and honor the
time-bound tradition of retired military officers not criticizing the president
or secretary of defense, claiming, “You need to give the people [in the Trump
administration] as much opportunity as possible to defend the country . . . without
me adding my criticism to the cacophony that is right now so poisonous.”24
Mattis defended his reluctance to abandon his political neutrality. “You don’t
endanger the country by attacking the elected commander in chief,” he said.
“I may not like a commander in chief one fricking bit, but our [democratic

21. Jake Tapper and Devan Cole, “Architect of bin Laden Raid: Trump ‘Threatens the Constitution’ When He
Attacks the Media,” CNN (website), November 19, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/18/politics/donald
-trump-william-mcraven/index.html; and Kristine Phillips, “ ‘Greatest Threat to Democracy’: Commander of
bin Laden Raid Slams Trump’s Anti-media Sentiment,” Washington Post (website), February 24, 2017, https://
www.washingtonpost.com /news / checkpoint /wp / 2017 /02 /23 /greatest-threat-to-democracy-commander-of
-bin-laden-raid-slams-trumps-anti-media-sentiment/.
22. William H. McRaven, “Opinion: Revoke My Security Clearance, Too, Mr. President,” Washington
Post (website), August 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/revoke-my-security-clearance
-too-mr-president/2018/08/16/8b149b02-a178-11e8-93e3-24d1703d2a7a_story.html; see also William
H. McRaven, “Opinion: William McRaven: If Good Men Like Joe Maguire Can’t Speak the Truth, We
Should Be Deeply Afraid,” Washington Post (website), February 21, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost
.com /opinions /william-mcraven-if-good-men-like-joe-maguire-cant-speak-the-truth-we-should-be-deeplyafraid/2020/02/21/2068874c-5503-11ea-b119-4faabac6674f_story.html; and John Nagl, “Opinion: Retired
Generals Warned Us about Rumsfeld. Now They’re Warning Us about Trump,” January 9, 2019, Washington
Post (website), https://www.washingtonpost.com /opinions / retired-generals-warned-us-about-rumsfeld-now
-theyre-warning-us-about-trump/2019/01/09/98dbae94-1430-11e9-803c-4ef28312c8b9_story.html.
23. Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Orders Withdrawal of US Troops from Northern Syria,”
New York Times (website), October 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/mark-esper
-syria-kurds-turkey.html; and Helene Cooper, “Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of
Trump’s Worldview,” New York Times (website), December 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20
/us/politics/jim-mattis-defense-secretary-trump.html.
24. Quint Forgey, “Mattis Says He Owes Trump Silence but Won’t Keep Quiet Forever,” Politico (website),
August 29, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/29/mattis-trump-criticism-1477663; and Katie
Shepherd, ‟ ‛I Earned My Spurs on the Battlefield’: Mattis Jabbed Trump. Critics Say He Hasn’t Gone Far
Enough,” Washington Post (website), October 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/18
/i-earned-my-spurs-battlefield-mattis-jabbed-trump-critics-say-he-hasnt-gone-far-enough/.
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election] system puts the commander in chief there.”25 He resigned a day
after the president announced an abrupt troop withdrawal from Syria, a
decision contrary to the advice of top military advisers who were not consulted
by Trump nor informed of the decision before the public announcement.
Trump later walked back the decision when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Milley persuaded him to leave a smaller force of US Special Forces in
the area. In his resignation letter, Mattis wrote the president has, “the right to
have a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on
these and other subjects, I believe it is right for me to step down from
my position.”26
Execute Legal Orders
As Huntington wrote, “When the military man receives a legal order from
an authorized superior, he does not hesitate, he does not substitute his own
views; he obeys instantly.”27 Military officers must comply with orders from
civilians even if they have reservations about the logic of the command and
whether it is militarily prudent. Obedience is one of the principal pillars of
military norms; one can disagree but not disobey.
Military officers have several unprofessional tactics, although contrary to
military obedience, they can use to ignore or block a superior’s orders. Richard
Kohn lists a few them: taking an inordinate amount of time to comply
with the command, leaking information to the press in the hopes public
exposure will force the withdrawal of the order, getting congressional leaders
involved, or purposely failing to complete the task in an effective manner.28
Refuse to Execute Illegal Orders
The final fundamental principle considers the options military officers have
when given illegal orders. To many military officers, refusing to follow illegal
orders may sound like a simple, black-and-white decision: military personnel
must not abide by orders that are illegal. However, what constitutes “illegal” is
often ambiguous and confusing. Subordinates who receive dubious orders may
25. Dan Lamothe and Greg Jaffe, “Emerging from His Silence, Mattis Faces Criticism for Trying to Take the
‘Middle Road’ on Trump,” Washington Post (website), August 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national
-security/after-months-of-silence-mattis-faces-criticism-for-trying-to-take-the-middle-road-on-trump/2019
/08/29/7f4c0e10-ca8d-11e9-be05-f76ac4ec618c_story.html.
26. Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, ”Trump Orders Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Northern Syria,”
Washington Post, October 16, 2019; and Helene Cooper, “Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of
Trump’s Worldview,” New York Times, December 20, 2018.
27. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 73.
28. Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Naval
War College Review 55, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 15–16, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
/vol55/iss3/2/.
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find it challenging to determine if the order is truly contrary to an established
legal precedent. The legality of an order may be much more nuanced than a
clear delineation between legal and illegal orders that are easily distinguishable
to the junior party.
Certainly, there are some orders that should not be obeyed: intentionally
killing civilians, mistreating prisoners, torture, unnecessarily destroying civilian
property, using human shields, rape, and hostage taking, for example. These
incidents constitute war crimes and are illegal in accordance with US law, the
Geneva Conventions, and customary international law. Clear violations of the
principles of armed conflict (humanity, moderation, discrimination, and military
necessity) should also be rejected, although there is much more subjectivity in
these definitions. Some non-derogable human rights are never permitted to be
suspended or denied under any circumstances.29
The strict codes of military obedience and discipline implicitly discourage
juniors from questioning orders. According to Article 92 of the Uniform Code
of Uniform Justice, it is a crime to disobey a lawful order, and doing so during
wartime is punishable by death. Rosa Brooks, former Department of Defense
senior counsel, asserts the military’s culture of obedience and subordination to
civilian leadership inhibits the military´s ability to reject illegal orders.30 Brooks
observes, “Officers rarely respond with a flat-out ‘no’ when senior civilian
officials start playing fast and loose with the law.”31 Soldiers are more likely to
defer to the orders of superiors rather than question their legality, especially
during times of conflict when hesitation could mean operational failure or risk
to one’s unit.
To understand the propensity of military personnel to defer to senior
officials, consider the following example from recent US military history. When
the Bush administration chose to use torture against detainees in Iraq and
elsewhere in 2003—a decision that clearly violated international and US law—
military officers raised objections that such actions were illegal and unethical. Yet,
no military servicemembers refused the orders, resigned in protest, or raised the

29. Patrick Paterson, The Blurred Battlefield: The Perplexing Conflation of Humanitarian and Criminal Law in
Contemporary Conflicts (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University, March 2021), 15–16, 27; and see also
Non-Derogable Rights and Freedoms under Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and articles 27(1) and 27(2) of
the American Convention on Human Rights.
30. Rosa Brooks, “The Military Wouldn’t Save Us from President Trump’s Illegal Orders,” Washington Post,
March 4, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-military-wouldnt-save-us-from-president
-trumps-illegal-orders/2016/03/04/9ef8fd44-e0ea-11e5-846c-10191d1fc4ec_story.htm.
31. Rosa Brooks, “If Trump Orders War Crimes, the Military Will Face an Impossible Task,” Washington
Post (website), January 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/08/if-trump-orders-war
-crimes-military-will-face-an-impossible-choice/.
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issue with congressional leaders. Despite serious reservations about illegal orders,
they followed the orders of their civilian superiors.32
If a civilian superior insists a military officer comply with an illegal order,
what options are available? The servicemember has three choices. First,
comply with the illegal order. Second, agree to follow the order but move
slowly, hoping someone intervenes to correct the situation or the incident
gets resolved before action is required. Third, refuse to follow the order and
keep a clear conscience.
The first option, compliance—even if one suspects the order is illegal—
is the default option under normal circumstances. For reasons explained
previously, military officers often do not have, nor are they expected to have, a
comprehensive understanding of the many factors that may have gone into
the decision-making process followed by civilian officials.
If an officer chooses incorrectly and complies with the illegal order, he will
have to live with his conscience and any subsequent investigation that might find
him morally or criminally complicit in an illegal action. If the officer knows the
order is illegal and decides to comply with it regardless, he could be intentionally
committing a crime. The defense, “I was only following orders,” is not a valid
justification and has been rejected in many famous military trials, including
the Nuremberg Trials, the trial of William Calley for the 1968 My Lai
Massacre, and the trial of military guards at the Abu Ghraib detention
facility in Iraq.
The second option, agreeing with the order but failing to comply with it, is
counter to the military values of obedience and discipline. “Shirking” or “slow
rolling” is also considered insubordinate because officers are expected to comply
with orders promptly without delay.
The third option is for the officer to refuse the order and explain to the
person who issued the dubious command why he will not comply with it. To
make that weighty decision, he must have knowledge about why the action is
illegal. This raises a requirement to educate military officers on ethics and
actions forbidden by law (for example, war crimes or crimes against humanity).
Recent incidents demonstrate at least some US servicemembers do not
clearly understand those issues.33 In sum, professional military officers must

32. Rosa Brooks, “Military Wouldn’t Save Us”; and Neil A. Lewis, “Military’s Opposition to Harsh
Interrogation Is Outlined,” New York Times (website), July 28, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/28
/politics/militarys-opposition-to-harsh-interrogation-is-outlined.html.
33. Paterson, Blurred Battlefield, 86–87.
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have a significant level of ethical and legal awareness to perform their jobs
effectively and honorably.
The subject of resignation comes up frequently in these instances. Some
civil-military scholars believe resigning is a form of protest that could
undermine civil authority. According to Kohn, for example, there is no place in
a professional military for resignations in protest. In nearly all cases, military
officers should always “salute and obey.” Anything other than an officer’s
unconditional compliance with orders could subvert the military obedience
critical to good order and discipline. According to Kohn, “nothing would
undermine (the civil-military balance) more than a resignation by a senior
military officer.” For this reason, “there is no tradition of military resignation in
the United States, no precedent—and for good reason,” he wrote.34
Throughout US military history, few (if any) senior military officers have
resigned to protest civilian defense policy. General Milley, during testimony to
Congress, explained the military’s perspective:
As a senior military officer, resigning is a really serious thing and it’s
a political act if I’m resigning in protest. It would be an incredible act of
political defiance for a commissioned officer to just resign because my
advice is not taken. This country doesn’t want generals figuring out what
orders we’re going to accept and do or not. [Enlisted service members]
don’t get a choice to resign and I’m not going to turn my back on them.
They can’t resign, so I’m not going to resign. If the orders are illegal, we’re
in a different place, but if the orders are legal from civilian authority, I
intend to carry them out.35

Conclusion
Neither civilians nor military officers should blindly defer to the other. Both
groups have important expertise to contribute to security solutions that often
require a whole-of-government response. The interrelational chemistry must be
sufficiently healthy to permit a constructive civil-military relations dialogue.
To ensure all senior military officers understand the liberties and limits
of apolitical armed forces, service war colleges should teach these functional
guidelines. It is necessary but insufficient to examine only the theories and
histories of US civil-military relations. Practical codes of behavior supported by
real-world examples are essential to illustrate the complex relations with civilian
decisionmakers. This article is not a siren’s call for a politically active military.
34. Richard B. Myers and Richard H. Kohn, “Salute and Disobey? The Civil-Military Balance, before Iraq
and After,” Foreign Affairs (website), September/October 2007.
35. General Mark Milley, testimony to Senate committee, September 28, 2021.
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It is the opposite. The guidelines proposed here are meant to help the next
generation of senior military officers successfully navigate Washington’s
contentious political environment.
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Interrupting Bias in Army Talent Management
Danielle Holt and Susan Davis

ABSTRACT: This article addresses the impact of diversity, equity, and
inclusion on talent management. It explains how systemic bias impairs the
US Army’s ability to harness cognitive diversity. It stresses the value of
cognitive diversity among teams and senior leadership and how cumulative
bias impacts the entire career cycle of an individual. It concludes by offering
practical suggestions to reduce bias in the assignment, promotion, and
selection processes.

Key words: diversit y, equit y, inclusion, talent management,
unconscious bias

T

he modernization of US Army talent management must include
the development of a more innovative and inclusive culture to meet
future threats. The Army ethic represents the primary advantage over
near-peer adversaries, requiring processes and transparency in senior leadership
selection to reflect the diversity of the Total Force. Future threats will blur the
lines between competition and conflict and physical and cognitive warfare.
The volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments of the future will
require the Army to harness its collective cognitive diversity to achieve situational
awareness and create narratives of purpose. All will require flatter, highly
innovative, and inclusive teams to integrate team capabilities and talents.
Unconscious bias within assignment and evaluation processes is a potential
threat and an opportunity for enhanced meritocracy. Assessments should move
toward the identification of desired knowledge, skills, and behaviors and the
evaluation of potential using relational analytics. Army talent management must
foster the selection of cognitively diverse leaders who demonstrate competencies
of confident humility and mental agility to generate organizational psychological
safety. Only by leveraging the complete scope of diversity through an inclusive
culture will the Army be able to prevail in the cognitive dimension.

The year 2020 marked a significant shift in Army personnel management as
the service embraced a series of changes (including officer assignment) using a
regulated, market-based approach and command selection through a series of
standardized, in-person assessments.1 The impetus for change included growing
concern over attracting people to and retaining them in an all-volunteer force,
1. Michael A. Grinston, James C. McConville, and Ryan D. McCarthy, The Army People Strategy
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 2019), 3–4.
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increasing reliance on innovation in the growing knowledge economy, and the
maintenance of economic and technical competitive advantages over near-peer
adversaries. In acknowledging people as the “greatest strength and most important
weapon system,” the Army has sought transformational change to attract and
retain the talent best suited to meet the nation’s future threats.
The Army has embraced talent management transformation amid the
backdrop of a global pandemic that has altered the way Americans work, and the
Army has done so amid civil unrest that has resulted in part from systemic racism.
As the Army embarks on personnel management modernization, the service
risks unintentionally amplifying systems of inequality that may impede diversity,
equity, and inclusion (DEI) in a values-based organization. Addressing DEI in
the selection of senior leaders is critical in both interpreting and influencing the
cognitive dimension of the information environment.2 The cognitive dimension
encompasses how senior leaders perceive, evaluate, and ultimately act on
information. Confronting prospective systemic threats that arise from potential
biases within talent management offers opportunities to create a more inclusive
Army culture.3
Future talent management processes will use big data and artificial intelligence
to optimize promotion, assignment, and leader selection at the individual
rather than cohort level. In the practice of people analytics, data can be used
to predict markers of success and drive human resources practices to become
more evidence-based.4 Automated systems and algorithms that leverage data
are also prone to the biases of the humans who developed them; thus, caution is
advised at every step of process development.
The Case for DEI in the Army
Whereas other services place a premium on technology and warfighting
platforms, people represent the essential component of future Army multidomain operations. Rather than rigidly managing personnel with predetermined
career timelines, new Army talent management practices capitalize on individual
knowledge, skills, and behaviors (KSBs) and preferences using a more flexible career
model to accommodate changing household structures and demographics.5 The
workforce has shifted to include more women, dual-career households, single parents,
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs
of Staff, updated November 20, 2014), 20, 34.
3. E. Casey Wardynski, Army People Strategy: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Annex (Washington, DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 1, 2020).
4. Iris Bohnet, What Works: Gender Equality by Design (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2016), 15.
5. Grinston, Army People Strategy, 1.
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and racial and ethnic diversity.6 A 2019 demographic profile showed 53 percent of
active-duty Army servicemembers were married, 5 percent were in dual-military
marriages, 41 percent had children, and 5 percent were single parents, reflecting
a variety of household structures differing from the traditional nuclear family.7
Talent management processes should support, to the greatest extent possible, a
wide range of changing family concerns, such as spousal employment, health care,
childcare, and education.8
The composition of military servicemembers reflects the shifting
demographics of the US population. As discussed in the 2020 New York Times
article “African-Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military, but Almost
Invisible at the Top,” minority groups remain underrepresented in the officer
ranks compared to the enlisted corps.9 Underrepresentation is attributed to
decreased matriculation at the service academies, preferences for noncombat
arms specialties, a lack of mentors, and episodes of racism and extremism within
the military. Data indicate 71 percent of officers and 52 percent of enlisted
personnel reported as White, 11 percent and 23 percent reported as Black,
8 percent and 18 percent reported as Hispanic, and 7 percent and 5 percent
reported as Asian in the active-duty Army.10 At the most senior levels, disparities
increase, with general officers reported as 84 percent White, 9 percent Black,
3 percent Hispanic, and 2 percent Asian.11 Considering gender, women make up
14 percent of enlisted personnel, 19 percent of officers, and 11 percent of Army
general officers.12
A 2012 RAND study found Black and Hispanic officers were promoted at
lower rates than White officers, particularly at the O-4 to O-5 level, suggesting
the field-grade officer step represents a key promotion milestone.13 The same
RAND study found female officers are less likely to be promoted at the O-2
through O-4 ranks, which coincides with childbearing years.14 With future
US demographic trends predicting a minority-White population in 2045,
6. Deborah L. Plummer and C. Greer Jordan, “Going Plaid: Integrating Diversity into Business Strategy,
Talent Management, and Work Design,” in Handbook of Diversity Management: Inclusive Strategies for Driving
Organizational Excellence, 2nd ed., ed. Deborah L. Plummer (Boston: Half Dozen Publications, 2018), 317.
7. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Community and Family Policy, 2019 Demographics
Profile of the Military Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020).
8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment Characteristics of Families—2020,” news release no. USDL-210695, April 21, 2021, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf.
9. Helene Cooper, “African-Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military, but Almost Invisible at the Top,”
New York Times (website), May 25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/us/politics/military-minorities
-leadership.html.
10. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Strength Analysis and Forecasting Division, Army Demographics:
FY20 Army Profile (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2020), 2.
11. Wardynski, Annex, 2.
12. CFR.org Editors, “Demographics of the US Military,” Council on Foreign Relations (website),
July 13, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/demographics-us-military.
13. Beth J. Asch, Trey Miller, and Alessandro Malchiodi, A New Look at Gender and Minority Differences
in Officer Career Progression in the Military (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), x.
14. Asch, Miller, and Malchiodi, New Look at Gender.
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individuals whose backgrounds include two or more races are expected to grow by
226 percent.15 Consequently, the non-White, multiracial population will represent
the “primary demographic engine of the nation’s future growth.”16
A case even more compelling than simple representation or changing
demographics is the Army’s requirement to create shared understanding and
mutual trust to enable mission command.17 As a values-based organization, the
Army necessitates diverse, equitable, and inclusive work environments. The
Army ethic reflects the core values and beliefs that guide the “conduct of Army
professionals bound together in common moral purpose.”18 The Army ethic is
codified legally in the US Constitution; the Uniform Code of Military Justice;
Titles 5, 10, and 32 of US Code; and the Oath of Commissioned Officers
and morally in the Declaration of Independence, creeds, mottoes, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.19
To maintain the trust of the American people and demonstrate the
accountability of the nation’s institutions, the selection of senior Army leaders
requires transparency. Confidence in the military as an institution—typically
rated as one of the most trustworthy organizations—decreased from 70 percent
in 2018 to 56 percent in 2021, with the greatest decline in individuals under the
age of 30.20 Millennials (people aged 25 to 40 in 2021) and Generation Z
(people aged 6 to 24 in 2021) increasingly value DEI. Forty-seven percent
of millennials, the largest and most diverse generation in the US labor force,
considered DEI an important factor in choosing a job, whereas only 33 to
37 percent of people over the age of 40 did so.21 Generation Z, representing
incoming military recruits, valued increasing racial and ethnic diversity as a
positive social trend.22
Diversity can refer to both demographics and thought. Diversity of thought,
termed “cognitive diversity,” may arise from variations in background, experience,
15. Jennifer Brown, Inclusion, Diversity, the New Workplace & the Will to Change (Hartford, CT: Publish Your
Purpose Press, 2016), 85–87.
16. William H. Frey, “The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census Projects. Youth Minorities
Are the Engine of Future Growth,” Avenue (blog), March 14, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the
-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects.
17. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Mission Command, Command and Control of Army
Forces, Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, July 2019), 1-3–1-6.
18. Thomas P. Galvin et al., Strategic Leadership Primer for Senior Leaders, 4th ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2019), 90–91.
19. HQDA, Army Leadership and the Profession, Army Doctrine Publication 6-22 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
July 2019), 1-6–1-7.
20. Ronald Reagan Institute, Reagan National Defense Survey (Simi Valley, CA: Ronald Reagan Presidential
Foundation and Institute, November 2021).
21. “Millennials at Work: Perspectives on Diversity and Inclusion,” Weber Shandwick (website),
December 6, 2016, https://www.webershandwick.com/news/millennials-at-work-perspectives-on-diversity
-inclusion.
22. Kim Parker, Nikki Graf, and Ruth Igielnik, Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials on Key Social and
Political Issues (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, January 17, 2019).
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and perspective. One framework for diversity consists of primary dimensions,
such as age, sexual orientation, physical abilities, race, gender, spiritual beliefs,
and class, and secondary dimensions, such as work experience, geographic
location, education, first language, cognitive style, and political beliefs.23 Everyone
possesses a unique combination of dominant and nondominant primary and
secondary dimensions of diversity. Varied nondominant attributes across teams
generate shared understanding of lived experiences, which builds trust in an
inclusive environment. Cognitive diversity enables different approaches for
gaining understanding of, analyzing, and solving problems. Cognitive diversity
can be defined as “differences in information, knowledge, representations,
mental models, and heuristics.”24
Cognitive diversity empowers mental agility within the current operational
environment. Teams with cognitive diversity collectively possess a variety of
analytical tools for enhancing problem solving in response to current and future
threats in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments.25 Racial
injustice, income inequality, and political polarization threaten trust in the
ability of democratic institutions to resolve conflict and equitably provide
public services.26 Technology allows for the rapid dissemination of information,
increasing individual empowerment either for good or for bad, while
social media amplifies collective group identities and identity politics.
According to General Martin Dempsey, US Army retired, the digital echo
resembles an echo chamber consisting of information that reinforces established
beliefs while dismissing conflicting data. The digital echo can distort information
and situational awareness, making the interpretation of information by leaders
critical to creating narratives of purpose and meaning.27
The future operational battlespace will likely include multiple dimensions.
Cyberwarfare increasingly moves armed conflict from the physical space to the
cognitive. In addition, hybrid warfare blurs conventional and special operations
while technological advancements create weapon systems with instantaneous
effects, resulting in convergence across domains.28 Convergence—or the
creation of simultaneous effects—demands cognitively diverse and inclusive

23. Marilyn Loden, “Transforming Organization Cultures: Notes from the Field,” in Plummer, Handbook
of Diversity Management, 252.
24. Scott E. Page, The Diversity Bonus: How Great Teams Pay Off in the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2017), 14–15.
25. Page, Diversity Bonus, 172–73.
26. Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends: The Future Starts Today, 6th ed. (London: Ministry of
Defence, October 2018).
27. Martin Dempsey and Ori Brafman, Radical Inclusion: What the Post-9/11 World Should Have Taught Us
about Leadership (Arlington, VA: Missionday, 2018).
28. JCS, Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World
(Washington, DC: JCS, July 14, 2016), 36.
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teams able to integrate actions rapidly across multiple domains.29 Success will
be determined by both victory in the physical domain and the timely ability to
craft narratives of purpose and to identify critical information deftly across the
spectrum of competition to conflict. The cognitive dimension of the information
environment “encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and
respond to or act on information” that is largely influenced by elements of the
primary and secondary dimensions of diversity. In creating desired effects to gain
dominance, the cognitive dimension “constitutes the most important component
of the information environment.”30 Within the cognitive dimension, the Army
ethic represents the decisive advantage in multi-domain operations and separates
the United States from near-peer adversaries. Thus, to ensure mission success,
the Army must address potential barriers to achieving cognitive diversity by
considering processes that select, assign, and offer developmental opportunities.
Unconscious Bias Constrains Cognitive Diversity
Heuristics and unconscious bias complicate the selection of cognitively
diverse teams. Heuristics represent mental shortcuts that enable decision making.
The two systems of decision making are “fast,” snap judgements and “slow,”
voluntary deliberation, referred to as System-1 thinking and System-2 thinking,
respectively.31 Driven by emotional and situational cues, System-1 (fast) thinking
involves impressions or intuitive thoughts. System-2 (slow) thinking entails
focused concentration to derive solutions methodically. As a result of System-1
thinking, everyone has unconscious biases that are reinforced to varying degrees by
their cultures, experiences, and environments. Time-restricted or time-pressured
conditions such as combat increase one’s reliance on System-1 thinking to make
decisions intuitively with incomplete information.
In a talent management context, System-1 thinking contributes to four
heuristics that impair critical thinking: priming, affinity bias, confirmation bias,
and the representativeness heuristic.32

29. Tom Greenwood and Pat Savage, “In Search of a 21st-Century Joint Warfighting Concept,” War on the Rocks,
September 12, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/in-search-of-a-21st-century-joint-warfighting
-concept/.
30. JCS, Information Operations, I-3.
31. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 20–22.
32. Mark Kaplan and Mason Donovan, The Inclusion Dividend: Why Investing in Diversity & Inclusion Pays
Off (Brookline, MA: Bibiomotion, Inc., 2013), 112–13.
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•

Priming is the triggering of thoughts or emotions that may
subconsciously affect candidate assessment or selection (for example,
endorsement prior to assessment).

•

Affinity bias causes people to select others with similar attributes (for
example, selecting someone because he or she matriculated at the
same university).

•

Confirmation bias serves to reinforce previously held beliefs about the
attributes of successful applicants (for example, selecting a candidate
because other members from his or her branch have been successful).

•

The representativeness heuristic estimates the likelihood of a
candidate’s success based on stereotypes such as physical fitness
alone.33 The combination of these heuristics that unintentionally and
often negatively influence decisions over time. Common stereotypes
reflect assumptions surrounding both observable attributes and
invisible attributes, such as race, gender, sexual orientation, age,
physical ability, and job role.

27

The accumulation of biases toward nondominant attributes at every decision
point over the course of a career exponentially impacts senior-leader selection
in a closed talent management system.34 These often-unintentional slights
are insidious and difficult to control without systematic processes in place.
As an example, the removal of photos from the board process may help reduce
unconscious bias toward gender, race, or body type on the day of the board.
Simply removing photos, however, does not fully eliminate the unconscious bias
that may have impacted assignment opportunity, evaluations, and schooling,
highlighting the importance of talent management system design throughout the
career life cycle.
Organizational cultural norms hamper the building of cognitively diverse
teams. Individuals in nondominant or stigmatized groups often downplay their
group identities by altering their appearance or behavior, changing their manner
or the content of their speech, or avoiding talking about their personal lives.35
These individuals engage in this behavior to assimilate into or maximize the
comfort of the dominant group. This phenomenon is referred to as “covering” or
“code-switching.”36 Whereas authentic self-expression within accepted military
33. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Jessica D. Blankshain, and David A. Cooper, Decision-Making in American Foreign
Policy: Translating Theory into Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 103–8.
34. Gvosdev, Blankshain, and Cooper, American Foreign Policy, 18–22, 274.
35. Brown, Inclusion, 91–93.
36. Courtney L. McCluney et al., “The Costs of Code-Switching,” Harvard Business Review (website),
November 15, 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/11/the-costs-of-codeswitching.
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norms and culture allows for the full employment of individual talents, covering
wastes energy better spent innovating, collaborating, and problem solving.
Code-switching decreases performance, weakens commitment to one’s
organization, and contributes to burnout.37 The challenge lies in continually
reassessing military norms that unnecessarily result in code-switching or
worsening conditions for nondominant groups. The change in acceptable
hairstyles due to disproportionate alopecia or hair loss in Black women due to
tight hairstyles, such as a bun, is an example of a reassessment.38
Examples of how cultural norms and stereotypes may continue to drive
individuals in nondominant groups to cover and assimilate into the dominant
group abound. Although lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
servicemembers can now serve openly after the ban on transgender individuals
was rescinded in 2021, many may still feel the need to cover in the context of
a predominantly cisgender, male, heterosexual population.39 Women, who can
now serve in any Army branch, still often face a double bind when displaying
leadership traits traditionally stereotyped as masculine, like ambition and
dominance and risk, and expose themselves to a likeability penalty for not
displaying communal traits, such as compassion and helpfulness.40 Women may
also face gender hierarchy threat because research shows female officers are more
likely to receive lower performance ratings from superiors close to them in rank
than their male peers.41 Although tremendously positive, policy changes allowing
qualified soldiers (regardless of gender, race, or sexual identity or preference) to
serve in all aspects of the Army only represent the first step in fully assimilating
and harnessing the cognitive diversity of all servicemembers.
Although the Army supports DEI principles, it is also vulnerable to the
discrimination and fairness paradigm in which an organization focuses on
demographic representation within a code of conformity. The discrimination
and fairness paradigm inadvertently overlooks the competitive advantage of
cognitive diversity, hinders the speaking of truth to power, and undermines
organizational learning.42 The Army expression “I only see green” invalidates
visible differences and disregards the unconscious bias that has systematically
37. Bernardo M. Ferdman and Laura Morgan Roberts, “Creating Inclusion for Oneself: Knowing,
Accepting, and Expressing One’s Whole Self at Work,” in Plummer, Handbook of Diversity Management, 91.
38. Jessica Korona-Bailey et al., “Free the Bun: Prevalence of Alopecia among Active Duty Service Women,
Fiscal Years 2010–2019,” Military Medicine (website), July 9, 2021, https://academic.oup.com/milmed/advance
-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/milmed/usab274/.
39. “Enabling All Qualified Americans to Serve Their Country in Uniform,” Exec. Order 14004,
January 25, 2021).
40. Alice Hendrickson Eagly and Linda L. Carli, Through the Labyrinth: The Truth about How Women
Become Leaders (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2007), 86.
41. Bohnet, What Works, 29.
42. David A. Thomas and Robin J. Ely, “Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing
Diversity,” in HBR’s 10 Must Reads: On Diversity, ed. Harvard Business Review (Boston: Harvard Business
School Publishing Corporation, 2019), 6–7.
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led to underrepresentation. According to Sergeant Major of the Army Michael
Grinston, “I just see green” ignores differential treatment of soldiers when they
are not in uniform.43 More importantly, the paradigm silences the conversation
necessary for validating the experiences of group identity and incorporating
this knowledge into inclusive organizational practices. The art of command
lies in simultaneously balancing the tensions resulting from the enforcement
of uniform codes of conduct and fostering mutual respect to capitalize on the
diversity of thought.
DEI Structural Models
Improving DEI requires an understanding of insider-outsider group dynamics
in which the insider (or dominant) group has the most power and less awareness
of challenges faced by nondominant groups and the outsider group has an acute
awareness of insider group norms but less influence for changing or challenging
norms without fear of repercussions.44 The Army addresses diversity with
established policies typically emphasized through legal precedents and
federal mandates.45 Programs such as Military Equal Opportunity emphasize
education, training, and reporting at the individual level.46 Successful DEI
programs must prioritize the inclusion of all individuals, including insider
groups, as part of the solution and limit the extent to which other groups feel
like outsiders by creating psychological safety. Mandatory diversity training
has been shown to raise animosity toward outsider groups, particularly when the
training is perceived as shaming and blaming White males.47
Strategic DEI models include policy reviews and diversity councils. The
Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion provides policy oversight for the
Department of Defense.48 The Defense Culture Institute, administered by
the Office of People Analytics, produces the Defense Organizational Climate
Survey, which is routinely administered to help commanders assess unit
climate.49 In 2020, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper removed photos from
43. Dontavian Harrison, “Army Senior Leader Town Hall,” US Army (website), July 22, 2020, https://www
.army.mil/article/237512/army_senior_leader_town_hall.
44. Kaplan and Donovan, Inclusion Dividend, 131–38.
45. Department of Defense (DoD) Board on Diversity and Inclusion, Department of Defense Board on
Diversity and Inclusion Report: Recommendations to Improve Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the
US Military (Washington, DC: DoD, 2020).
46. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DoD Military Equal Opportunity
Program, DoD Instruction 1350.02 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 4, 2020).
47. Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev, “Why Diversity Programs Fail,” in Harvard Business Review,
On Diversity, 32.
48. “About ODEI,” Office for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (website), n.d., https://diversity.defense.gov
/About-ODEI/.
49. “DEOCS: Frequently Asked Questions,” Defense Culture Institute (website), updated
December 28, 2020, https://www.defenseculture.mil/Portals/90/Documents/A2S/OPA-DEOCS-Survey
_Admins_FAQs-20201230.pdf?ver=duUEjU3taRCECammowSlzA%3D%3D.
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consideration by selection boards.50 Esper also established the Defense Advisory
Committee on Diversity and Inclusion in the Armed Services to mirror the
Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, established in 1951.51
Highlights from the Defense Advisory Committee on Diversity and
Inclusion in the Armed Services report include robust recommendations to
monitor demographic trends in performance evaluations, ensure diverse pools
for nominative positions, standardize human resources data for analysis, and
release demographic data from promotion board results.52 Implementation
of these practices would be a step in the right direction. The Army is leaning
forward on these issues through Project Inclusion, the service’s strategic
DEI plan introduced in 2020.53 In addition to removing Department of the
Army photos, the service plans to redact race, ethnicity, and gender data from
Officer and Enlisted Record Briefs; conduct listening sessions; and review military
justice cases for racial disparities.54
Systematic organizational approaches are most notably missing from current
DEI initiatives targeting either the interpersonal or strategic level. Grinston’s
“This Is My Squad” initiative builds cohesive teams at the tactical level.55
The DEI annex of the Army People Strategy outlines the strategic goals of
leader commitment, talent management, organizational structure, training
and education, and equitable and inclusive environments. To inform the way
ahead and operationalize these strategic goals because work is increasingly
performed by teams, the Army should consider organization-level dynamics
and relational analytics.

•

Organizational dynamics addresses how information is shared, how
teams are constructed, how influence is applied through networks,
and how cross-functional groups interact.

•

Relational analytics describes how human social networks
contribute to forming ideas, changing behavior, completing tasks,
creating silos, and forming critical human links and nodes to
accomplish organizational missions.56 Both approaches will assist

50. Mark T. Esper, memorandum, “Immediate Actions to Address Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal
Opportunity in the Military Services,” July 14, 2020.
51. “Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services,” Defense Advisory Committee on Women in
the Services (website), n.d., https://dacowits.defense.gov/.
52. DoD Board on Diversity and Inclusion, Diversity and Inclusion Report.
53. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)/Deputy Chief of Staff G-1, “US Army
Project Inclusion,” US Army (website), June 29, 2020, https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2020/06/29/.
54. US Army Public Affairs, “Army Unveils New Initiative to Promote Diversity, Inclusion across the Force,”
US Army (website), June 25, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/236766/?st.
55. Christopher Dunlap et al., “Ownership: This Is My Squad,” NCO Journal (website), September 2, 2020,
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2020/September/This-is-My-Squad/.
56. Paul Leonardi and Noshir Contractor, “Better People Analytics,” in HBR’s 10 Must Reads: On Reinventing
HR, ed. Harvard Business Review (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2019), 62–70.
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the Army with identifying organizational actions to reach the
established strategic goals.
Traditional workplace inequities stem from a dominance model in which
certain characteristics such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and gender
identity are preferred.57 Dominance models can also emerge in functional areas,
where some professional backgrounds are routinely favored, stifling contributions
from people in less-favored functional areas. A strong cultural preference exists
for leaders from combat arms branches; this preference likely stems from the
view combat arms officers are best prepared to lead large-scale combat operations.
Present-day conditions, however, suggest the growing complexity of future
operations along the spectrum of competition to conflict. The COVID-19
pandemic, the global supply-chain crisis, worsening climate change, and disruptive
technology are a few challenges the Army may face in the operational environment
of the future.
Multi-domain operations will require leaders with diverse backgrounds and
knowledge both to lead and to collaborate effectively in a cohesive environment.
Currently, almost 70 percent of general officers come from occupations related
to tactical operations, creating the potential for engaging in groupthink about
complex problems.58 Operations across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace
require dominance in the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.
Multi-domain operations necessitate cognitive diversity and require reassessment
of the composition of the desired skill sets, experience, perspectives, and
backgrounds of strategic leaders.
Leader attributes should be identified through KSBs and deliberately sought
out in the talent management processes. Considering power models to help
define these attributes is beneficial. Two models of power are the dominance
or “power-over” model and the functionalist or “power-with” model.59 According
to Melanie Joy, power-over behaviors prioritize the leader’s self-importance at
the expense of the team, resulting in followers experiencing shame. Toxic and
counterproductive leadership styles directly “prevent diversity numbers from
improving.”60 Power-with dynamics include earning trust through actions that
benefit the group, emphasize humility, and recognize the worth of all group
members. Leaders must rethink and interrupt System-1 (fast) thinking while
57. Deborah L. Plummer, “Overview of the Field of Diversity Management,” in Plummer, Handbook of
Diversity Management, 8–9.
58. Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Military Occupations and Implications for Racial/Ethnic and
Gender Diversity, Issue Paper no. 23 (Arlington, VA: Military Leadership Diversity Commission, March
2010), 2.
59. Melanie Joy, Powerarchy: Understanding the Psychology of Oppression for Social Transformation (Oakland,
CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2019), 27–30.
60. Brown, Inclusion, 113.
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reinforcing power-with behaviors that are characterized by confident humility.61
Individuals with the most power need to do the most rethinking about design
that inadvertently but systematically favors one group over another in a
values-based organization. This rethinking would place the responsibility
on Army strategic leaders to consider whether talent management processes
support the assignment and selection of cognitively diverse leaders throughout
the career life cycle.
Assignment Distribution Design
The Army must target the cumulative effect of unconscious bias that leads to
visible disparities between the Army’s senior leaders and the Total Force. The new
Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP) modernizes talent management using
an information-driven, market-based approach that considers soldier and unit
preferences.62 Units are expected to advertise and provide job descriptions and
desired KSBs, and officers are expected to complete an accurate résumé and
interview in a manner comparable to practices in the civilian job market.
As designed, the ATAP may succumb to the same forces that contribute to
underrepresentation among nondominant groups (for example, minorities
and women in civilian-sector leadership positions) if the process is not
used within a deliberately inclusive organizational framework. Currently,
neither organizational leaders nor soldiers have fully developed skill sets
for fostering optimal hiring practices and interview techniques. The
ATAP User Agreement explicitly prohibits questions about age, gender,
religion, sexual orientation, and marital or family status and recommends
standardized, behavior-based questions.63
The biggest concerns acknowledged by the Army Talent Management
Task Force about the ATAP market system included diversity, nepotism,
and variable performance distribution across units.64 In the context of DEI,
employing processes that consistently evaluate and transparently report
the selection of a diverse slate of officers is crucial. Without processes to
counter unconscious bias, units and leaders are prone to favoring officers they
know, look like, or with whom they share similar backgrounds. To enhance
organizational performance and enable inclusive environments, the Army
61. Adam Grant, Think Again: The Power of Knowing What You Don’t Know (New York: Viking Press,
2021), 121–42.
62. “Army Talent Alignment Process,” US Army Talent Management (website), 2016, https://talent
.army.mil/atap.
63. HQDA, Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP) User Agreement, Executive Order 241-21 (Washington,
DC: HQDA, September 30, 2021).
64. US Army, Army Talent Management Leader Professional Development Briefing (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 2019), YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0C8WG4Z5f Tw.
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needs processes that force diversity and interrupt the tendencies resulting from
unconscious bias.
Leaders can take practical steps to promote diversity and mitigate unconscious
bias. Officers charged with selections should consider two or more individuals
from underrepresented groups when they rank a list of potential candidates.
Candidates should be transparently scored to allow for objective comparisons,
which help leaders to employ methodical, System-2 (slow) thinking.65
As the identification of KSBs matures, cognitive diversity could be assessed
by the combination of KSBs, demographics, education, and assignment history.
The Army could use artificial intelligence to review job descriptions for
language that may reflect the bias of the writer or deter underrepresented
groups from applying. The Army could require units to transparently publish
the number and composition of applicants considered for career-enhancing
positions. The current market system requires regulation to prevent gaming
of the current business rules.
Data usage and transparency are essential for understanding the impact
of unconscious bias and holding organizations accountable for equitable
selection processes. In a future ideal system, leaders and organizations would
be informed by modern people analytics to understand the diversity needs of
their organizations.66 Preferable to subjective assessments, data-driven personnel
selection can identify top performers. Leaders responsible for selecting officers
should receive education and training on conducting interviews, creating
objective evaluation criteria, and assessing and selecting soldiers to meet
organizational cognitive diversity gaps.
The Army’s Command Assessment Program executes a comprehensive battery
of evaluations to assess talent for command positions while taking measures
to minimize bias. First implemented in 2019 for the Battalion Command
Assessment Program, the four-day, in-person program evaluates candidates
across five dimensions: verbal communication, written communication, physical
fitness, cognitive and noncognitive skills, and manner of past performance
reflected on the Centralized Selection List order of merit.67 A panel conducts
double-blind interviews of the candidates behind a screen to limit unconscious
bias related to race and ethnicity.68 Panel members participate in antibias
training just before the initial interview process and receive a shorter refresher
65. US Army Talent Management, Commander’s Guide to ATAP (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, 2020), 13.
66. Leonardi, “Better People Analytics,” 62–70.
67. J. P. McGee and Ryan Evans, “The Army’s New Approach to People,” December 16, 2019, War on the
Rocks, mp3, 41:08, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/the-armys-new-approach-to-people/.
68. Association of the US Army, Noon Report – MG Joseph P. McGee – 8-13-2020 (Arlington, VA: Association
of the US Army, August 13, 2020), YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vd3dagl3hcA.
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each day they serve on the panel. Individuals who have previously worked
with candidates are asked to complete the Army Commander Evaluation
Tool, which is intended to reflect fitness for command and identify
counterproductive behaviors.
These processes (double-blind interview, bias training, and anonymous
peer and subordinate feedback) are notable examples of processes put in place
to combat bias and should be considered best practices. The Army should
consider formally implementing a shortened version of the Army Commander
Evaluation Tool at frequent career milestones to identify leaders who are most
effectively leading in a manner consistent with the Army ethic. Aggregate
demographic information of selected officers should be published for all
selected commanders. Transparent practices engender trust, allow for the
assessment of diversity needs, and further the mission of the organization.
Performance Evaluation Design
Performance evaluations reflect the largest threat and greatest opportunity
related to unconscious bias. The officer evaluation report—specifically, the senior
rater narrative and forced distribution components—play a primary role in selection
boards for professional military education (PME), command, and promotion.
Performance evaluations in the private sector have been shown to reflect the biases
and tendencies of the rater more than the performance of the rated officer, with
62 percent of the variance accounted for by the rater and 21 percent by the
rated officer.69 Tim Kane, author of Bleeding Talent and Total Volunteer Force,
both of which fueled congressionally directed talent management initiatives,
argues evaluations “are one of the weakest categories of talentmanagement
for the military” because inflated evaluations do not provide enough granular
information to differentiate individuals for promotions or assignments.70 Army
officer evaluation reports have open-ended components that have a forced
distribution influenced by the size of the rating pool. Favoritism shown by
the rater, senior rater, or the organization, or the conflicting loyalties of these
entities, may influence these components. Open-ended evaluations that lack
predetermined assessment criteria have been shown to be most prone to bias.71
The Army should consider replacing open-ended statements of
performance with assessments of an officer’s strongest KSBs, as demonstrated
69. Marcus Buckingham and Ashley Goodall, “Reinventing Performance Management,” in Harvard Business
Review, On Reinventing HR, 49.
70. Tim Kane, Total Volunteer Force: Lessons from the US Military on Leadership Culture and Talent
Management (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2017), 95–99.
71. Lori Nishiura Mackenzie, JoAnne Wehner, and Shelley J. Correll, “Why Most Performance
Evaluations Are Biased, and How to Fix Them,” Harvard Business Review (website), January 11, 2019, https://
hbr.org/2019/01/why-most-performance-evaluations-are-biased-and-how-to-fix-them.
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by performance. Predefined measures of performance and desired KSBs must be
created, either universally to address the attributes and competencies described
in Army Leadership and the Profession, Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, or
by the rater and distributed at initial counseling. Employing more frequent,
standardized performance assessments; transparency in expectations; and
aggregate consistency checks across populations would interrupt bias and shift
Army processes toward a true meritocracy.
During World War I, the US military developed a “merit rating,” or forced
distribution, system that served as the basis for performance appraisals,
a practice largely abandoned by corporate America over 15 years ago.72
Employee performance has been shown to decline when an employee is rated
relative to others (also known as “social comparison”) and to improve when the
employee’s performance is compared to his or her previous performance (also
known as “temporal comparison”).73 The US Air Force, US Marine Corps, and
US Coast Guard have abandoned forced distribution rankings; only the Army
has kept the practice.74 As work in the knowledge economy increasingly
becomes team-oriented, peer feedback is critical for leader development.75
By the early 2000s, many US companies prioritized agile leadership
techniques that emphasized “individuals and interactions over processes
and tools” and “responding to change over following a plan” to enhance
innovation.76 Adaptability requires performance evaluations to align with
team-based performance.
In the Army’s current officer evaluation report, the senior rater describes
an officer’s potential by comparing the officer to his or her contemporaries
and assessing his or her potential for Headquarters Department of the Army
boards, such as PME and promotion.77 Instead of the senior rater recommending
selection for PME, it should be widely accessible via distance learning to
the greatest extent possible to accommodate competing professional and
personal demands, such as deployment or family considerations. Selection for
in-person or degree-producing PME could remain competitive by including
application requirements. Since many courses require passing a physical
72. Peter Cappelli and Anna Tavis, “The Performance Management Revolution: The Focus Is Shifting from
Accountability to Learning,” Harvard Business Review (website), October 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/10/the
-performance-management-revolution.
73. Jinseok Chun, Joel Brockner, and David De Cremer, “People Don’t Want to Be Compared with Others
in Performance Reviews. They Want to Be Compared with Themselves,” Harvard Business Review (website),
March 22, 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/03/people-dont-want-to-be-compared-with-others-in-performance
-reviews-they-want-to-be-compared-with-themselves.
74. Kane, Total Volunteer Force, 101.
75. Peter Cappelli and Anna Tavis, “HR Goes Agile,” in Harvard Business Review, On Reinventing HR,
33–39.
76. “Manifesto for Agile Software Development,” Agilemanifesto.org, 2001, https://agilemanifesto.org.
77. HQDA, Evaluation Reporting System, Army Regulation 623-3 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
June 14, 2019), 21.
TOC

36

Parameters 52(1) Spring 2022

fitness test, temporary physical limitations such as injury or pregnancy—
events that facilitate the furthering of one’s education—should not hinder
participation in PME.
Objectively defining future potential is difficult and particularly prone to bias
if aggregated data and sources are not used. Senior-rater evaluation of potential
should incorporate data-driven assessment, such as peer feedback and temporal
comparison, rather than evaluation against peers. Evaluation Reporting System,
Army Regulation 623-3, defines potential as judgment about whether the
soldier can perform at a higher responsibility or grade.78 According to
Claudio Fernández-Aráoz, Information Age potential requires a learning
orientation and the ability to “adapt and grow into increasingly complex roles
and environments.”79
Evaluations need to move toward assessing subordinate leader development,
a leader’s learning orientation, and the leader’s ability to build networks as
fundamental leadership competencies. Key metrics for potential include
behaviors and attributes demonstrated both to supervisors and to peers
and subordinates. These behaviors and attributes include motivation,
curiosity, insight, creativity, engagement of networks, and perseverance and
determination.80 Senior raters may apply relational analytics to assess the
strength and diversity of an individual’s network and ability to exert influence
outside of the organization.81 Codified as an essential leader competency in
Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, one who extends influence beyond the chain
of command creates shared purpose through negotiation, consensus building,
and conflict resolution—skills critical for creating an inclusive environment.
Psychological Safety for Inclusive Talent Management
The processes for assignments, command selection, and evaluations
can interrupt bias, but, ultimately, inclusion reflects a sense of belonging
built through mutual trust and psychological safety. Diversity inherently
introduces conflict through differences in perspective. Whereas people
experience trust at the individual level, psychological safety exists at the
organizational level.
In The Infinite Game, Simon Sinek explains the relationship between
performance and trust.82 Team members with high performance and low
78. HQDA, Evaluation Reporting System, 198.
79. Claudio Fernández-Aráoz, “21st-Century Talent Spotting,” in Harvard Business Review, On Reinventing
HR, 80–86.
80. Fernández-Aráoz, “21st-Century Talent Spotting,” 80–86.
81. Leonardi and Contractor, “Better People Analytics,” 62−70.
82. Simon Sinek, The Infinite Game (London: Portfolio, 2019), 109.
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trust characterize typical toxic or counterproductive leadership styles. Today,
Army evaluations reflect performance and one person’s estimation of future
performance in different environments. The evaluations prioritize short-term
accomplishments rather than long-term soldier development, engagement,
and sustainability. More easily assessed than trust, performance can hide
leadership traits employed to generate team performance and simply reflect
technical competence. Trust, in contrast, stems from leader integrity, honesty,
and accountability for the good of the team. Brené Brown emphasizes the
importance of trusting others to respect boundaries and demonstrating
reliability, accountability, confidentiality, integrity, nonjudgment, and
generosity to establish belonging.83
Belonging also requires organizational leadership that creates psychological
safety to benefit from cognitive diversity fully. Amy Edmondson describes
psychological safety as an environment in which individuals are “not hindered
by interpersonal fear” preventing them from sharing information or ideas.84
Psychological safety involves establishing a culture in which people can ask
questions or discuss mistakes without experiencing shame or humiliation. It is
not about being nice or lowering standards; rather, it is about the maintenance
of high standards in an honorable environment, which, in turn, promotes
high-quality performance and reduces risk.85
Conclusion
Changing workforce demographics and justice imperatives in a
service-oriented, values-based organization make inclusion and diversity in
talent management an Army-mandated requirement. Solutions to complex
problems in future, multi-domain operations will demand success in the
physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions, making diversity and
inclusion in talent management synonymous with achievement of the
Army’s mission. Mission command requires maximizing the human potential
to thrive in ambiguity through shared understanding and mutual trust.
Organizational leaders must be primed to interrupt bias by ensuring
consideration of diverse slates, standardized interview processes, and use
of predefined metrics or criteria for assignments and evaluations. Data
analytics will be needed to assess aggregate trends across subpopulations
and to verify internal consistency, and transparently published board results
will provide organizational accountability. These changes are needed to
83. Brené Brown, Braving the Wilderness: The Quest for True Belonging and the Courage to Stand Alone (New
York: Random House, 2017), 75–79.
84. Amy C. Edmondson, The Fearless Organization: Creating Psychological Safety in the Workplace for Learning,
Innovation, and Growth (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019), 17–19.
85. Edmondson, Fearless Organization.
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ensure DEI within the Army are reflective of the doctrinal Army ethic,
and ultimately allow the Army to retain top talent and prevail in the
cognitive dimension.
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ABSTRACT: As women assume more combat roles in the US military and
continue to operate in austere environments with varied mission sets, the
Department of Defense must rethink its approach to equipment and uniform
development to accommodate female anatomical differences. This article
analyzes the results of a study conducted during the Sandhurst Military
Skills Competition at the United States Military Academy to determine the
effectiveness of commercial off-the-shelf products the Army has adopted to aid
female urination—products used by competition participants that may not be
the best or healthiest options for women.
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n 1943, the Women’s Army Corps passed into law and allowed women to
enlist or commission in the Army with all the rank, privileges, rights, and
benefits of their male counterparts. Although legislation is a good start,
the soldier archetype cannot be legislated. It is forged through the practices and
traditions of the organization. While the Army has taken steps to transform the
soldier archetype to include women, much room for improvement exists.

Army women, like men, must operate in uniforms, protective outer
garments with weapons, hydration gear, and communication devices among
predominately male peers and leaders. While uniform accommodations have
been made for men concerning the location of the button fly on all trousers and
the design of undergarments, current uniforms impede urination for women.
As a result, women limit fluid intake to avoid the embarrassment of the
common female stance (the squat position), and adjust their tolerance level
of privacy and discretion.1 Experts have observed in austere environments with

1. Anne L. Naclerio et al., “The Concerns of Women Serving in the Afghanistan Theater of Operations,”
Military Medicine, White Paper (2011), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2011/womens
-concerns-afghanistan.pdf; and Nancy Steele and Linda H. Yoder, “Military Women’s Urinary Patterns,
Practices, and Complications in Deployment Settings,” Urologic Nursing 33, no. 2 (March–April 2013),
https://doi.org/10.7257/1053-816X.2013.33.2.61.
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limited facilities and close proximity to others, the common female stance is
humilitating, dangerous, and hard to accomplish.2
Although limiting fluid intake allows Army women to restrict the need
to urinate in the field, they face potential health consequences such as the risk
of urinary tract infections, incontinence, vaginitis, and other infections of the
urethra and possibly the kidneys.3 The Program Executive Office Soldier and the
Natick Soldier Systems Center recognized these health threats and provided a
commercial off-the-shelf solution: female urinary diversion devices (FUDDs),
which became available in the Government Services Administration inventory
around 2015 or 2016 as women were being filtered into combat arms positions
once coded for men. This exciting development started with cultural support
teams who augmented special operations units to fill the critical limiting gap
of leveraging Afghan women in the fight against Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan.4 Research also points to sustaining the inclusion of women in
combat arms as more evidence reveals the “band of brothers” contrived exclusions
have no merit.5 Still, relatively few resources and little attention have been paid to
the issue of female urination or the equipment hastily accepted to deal with the
long-standing problem.
The Freshette and Shewee urinary devices offered solutions to the problems
experienced by females in the field. They were added in response to good
customer reviews from the outdoor adventurist community and had not been
systematically tested for ground troops in military field training or deployed
conditions to validate their effectiveness or level of acceptance.6 The Freshette was
previously studied by military personnel as a solution for aviators and a way to
reduce the damaging effects of limiting fluid intake and delaying fluid voiding.7
2. Nancy M. Steele, “A Female Urinary Diversion Device for Military Women in the Deployed Environment”
(Bethesda, MD: Uniformed Services University, 2016).
3. Elodi J. Dielubanza and Anthony J. Schaeffer, “Urinary Tract Infections in Women,” Medical Clinics of
North America 95, no. 1 (January 2011), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcna.2010.08.023; Armed Forces Health
Surveillance Center (AFHSC), “Urinary Tract Infections during Deployment, Active Component, U.S. Armed
Forces, 2008–2013,” Medical Surveillance Monthly Report 21, no. 3 (March 2014); Carla Hawley-Bowland,
“Lady J” and “Freshette Complete System”: A Field Trial for the Active Duty Woman (El Paso, TX: William
Beaumont Army Medical Center, 1995); and “Urinary Tract Diseases and Conditions Stress Urinary
Incontinence: Study Findings from David L. Howard et al. Provide New Insights into Stress Urinary
Incontinence (Complications of Sling Surgery for Stress Urinary Incontinence among Female Military
Beneficiaries),” (Atlanta, 2018).
4. Ellen Haring, review of Ashley’s War: The Untold Story of a Team of Women Soldiers on the Special Ops
Battlefield, by Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, Parameters 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015).
5. Lena P. Kvarving, review of “Beyond the Band of Brothers: The US Military and the Myth That Women
Can’t Fight,” by Megan Mackenzie, Internasjonal Politikk 74, no. 2 (2016).
6. Lijing Wang et al., “Anthropometric Measurements of the Female Perineum for Design of the Opening
Shape of Urination Device,” International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 46 (March 2015): 29–35, https://doi
.org/10.1016/j.ergon.2015.01.004; and Hawley-Bowland, “Lady J” and “Freshette”; and Department of
Defense (DoD), “Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Service (DACOWITS)
2009 Meeting Minutes,” website, https://dacowits.defense.gov/Reports-Meetings/2009-Minutes/.
7. Steele and Yoder, “Military Women’s Urinary Patterns”; Hawley-Bowland, “Lady J” and “Freshette”; and
Victoria Tepe et al., “Women in Combat: Summary of Findings and a Way Ahead,” Supplement, Military
Medicine 181, no. S1 (January 2016): S109–18, https://doi.org/10.7205/MILMED-D-15-00409.
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A 2012–16 survey that analyzed the Freshette with a sample size of 94
deployed military women during Operation Enduring Freedom resulted in the
recommendation of implementing this FUDD for use in austere environments.8
While the study provided much-needed data on one model, further research
and discussion were needed to understand the importance of these devices when
integrating women into all dimensions of Army life.
Based on the sustainment of women in combat arms positions, our research
team evaluated these commercial off-the-shelf products for their ability to
facilitate easy and comfortable female urination and sustain combat effectiveness.
As a doctoral candidate at the University of Miami, Lieutenant Colonel Andrea
Peters conducted a series of studies on female urination in austere environments
with an eye toward transforming policy into practice. Her research affirmed
prior work that identified this topic as a key concern for women in both
combat and support services.
Her findings revealed urinary aids influenced the reduction of urological
infections, however, female soldiers and Army leaders lacked awareness and
education on the benefits of these devices.9 These results propelled the study team
to understand why there is a lack of education and employment and how the team
could apply human systems integration to improve urogynecological health and
mental well-being, thus making women more effective teammates. The goals of
the Sandhurst study were to build on previous studies, take them a step further by
outlining empirical evidence to influence and develop device-use policies, provide
a standard for future product analysis, and to serve as a model for the design and
development of products that will better meet the needs of female servicemembers
in a variety of operational environments.
Policy Background
Women have officially served in the US Army with equal benefits and
protections since July 1943 under the Women’s Army Corps and have
trained and aided in all types of Army units in limited capacities from the
Medical Service Corps to special operations.10 These limited military
occupational specialties excluded women from combat arms roles and branches
like infantry, armor, and field artillery. While the early 1990s saw the
expansion of women’s roles in the military, including serving on combatant ships
and piloting combat aircraft, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission
observed women were still marginalized due in part to long-held assumptions
8. Steele, “Female Urinary Diversion Device”; Steele and Yoder, “Military Women’s Urinary Patterns.”
9. Andrea Peters, “Female Urination in Austere Environments: A Mixed Methods Analysis” (PhD diss.,
University of Miami, 2020), 53–57 and 106.
10. “History,” Women in the Army, accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.army.mil/women/history/.
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that women would negatively affect unit cohesion and were more prone to
physical and mental limitations in combat.11 In March 2009, the Defense
Advisory Committee on Women in the Services discussed the policy limiting the
roles of women in combat arms, the individual experiences of the soldiers, and the
implications of changing these roles. Attendees, both officer and enlisted, argued
women were already serving in combat and the role limitations only caused
divisions within units that are supposed to thrive on cohesion.12
In the process of reviewing legislation, policy, and perceptions of the
operational environment, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission
discovered the lack of both empirical data correlating female fitness
requirements and battlefield performance and supporting research on the increase
of female mental-health issues when compared to male servicemembers.13
When Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester stood her ground in a firefight in Iraq
(she later earned the Silver Star for her achievement) and the female
engagement teams and combat support teams made impactful gains in
Afghanistan, the military and the US government were reminded of the
combat potential of women.14 The women’s actions and accomplishments served
as the impetus for the Army to examine how it might provide opportunities for
women to serve in combat roles.
In 2013, the Department of Defense opened all Army branches to women,
and in December 2015, another historic decision opened all combat roles
previously coded male to women.15 In 2016, Acting Secretary of the Army
Patrick J. Murphy demonstrated the new policy also represented a shift in the
attitude of military leadership. He stated, to the Army and the world, that women
are capable of performing every job in the Army to the highest standards. He also
recognized the critical role leaders hold in integration.16
The Army’s change in policy and attitude necessitated updates to
infrastructure, regulations, education, and practices to integrate women fully into
the Army. Although conceptually realized, the updates and implementations
were—and are—slow due to a lack of attention, budget limitations, and time
11. Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), Women in Combat: Legislation and Policy,
Perceptions, and the Current Operational Environment, Issue Paper no. 56 (Washington, DC: MLDC, 2010),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=716213.
12. DoD, “DACOWITS 2009 Meeting Minutes.”
13. MLDC, Women in Combat.
14. Sean Mclain Brown, “7 Bad-ass Women Who Made Military History,” Military.com, https://www
.military.com/history/7-bad-ass-women-who-made-military-history.html.
15. “History,” Women in the Army; and C. Todd Lopez, “Army Describes Plans for Integrating Women
into Combat,” US Army, June 19, 2013, https://www.army.mil/article/105814/army_describes_plans_for
_integrating_women_into_combat.
16. J. D. Leipold, “Army Reveals Plan to Fully Integrate Women into All MOSs, Combat Units,” US Army
(website), March 22, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/161770/army_reveals_plan_to_fully_integrate
_women_into_all_moss_combat_units.
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constraints. Women, however, still face the problem of how to urinate in the
field safely and effectively. While the inclusion of women in combat has renewed
conversations on the subject, women across multiple force sustainment branches
(formerly combat service support branches) have dealt with the lack of equipment
for their most basic needs. These concerns arose as early as 1775 when women
served unofficially as cooks and nurses in the Revolutionary War.17 Health-care
officials serving during Operation Enduring Freedom testified to the lack of
urinary accommodations for women on foot marches and convoy missions—and
even in unit base designs.18
A safe and practical method of urination has been a primary concern of
female servicemembers for decades. While the Army has shifted its attitude
toward women in combat, it has failed to address the fundamental role female
urinary safety plays in fully integrating women into the ranks. Thus, the
following sections evaluate the FUDDs the Army has already approved to assess
their effectiveness.
Materials and Methods
The study team leveraged the United States Military Academy autumn squad
lane competition, referred to as Sandhurst, to address the lack of systematically
focused field tests regarding female urination tools and practices. The annual
competition consists of 36 teams, with approximately one female cadet on each
team. The teams face challenges that closely mimic real combat scenarios.
Female participants were informed of the study and participated in an
information session where they could ask questions and handle the devices. The
women returned for a second session where they could ask more questions, pick
up devices (Freshette and Shewee), and select operational camouflage trousers of
their choice—either the unisex trouser traditionally issued to men and women
or the alternate more formfitting trouser with elastic in the waistband and a
shorter button fly. Participants were also asked to consent formally to the study,
though this step was not required by the institutional review board.19
A total of 16 women, ranging between 18 to 22 years old, picked up devices;
15 women returned the devices after the competition, and 14 women completed
the closeout survey. Additionally, to provide more insight to Army leaders, the
study team carefully analyzed pre- and post-swabs of the devices to determine the
propensity of bacteria growth and the resulting implications.
17. “History,” Women in the Army.
18. Steele and Yoder, “Military Women’s Urinary Patterns.”
19. Karen Peck, e-mail message to Lieutenant Colonel Andrea Peters, October, 10, 2019.
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Variables
Prior to Sandhurst, the female cadets selected either the Freshette device or
the Shewee device. The outcome variables below were measured via a survey
using a Likert scale to understand the women’s attitudes and opinions toward
the new devices.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Overall satisfaction
Design
Ease of use
Ease of cleaning
Ease of storage
Carrying case

•
•
•
•
•

Durability
Size
Color
Compatibility with unisex trouser
Compatibility with alternate trouser

The scale consisted of seven response options ranging from extremely
satisfied to extremely dissatisfied. The seven options allowed a midpoint of
neutrality and a more straightforward approach to removing incomplete and
inaccurate information due to system or respondent errors.20
Field Use: Sandhurst Military Skills Competition
On October 18, 2019, study participants began the competition in tactical
formations for an 18- to 24-hour grueling competition. The Sandhurst Military
Skills Competition dates to 1967 when the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
exchange officer presented the United States Military Academy with a British
officer’s sword to use as a competition prize. Academy leadership, eager to provide
the corps of cadets with a regimental-skills competition that would enhance
professional development and military excellence in basic soldier skills, developed
the competition with the award being the British officer’s sword.21 Upon inception,
the goal was to train and compete to enhance teamwork and to shoot, move, and
communicate effectively in combat situations.22
Each competition area tests a different aspect of small-team combat operations
and creates stress to stretch the participants—just like combat missions do in
a deployed environment. The lanes and events include functional fitness, the
M9 pistol range, the M203 grenade-launcher range, zodiac water course, land
navigation, bivouac, night tactical road march, obstacle course, leader’s reaction
20. Gail M. Sullivan and Anthony R. Artino, “Analyzing and Interpreting Data from Likert-Type Scales,”
Journal of Graduate Medical Education 5, no. 4 (2013): 541–42, https://doi.org/10.4300/JGME-5-4-18.
21. “Sandhurst Competition,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia (website), last modified December
2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandhurst_Competition; and Chris Ophardt and Brandon O’Connor,
“2021 Seven Things to Know about Sandhurst,” United States Military Academy, March 26, 2021,
https://www.westpoint.edu/news/2021-seven-things-know-about-sandhurst.
22. “Sandhurst Competition.”
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course, rifle marksmanship, call for fire, combat swimming, and a burden—a
small-team, critical-thinking event that also called for strength and agility.23 Upon
completion of the competition, 15 participants returned devices to the study team
to analyze the pre- and post-bacterial activity on the devices and extension tubes
using Mueller-Hinton agar plates divided into fours and cotton-tipped swabs
soaked in Luria-Bertani (LB) media (most common medium to grow bacteria) to
swab each device and inoculate the dishes. The dishes were incubated for 24 hours,
and microscans were completed to identify bacteria, if present.
Survey Results
The survey results yielded an overall positive response, ranging between
extreme dissatisfaction and extreme satisfaction and revealing room for
improvement of the devices. Specifically, 50 percent of the respondents were
moderately satisfied with the overall device, design, and durability; however,
57.15 percent indicated they were between slightly satisfied to slightly dissatisfied
in the ease of storage. A total of 76.92 percent of the respondents wanted
improvements in the carrying case. The Freshette came in a plastic bag that was
too small to handle effectively when urine coated the device, and the Shewee
had no ventilation for the case.
Additionally, the responses revealed more negative opinions when using the
devices with the operational camouflage trousers. Seven women (58 percent) were
in the midrange of opinion when using the device with the unisex trouser and
four women (57 percent) when using the alternate trouser. Participants expressed
mostly negative opinions about the ease of cleaning, with 43.34 percent ranging
between slightly satisfied to moderately dissatisfied. Their responses indicated a
need or desire to wash these devices and more guidance on how to do so effectively.
The Likert scale responses were confirmed through qualitative responses and
analyzed through affinity clustering. Analysis revealed nine out of 14 (64 percent)
women washed their devices by rinsing with sink water, flushing with canteen
water, or using soapy water. The graphical representation of the female Sandhurst
competitors’ satisfaction levels in figure 1 (below) provides a visual representation
of the opinion data.

23. Ophardt and O’Connor, “2021 Seven Things.”
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Figure 1: Respondent Satisfaction Scale

Figure 1 confirms the primarily positive response of having the urinary aid. It
also shows the range of opinions and indicates there is room for improvement to
adapt the devices specifically for military use. The affinity clustering of the survey’s
qualitative data revealed requirements for the resizing of the collection cup and
spout angle due to the urine splash and cup compromise, developing a carrying
case for ease of storage, altering trouser design due to limited anatomical access,
using proper cleaning solutions, and providing education due to the current lack
of availability.24
The preliminary swabbing of the Shewee tube resulted in one colony forming
unit consistent with Staphylococcus spp., while post-swabbing of the devices
revealed more interesting and concerning results.25 The post-microbial swabbing
occurred for eleven Freshette devices and four Shewee devices upon completion
of the competition. The resulting number of device types were based on the
women choosing the device they liked best or were most comfortable using. The
results revealed one Freshette device with possible Lactobacillus (normal female
bacteria flora) species of 1000x gram stain and another device with possible grampositive Corynebacterium (a normal skin bacterium). The most concerning findings
were discovered on one Freshette and one Shewee device. A 1000x gram stain
on a blood agar plate, revealed possible Proteus spp. (swarming bacterial species),
a common cause of urinary-tract infections.26 The microscan confirmed the
24. Peters, “Female Urination Austere Environments.”
25. Peters et al., “Detection Potential Pathogenic Bacteria.”
26. Peters et al., “Detection Potential Pathogenic Bacteria.”
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presence of the swarming bacteria and further analysis revealed the bacterium
also forms biofilms. The most concerning finding was the identification of Proteus
mirabilis isolates resistant to tetracycline, piperacillin/tazobactam, and aztreonam
while the other isolate was only resistant to tetracycline.

Implications for Integration
Genuine integration and equity occur gradually within organizations as
psychosocial change must strike a balance with existing physical support systems.
Integrating women into the military is similar; however, the understanding
and updating of tools, policies, and procedures to meet the needs of the female
anatomy have been seriously neglected. The Freshette and Shewee devices
seem to answer the long-standing concern of how to facilitate female urination
in austere environments by providing a tool pioneered by and designed for
outdoor adventurists.
The Army must reevaluate the efficacy of these devices for soldiers as military
women are deployed operationally. Thus, the one-size-fits-all approach will not
work as an enduring solution due to time constraints and varied mission sets
ranging from foot marches to mounted tasks. The Sandhurst study helped provide
attitudes and opinion data concerning the FUDDs and illuminated the possibility
of resulting infections from device usage, thereby posing a major concern for
open and free use of FUDDs without redesign or specific education on proper
sanitation. In particular, the devices must be reevaluated for basin size, spout
angle, carrying case accessibility, and, most importantly, for proven antimicrobial
features. Currently, the limited cup volume can cause urine to splash or sit on the
body causing moisture-associated skin damage and irritation.27
Additionally, both the unisex trousers and the alternative trousers
complicate usage since neither account for the position of female anatomy.
If the Army deems it more feasible to maintain the current General Services
Administration inventory devices and trousers, leadership can consider
a twofold approach that will allow quick wins and the ability to protect
and enhance the female force while working toward the broader goal of a
more-inclusive Army culture. The approach must address policy and
procedural changes from the larger Army perspective and most important, this
cultural shift will happen because lower-level Army leaders buy into the concept
and its execution.

27. Mikel Gray, “Incontinence-Related Skin Damage: Essential Knowledge,” Wound Management &
Prevention 53, no. 12 (December 2007).
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Recommendations for the Army
The following recommendations for the Army will help update policy
and procedures to aid in female inclusivity and safety as a forethought—
not an afterthought.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Provide all female soldiers with a urinary diversion device.
Update the Common Table of Allowance 50-900, Clothing and Individual
Equipment, and the Organizational and Clothing Individual Equipment
lists to reflect the issuance of the urinary devices that can be replaced
every two years based on need.
Update packing lists to include these devices as an inspectable item.
Provide natural cleaning wipes and spray with every issued urinary
device and allow the reissue of these expendable items throughout
the year.
Teach women in basic training about the devices and proper vaginal
and urinary-tract care in garrison and in less-than-ideal environments.
Update current Field Hygiene and Sanitation, Training Circular 4.02-3,
to educate the force, both males and females, on urinary-tract infections,
their development, their possible impact, their treatment, and their
prevention.28
Normalize the use of urinary aids for women and for all military
members in cold-weather climates to afford a more expedient and safer
means to urinate in dangerous temperatures. The aid may even be a
useful tool for both sexes for nuclear, biological, and chemical situations,
but research must be done to validate this assumption.

The above recommendations meet the Army where it currently stands and
will help the service prepare for the 15 percent female force that continues to
populate previously male-coded positions. The Army’s return to combined-arms
maneuver and wide-area security, combined with the increased number of
women within combat positions, requires a strategic approach to providing the
appropriate tools and equipment for women in these environments. Furthermore,
the recommended steps highlight the fact that bacteria inhabit all regions of the
world, and bacteria are a perennial threat for military forces during training and
deployments regardless of sex.29 The reexamination of female needs and desires

28. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Hygiene and Sanitation, Training Circular
4-02.3 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2015).
29. Peters et al., “Detection Potential Pathogenic Bacteria.”
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will ultimately provide force multiplication and reduce the unnecessary cognitive
and physical load on women, their teams, and their leaders.
Alhough the above top-level recommendations are for the Army, command
teams can also influence education and change in the psychosocial approach to
female urination tools and procedures. As previously stated, cultural changes
cannot be legislated; instead, they must be adopted and implemented within
organizations. For a fully inclusive Army culture to take root, Army leaders
must embody a broader perspective and command style. This shift in
perspective will also alter behaviors and influence positivity to the lowest
ranks as more cohesive and supportive teams are crafted and nurtured.
Army Leader Recommendations
The points below are a continuation of recommendations specific to Army
leaders to help them influence cultural and cognitive shifts in perspective. The
assumption is the uniform and current equipment resources remain constant.
Leaders can begin the shift by ensuring unit surgeons, medics, and lower-level
leaders of both sexes are educated on the use and care of devices. Because of the
nonautomatic nature of acquiring FUDDs, leaders will need to purchase these
devices from the General Services Administration inventory to ensure female
servicemembers have adequate tools to lessen the safety concerns of urination in
austere environments and ease inconvenience.
Once Army leaders are trained and devices are received, units must:

•
•
•
•

Provide in-depth use and cleaning instructions for females within the
formation
Educate leaders on the proper integration within the formation to lessen
the negative stigma some women have experienced concerning the use
of an assistance device.
Educate users on the varied uses within hardstand latrines, mobile
latrines, and open-field conditions.
Educate or reinforce the user’s knowledge on vaginal health and the
proper care of the device.
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•

Account for all team members when a tactical stop is integrated into
movement plans and plan for female urination which includes personal
and device sanitation. These stops will take longer for females with
or without urination aids. Leader time hacks should account for the
frequency and the length of time needed for the entire team whether in
training or executing a real-world mission.

Conclusion and the Study’s Broader Significance
The full breadth of the study team’s research, not just Sandhurst, revealed
alarming issues concerning women, urinating, urination devices, and the
attitudes of male counterparts. Although the specific examples below deal with
urination situations, the occurrences paint a bigger picture of the state of the
Army’s prevailing male dominance mindset.
A participant during the preliminary research studies revealed how she
was forced to urinate between two vehicles in the middle of a busy road
in Iraq, responding jokingly that half of Iraq had seen her bare backside.
Though amusing, what impact could this situation have had culturally on how
Iraqis view Americans and furthermore, women? There were accounts of a
woman taking tactical pauses with her unit and the unit leaving her behind,
not realizing she was still urinating due to being out of sight from teammates.30
In a real-world mission, this woman could have found herself left behind
and cut off from her team in potentially dangerous territory. In casual
conversations, some cadets have mentioned comments made by male
counterparts of “you want to pee like a man,” or “what is that” as the woman is
urinating that precede excuses like “it was just a joke and you’re being emotional.”31
Additionally, when women were asked how they feel about urinating in close
proximity to men, most replied they were uneasy and embarrassed but have
“sucked it up and drove on.”32
The latter mindset is why women have been successful in the military and
specifically the Army. Their desire to succeed and their resilience in operating
within a noninclusive culture propels them forward. While females continue
to seek success by any means available, the Army has been slow to provide
structurally safe opportunities as revealed by the comments provided above and
others revealed in previous studies.
If the military is serious about executing the Army People Strategy,
leadership must recognize the achievement of strategic goals such as readiness,
30. Peters, “Female Urination Austere Environments.”
31. Jacob E. Ziadeh, capstone meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Andrea Peters, January 2021.
32. Peters, “Female Urination Austere Environments.”
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diversity, professionalism, and full integration will require the Army to
acknowledge the key role women play whether that acceptance includes providing
more command opportunities or better accommodation of urination needs.33
By exploring an often-ignored subject, the study team revealed the lack of
full-system integration concerning clothing, equipment, tools, and most
importantly, people. The study engaged qualitatively and quantitatively, showing
the lack of resources crafted for women, including Army attempts to fit
commercial-off-the-shelf devices to female soldiers, which violates proper
user-focused design thinking. The study also exposes the psychological gaps in
understanding and execution as related to women fitting into an organizational
system designed for men that has not been redesigned for the needs of women.
Redesigning does not equate to lowering standards or weakening the approach.
Instead, redesign will enhance a unit’s combat effectiveness.
Future research can help support enhanced readiness by examining the impact
of field environments on the female system. Building on the work outlined
in this article, future researchers should consider examining the effects of
dehydration on the female system, delayed and/or restricted voiding and the
effects on the female body, how to improve uniform design for urination and
defecation in the field, FUDD sanitation, menstruation in austere environments
while using the FUDD or another aid, and other health areas that could enhance
or potentially hinder female performance during operations. Additionally,
small-team dynamics or interoperability should be studied to provide data points
of successes and areas for improvement psychosocially concerning the addition
of female members in previously all-male units. Further evaluation will create
a better understanding of the natural areas of integration and the more
challenging areas that may need additional support in shifting the
perspectives and attitudes of both men and women to foster a climate of trust,
understanding, and dependability.
Although the Freshette and Shewee devices give Army women an alternative
option to the common female stance they should not be considered an end to
the conversation about female urination in the military. As this study shows,
both devices may be susceptible to swarming bacterium that also causes biofilms
and is resistant to some urinary-tract infection antibiotic medications due to its
gram-negative composition. These findings and recommendations are the start
to more in-depth research and how leadership can provide Army women with
a better, more reliable solution that will not inhibit their combat effectiveness.
The translation of this research into actionable strategies for effective cleaning,
user instructions, device and uniform alterations, and Army personnel education
33.

“Army People Strategy,” US Army, accessed January 26, 2022, https://people.army.mil/.
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is an example of how the military should approach new tools, equipment, and
clothing with an eye to the full integration of female soldiers.
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A BSTR ACT: This a r ticle del ivers a novel economic ana lysis of
US dependence on China for rare-earth elements and sheds light on
how Western nations may exploit “limit pricing” to break China’s global
monopoly in rare-earth element production and refinement. This analytical
framework, supported by a comprehensive literature review, the application
of microeconomic and industrial organization concepts, and two case-study
scenarios, provides several policy recommendations to address an important
foreign policy challenge for the United States.
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T

he rise of China as a global economic and geopolitical superpower
is arguably the most important foreign policy challenge the United
States has faced since the end of the Cold War. Disputes between
the two countries have been geoeconomic in nature and revolve around issues
such as trade imbalances, limited market access, intellectual property theft, and
currency manipulation. At the same time, there is growing concern the two
nations are on a path to military confrontation and may not be able to avert the
Thucydides Trap—the tendency for conflict when an emerging power threatens
to displace existing hegemonies.
Following an escalation of diplomatic tensions, former President Donald J.
Trump launched a trade war in 2017 to pressure Beijing to implement significant
economic reforms and tackle unfair trade practices. As a result, the two nations
imposed tariffs worth hundreds of billions of dollars on one another’s goods.
More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the risks associated with the
concentration of goods production (for example, personal protective equipment
or medical supplies) in China and heightened concerns about China weaponizing
supply chains for geopolitical purposes. These growing tensions also revived
US concerns about its reliance on China as a primary source of rare-earth
elements (REE) and rare-earth element–based products (for example, oxides and
associated alloys).
Many critical military applications and industries use these elements as
an input to produce advanced electronics, hybrid vehicles, wind turbines,
magnets, and catalysts. More than a decade ago, pundits sounded the alarm
on China strengthening its dominance in the industry via its vast reserves and
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unparalleled ability to mine and refine these resources. A 2010 Government
Accountability Office report presented sobering statistics about China’s
dominance at all levels of the REE supply chain—the country produced
about 95 percent of the raw materials, 97 percent of oxides, and about
90 percent of the metal alloys.1 From a military perspective, the report stated
the US dependency on a potential adversary for critical resources could
shape the outcome of a military confrontation. For example, in a large-scale,
prolonged military conflict with Beijing over a dispute in the Taiwan Strait
or South China Sea, the US military industrial complex could find itself
struggling to secure the supplies needed to remain fully engaged in the fight.2
An early economic model explained how China emerged as the production
market leader. Through a sequence of four supply-and-demand models, the
model showed the gradual concentration of the REE supply chain in China.3
This article expands on this model and focuses on the use of limit pricing by
China to preserve its hegemony. The country’s state-owned producers recurrently
dialed up production and flooded global markets with cheap supplies to drive out
for-profit Western competitors, preclude the buildup of strategic stockpiles, and
discourage recycling programs. This article concludes recent market changes will
limit Beijing’s ability to manipulate prices for prolonged periods of time. Lastly,
market forces alone will not address the vulnerability. Any policy solutions must
involve significant and close cooperation with allies and sustained financial and
political backing by the US government.
State of Rare-Earth Elements
Over the last decade China has consistently demonstrated its dominance
of the REE global market. Following an incident in 2010 between a Chinese
trawler and the Japanese coast guard in the contested waters of the East
China Sea, Beijing stopped all shipments of these elements to Japan for
nearly two months. This decision disrupted Japan’s automotive industry, led
to global prices spikes, and generated a global rush to secure supplies. The
temporary price surge made it economically viable for previously mothballed
mines to reenter the market, exposed the inability of Western nations to fill
the temporary gap, and showed China was no longer a reliable long-term REE

1. Marc Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,” Congressional Research Service
R41347, December 16, 2013.
2. Charles J. Butler, “Rare Earth Elements: China’s Monopoly and Implications for U.S. National Security,”
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 38, no. 1 (Winter 2014), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf.
3. Dominik Schlinkert and Karl Geraldvan den Boogaart, “The Development of the Market for Rare Earth
Elements: Insights from Economic Theory,” Resources Policy 46 (2015): 272–80.
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supplier; it also failed to persuade the US government and its allies to implement
long-term solutions to this dependency.
Consequently, China continued to expand its global dominance and is now
confidently wielding it as a geopolitical weapon. For example, in May 2020,
President Xi Jinping made a publicized visit to a magnet facility. A few days
later, an editorial by Xinhua (the government’s official state-run press agency)
warned that by “waging a trade war against China, the United States risks
losing the supply of materials that are vital to sustaining its technological
strength.”4 A month later, Beijing threatened US defense contractors with
sanctions following the approval of a $620 million deal to supply missile
parts to Taiwan. The PRC’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is
currently exploring future controls on REE production and exports to the United
States and Europe. Chinese officials also reached out to domestic producers to
assess how severely US defense contractors would be impacted by a disruption in
exports in the event of a diplomatic dispute between the two countries.5
A targeted supply-chain disruption could cripple production of consumer
products and weapons systems in the United States and its strategic partners.6 The
plausibility of this scenario represents a national security threat and intensifies
the debate amongst policymakers and business communities about the United
States’ ability to find viable alternatives to sources of rare-earth elements.
To that end, the Trump administration published Executive Order 13817,
“A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,”
in 2017. It outlines a comprehensive set of policies and strategic goals and pushes
for action in research and development, international cooperation, assessment
of domestic mineral resources, streamlining federal permitting processes, and
expansion of the workforce in this sector. These proposed actions highlight key
economic issues that need to be addressed to mitigate the US reliance on China
for rare-earth elements. In 2020, the federal government published Executive
Order 13953, “Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain from
Reliance on Critical Minerals from Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the
Domestic Mining and Processing Industries,” which directs US federal agencies

4. Wayne M. Morrison, “Trade Dispute with China and Rare Earth Elements,” Congressional Research
Service in Focus, June 28, 2019.
5. Sun Yu in Beijing and Demetri Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth Export Curbs to Hobble U.S.
Defense Industry” Financial Times, February 6, 2021.
6. Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements,” 7.
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to identify potential authorities and develop agency-specific plans to improve the
mining and processing of rare-earth elements.7
The Biden administration published Executive Order 14017, “America’s
Supply Chains,” requiring the US government to review critical supply chains
and assess the the country’s dependency on other nations for key resources
and technologies—to include “critical minerals” and other identified strategic
materials such as rare-earth elements, as determined by the Department
of Defense. This policy is likely to endure future political vicissitudes given
growing bipartisan calls for a gradual decoupling of the American and
Chinese economies. While these policies signal a strong commitment by the
US government to address this national security threat, their implementation
will take time to progress and will require sustained political backing, reliable
financial support by the US federal government, and the involvement of the
business community.
Production, Trade, and Uses
Production and Trade
Rare-earth elements are metals desired for unique characteristics of
magnetism, luminescence, and strength.8 Contrary to what the name suggests,
these elements are abundant in the earth’s crust. Their rarity comes from being
scattered, mixed with other minerals, and rarely found in concentrations that make
extraction profitable.9 In addition, rare-earth elements are often a by-product of
other major mining activities, and reserves are geographically more concentrated
than other natural resources (for example, oil or natural gas). Historically,
mineral production that is highly concentrated in one or few countries is
vulnerable to market manipulations and natural disasters, political changes, or
environmental problems.10 China holds 37 percent of the world’s REE reserves
(see table 1). Illustrative of the rapid decline of the US industry, in 2009, the

7. US Department of Energy, Critical Minerals and Materials: U.S. Department of Energy’s Strategy to Support
Domestic Critical Mineral and Material Supply Chains, FY 2021–FY 2031, January 20, 2021, www.energy.gov
/sites/prod/files/2021/01/f82/DOE%20Critical%20Minerals%20and%20Materials%20Strategy_0.pdf.
8. Yufeng Chen and Biao Zheng, “What Happens after the Rare Earth Crisis: A Systematic Literature
Review,” Sustainability (2019): 11, 1288, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/5/1288/htm.
9. Morrison, “Trade Dispute with China,” 1.
10. K. J. Schulzet al., “Chapter A, “Critical Mineral Resources of the United States—Economic and
Environmental Geology and Prospects for Future Supply,” in Critical Mineral Resources of the United States—An
Introduction, US Geological Survey Professional Paper 1802 (2017), A1–A14, https://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1802
/a/pp1802a.pdf.
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United States accounted for 13 percent of these global reserves; a decade later, the
share was reduced to 1 percent (see table 1).11
Table 1. Geographic distribution of REE reserves (2019)
(Source: US Geological Survey, mineral commodity summaries, 2020)

Country
China
Vietnam
Brazil
Russia
India
Australia
Greenland
United States
Other
World

Reserves
44,000,000
22,000,000
22,000,000
12,000,000
6,900,000
3,300,000
1,500,000
1,400,000
6,900,000

120,000,000

Global Share
37%
18%
18%
10%
6%
3%
1%
1%
6%
100%

China has a greater lead in output as it accounted for 68 percent of
global production in 2019. This share is likely higher because illegal mining
and smuggling by the Chinese are not officially tracked. According to
estimates, between 50 to 60 percent of REE production in the country is
considered gray/illegal.12 The Bayan Obo mine in the Baotao province produces
50 percent of China’s rare-earth elements. The Sichuan province accounts for
24 to 30 percent of China’s mining, while the remaining quantities come from
the southern provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi.13 While holding
large reserves, Brazil and Vietnam mined miniscule quantities of rare-earth
elements in 2019. Despite a recent increase in global share from 9 percent in

11. Nabeel A. Mancheri, “Chinese Monopoly in Rare Earth Elements: Supply–Demand and Industrial
Applications,” China Report 48, no. 4 (2012), 449–68.
12. Chen and Zheng, “Rare Earth Crisis,” 12.
13. Frank Pothen and Kilian Fink, “A Political Economy of China’s Export Restrictions on Rare Earth
Elements,” Centre for European Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 15-025, 4.
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2018 to 12 percent in 2019 (see figure 1), the United States remains unable to
meet domestic demand as it did in the past.

Figure 1. Geographic distribution of REE production in 2018 and 2019
(Source: US Geological Survey, 2020, mineral commodity summaries 2020)

In the past, the United States was self-reliant and the world’s leading REE
producer. From the mid-1960s through the 1980s, the Mountain Pass mine—
located in California and owned by Molycorp Corporation—was the world’s
primary source of rare-earth oxides. Decades of neglect, underinvestment by the
federal government and academic community, and gradual losses of knowledge
and skilled labor required by this complex industry led to the decline of the
industry. The downward trend culminated with the shutdown of the Mountain
Pass mine in 2002 following regulatory issues and an environmental incident
involving a pipeline spill carrying contaminated water. Consequently, the United
States lost nearly all of its production capacity and became a net importer of
these compounds and metals, with 80 percent of imports originating in China.14
Uses
Rare-earth elements are used in a wide range of consumer goods such as
flat-screen TVs and cellphones. Other important industrial applications are
catalysts for petroleum refinement and automotive catalytic converters, wind
turbines, and hybrid and electric vehicles, among others. Production in the United
States propelled the development of modern military technology, and the new
defense applications bolstered the demand for REE inputs in turn, for jet
fighter engines, Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers, missile guidance
14. US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020, US Geological Survey (website), 132,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020.pdf.
TOC

Understanding a Changing China

Ferreira and Critelli 63

systems, antimissile defenses, satellites, ammunitions, communication systems,
etc.15An oft-cited example of the interdependency between the defense and
the REE sectors is the F-35 fighter jet which requires 920 pounds (417 kg)
of these materials. Also, rare-earth permanent magnets and specialized alloys
are vital to many military weapons systems. Some of these critical components
are exclusively built in China, which represents a threat to national security.16
Nevertheless, the defense uses of rare-earth elements accounts for a relatively
small share of US consumption—between 5 and 10 percent.17
As major economies transition to lower-carbon and renewable energies,
analysts estimate the demand for rare-earth elements will continue to grow rapidly.
Clean-energy technologies, such as hybrid electric vehicles or generators for wind
turbines, could consume up to 40 percent of all REE production by 2040.18 This
figure includes China’s growing downstream sector that now accounts for more
than 80 percent of total global consumption.19 The semiconductor industry—
another strategically important and fast-growing sector—is also becoming a major
consumer of rare-earth elements. Finally, the current lack of alternative sources
plays into the growing demand for these elements. When available, substitutes
tend to be less effective, and the quantity of recycled rare-earth elements remains
limited (for example, materials extracted from batteries, permanent magnets, or
fluorescent lamps).20
Chinese Dominance in the Global Market
For over five decades, China developed high-profile national programs and
devoted laboratories and teams exclusively to the study of rare-earth elements.
This long-term focus yielded significant results and set the conditions for the
country to expand its output of rare-earth elements in the late 1970s and 1980s.21
Chinese leaders then declared these elements “strategic” mineral resources
and, with the country’s high tolerance for environmental degradation and
low cost of exploitation, increased production and exports throughout the
1990s. This increase caused global REE prices to plunge and resulted in
many Western mining companies going bankrupt or significantly reducing
15. Morrison, “Trade Dispute with China,” 2.
16. Yu and Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth,” 2.
17. Alan Beattie, “Rare Earths and a Decade of Failure to Diversify,” Financial Times, September, 25, 2020.
18. International Energy Agency, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions,” World Energy
Outlook Special Report, May 5, 2021; and Mancheri, “Chinese Monopoly,” 262.
19. Nabeel A. Mancheri et al., “Effect of Chinese Policies on Rare Earth Supply Chain Resilience,” Resources,
Conservation & Recycling 142 (2019): 101–12.
20. Butler, “Rare Earth Elements,” 33; and US Geological Survey, “Mineral Commodity
Summaries 2020,” 200.
21. Pothen and Fink, “Political Economy,” 13–14; and Cindy Hurst, China’s Rare Earth Elements Industry:
What Can the West Learn? (Washington, DC: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, March 2010),
http://www.iags.org/rareearth0310hurst.pdf%20.
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operations. Beijing shifted toward developing an integrated supply chain
in mining, magnets, and other value-added products and declared the
development of domestic REE industries a strategic goal under the Made
in China 2025 strategy.22 The PRC now controls most of the global value
chain and accounts for nearly 90 percent of global REE refining capacity. In
contrast, the United States must export its domestically mined ores to China
for further processing because it lacks the refining, alloying, and fabricating
capacity. This gap is not due to technological preeminence but rather Beijing’s
earlier tolerance for pollution and environmental degradation.23 Production
of rare-earth elements comes with an enormous environmental footprint—
one ton can generate up to 60,000 cubic meters of waste gas, 200 cubic meters of
acid-containing sewage water, and over one ton of radioactive waste.24
China recently began consolidating its control over the industry to keep
prices high, reduce environmental pollution, and grant Chinese processors
access to low-cost materials.25 This consolidation is a stark reminder the Western
for-profit businesses are not competing on a level playing field. Chinese
authorities began setting up export quotas between 2007 and 2014. This policy,
however, was not legally binding and many miners continued to exceed their
output limits. Also, export restrictions were not applied to finished REE
products so China continued to flood global markets with relatively cheap
products. In 2014, after years of contention, the World Trade Organization
declared these export quotas incompatible with trading rules. Following this
decision, the PRC replaced export quotas with production quotas which have
remained fairly stable since 2014. The ongoing consolidation of the industry
into six state-owned enterprises is also central to efforts to tackle illegal or
environmentally noncompliant mining operations.
Beijing also began focusing on ensuring the reserves remain plentiful and
established commercial and national stockpiles managed by the China State
Reserve Bureau. Since annual production includes stockpiling a share of REE
materials, the PRC can impact global markets by manipulating its stockpile levels
and influence market prices by increasing or releasing its strategic reserves for a
limited period.26 Chinese authorities also attempt to attract foreign investors to
establish mining and processing facilities in the country with the lure of access to
raw materials, metals, alloys, and the burgeoning Chinese market. Nonetheless,
some foreign investors remain hesitant because of technology-sharing concerns.
22. Jamie Smyth, “US-China: Washington Revives Plans for Its Rare Earths Industry,” Financial Times,
Big Read, September 14, 2020.
23. Yu and Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth,” 4.
24. Chen and Zheng, “What Happens,” 11, 1288.
25. Mancheri et al., “Effect of Chinese Policies,” 101–12.
26. Polina Klossek, Jakob Kullik, and Karl Gerald van den Boogaart, “A Systemic Approach to the Problems
of the Rare Earth Market,” Resources Policy 50 (2016): 131–40.
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Overcoming China’s Control over Market Prices
The surge in prices of rare-earth elements in 2010–11 revealed the vulnerability
of Western nations to disruptions in the supply chain and triggered a wave of
studies, government reports, and legislative efforts proposing solutions to this
dependency. Popular recommendations include increasing and diversifying mining
and processing activities, investing in research and development to find substitute
materials, and lowering usage intensity or expanding recycling. A 2017 study by
Sprecher et al. proposed a framework with mechanisms to improve resilience
in supply chains.27 The first step is the diversification of supply by promoting
production in different countries or expanding recycling programs. Second, the
stockpiling of materials can serve as a buffer against temporary supply disruptions.
On the demand side, US manufacturers can develop technologies that reduce
usage or allow for substitution. As previously discussed, the Trump administration
proposed a multipronged approach to this issue through Executive Order 13817.
These efforts will face important economic challenges. First, investments in this
sector are technically complex, take at least 10 years to materialize, and require
a hard-to-find, skilled workforce and significant financial resources (typically
over $1 billion USD). Furthermore, global pricing is far from transparent and
is often affected by Chinese domestic policies. Due to the lack of information
on real REE production or break-even costs in China, Western producers find it
difficult to price their products competitively. This market uncertainty also exposes
investors to prohibitive short-term risks and precludes new investments and the
diversification of this supply chain.28 After all, international financial markets
have not forgotten recent bankruptcies of US and Australian mining operations.
In this market environment, proposed solutions must first recognize the global
market is not a level playing field and market-based actors are competing against a
state-capitalist economy that subsidizes and controls its domestic sector.
A growing number of industry experts suggest market forces alone will not
enable the development of alternative supply chains. Instead, they highlight the
need for significant public funding and continued government support.29 This is,
in part, because of China’s history of flooding the market with cheap rare-earth
elements when it perceives credible competition from other nations. Economists
call this behavior limit pricing, and it involves a monopolistic firm reducing
its prices to the point where new firms will not be able to make any profit or
even enter the market. While this action may lower potential short-term profits
27. Benjamin Sprecher et al., “Novel Indicators for the Quantification of Resilience in Critical Material
Supply Chains, with a 2010 Rare Earth Crisis Case Study,” Environmental Science and Technology, 51 (2017),
3860–70.
28. Klossek, Kullik, and van den Boogaart, “Systemic Approach,” 131–40; and Mancheri et. al., “Effect of
Chinese Policies,” 101–12.
29. Smyth, “Washington Revives Plans,” 6, 4.
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of the monopolistic firms, it also enables them to maintain their position and
long-term profitability. Limit pricing is less effective against new competitors
capable of absorbing losses over time. The past financial problems and subsequent
bankruptcies of Molycorp and Lynas, however, seem to indicate otherwise.
Furthermore, limit pricing is more effective for industries with significant
economies of scale. Entry in these types of markets is difficult and limited to a
very small number of firms because of the very large required investments.30
The Chinese use of limit pricing impacts Western production and supply
chains through three different channels: (1) impact its competitor’s profitability,
(2) discourage recycling, and (3) erode the need for building up strategic stockpiles.
Competitors’ Profitability
China can depress global prices and render Western competitors economically
unviable by increasing official production quotas or easing the crackdown on
illegal mining operations. The Chinese government can also support temporary
export surges by depleting its strategic REE reserves. Hence, Western governments
and investors must be prepared to endure temporary losses while recognizing
the use of limit pricing presents perils for China as well.31 First, Chinese mining
companies will provide resistance to lower market prices since this action will
lower their short-term profits. Second, China’s economic planners failed to
predict the rapid surge in domestic consumption of rare-earth elements and the
recent decreases in domestic production that followed the industry consolidation
and tougher enforcement of environmental regulations.32 Thus, it is unlikely
China will employ price limiting for prolonged periods of time as it would divert
valuable resources away from its processing industry. Lastly, surges in production
and exports would accelerate the depletion of this nonrenewable resource.
Building a Recycling Program
Levels of reuse and recycling of products containing rare-earth elements
remain modest worldwide, and the volume of these elements embedded in
existing products or waste streams continues to be a mostly untapped source.
This lack of reuse is largely explained by low market prices, logistical
complexities, high set-up costs, and negative environmental impacts associated
with recycling programs, mainly the use of toxic substances and the large amounts
of energy required to separate rare-earth elements from recycled materials.33
30. Jamie Smyth, “Industry Needs a Rare Earths Supply Chain outside China” Financial Times,
September 25, 2020.
31. Smyth, “Industry Needs Rare Earths, 6; and Beattie, “Failure to Diversify,” 4.
32. Butler, “Rare Earth Elements,” 30.
33. Beattie, “Failure to Diversify,” 2.
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A number of federally-supported, ongoing efforts in the United States seek to
increase the reuse and recycling of rare-earth elements. As long as Beijing retains
its pricing power, however, recycling alone will not close the wide gap between
demand and supply in the near future.34 Thus, the US government and its allies
must develop long-term recycling program incentives and exploit alternative
sources resilient to temporary price manipulations by China.
Building National Stockpiles
The National Defense Stockpile, established by the US Congress in 1939
(Title 50 United States Code § 98 et seq.) to decrease or avert dependency
on foreign sources for supplies of strategic and critical materials in times
of national emergency, was designed to store materials for a three-year war
scenario and now includes 40 different commodities stockpiled nationwide,
including rare-earth elements.35 Policymakers and pundits argue end users
should augment stockpile levels of raw material and REE-based critical
components to cope with temporary market disruptions or supply bottlenecks—
even if that augmentation means building reserves large enough to sustain
production for several years. Procuring and storing large reserves can be a risky
and costly decision. For example, Western governments and businesses could
capitalize on a Chinese-induced market glut by building up strategic stockpiles
at reduced prices. If prices remain low for longer periods of time, however,
holding large stockpiles would become financially unattractive. Also, the
development of new technologies could render long-term stockpiles obsolete and
create significant losses for the holders.
Since military technology requires only limited quantities of rare-earth
elements, diminishing supplies from China would not impact the US military
complex if the US government and industry maintain reserve levels large
enough to sustain manufacturing operations for several years and enough active
Western mining operations remain in line. These stockpiles should be part
of the US government’s and manufacturers’ risk management strategies and
may require public subsidies and international cooperation (for example,
development of a multinational consortium on REE stocking that involves
multiple NATO countries). The reserves should serve as a temporary tool to
absorb short-lived market disruptions until the United States can become selfreliant in mining and processing.

34. Chen and Zheng, “What Happens,” 16.
35. Heidi M. Peters, “Defense Primer: Acquiring Specialty Metals, Rare Earth Magnets, and Tungsten,”
Congressional Research Service, In Focus, January 30, 2020; and Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements,” 21.
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Proposed Long-term Solutions
This section proposes a series of longer-term solutions for Western countries
to counter China’s dominance in the global market. These measures are
well-aligned with the current market environment where Beijing is unable to
use limit pricing as in the past due to its own shortages and recent strategic goals
set by the US government (for example, Department of Energy).36
Creation of an Integrated Domestic Processing Industry
An integrated approach will enable the United States to manufacture the
component parts needed by the military complex and the emerging green
economy. If the United States expands its mining without developing a domestic
refining and manufacturing capacity, the country will move its dependency risk
along the supply chain. The following two highly probable scenarios underscore
the urgent need for building domestic value-added refining, metal production, and
alloying capacity in tandem with an expansion in domestic mining.
In scenario 1, China reduces its production and increases its imports.
China is now a major consumer of raw rare-earth elements while its domestic
production continues to decrease due to environmental and other policy
constraints. The country, therefore, will have to increase its imports of REE
concentrates or establish mining operations in other parts of the world, which
would help them circumvent the negative environmental consequences generated
by the industry. Both options will increase global competition for these raw
materials and reduce availability for refiners outside China (for example, in
the United States). Hence, the development of a US refining industry will
inexorably depend on reliable access to raw materials mined in the United States
or by its allies.
In scenario 2, China increases its production and decreases its imports. If
the PRC increases production and reduces imports, Western mining operations
dependent on China as an export market would be adversely impacted. Very few
smelters and processors outside the country can produce REE oxides and metals.
A US vertically integrated sector would guarantee a stable destination market
for Western mining operations and may be the only path to attract the investor
financing needed for this risky sector.37 In order to expand its refining capacity,
the United States must play catch-up and make significant investments toward
rebuilding a skilled labor force and establishing a comprehensive research
infrastructure. This step will require political will and significant public spending
36. US Department of Energy, Critical Minerals and Materials.
37. Humphries, “Rare Earth Elements.”
TOC

Understanding a Changing China

Ferreira and Critelli 69

to develop lasting partnerships between the US government, higher-education
institutions, and stakeholders from the mining and financing industries. It is
important to remember, Beijing channeled significant resources for decades
to develop world-class scientific institutes focused exclusively on researching
rare-earth elements. The United States will need to make an equal commitment
to regain its first-place standing in the global marketplace.38
Increased Collaboration, New Procurement Strategies, and New Technologies
Certain REE materials do not exist in the United States and others are not
available in economical quantities, so refining specific rare-earth elements
may not be cost-effective domestically. Western nations can address these
challenges via public policies, technological breakthroughs, and cooperation. The
United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia began setting up new
programs involving coordination and research funding for domestic operations.
At the federal level, as proposed in Executive Order 13817, the Department
of Defense can foster collaboration with friendly nations and their businesses by
employing mechanisms, such as reciprocal defense procurement or security of
supply arrangements, to ensure the widest supply of defense goods and services.
These arrangements could expand the participation of allies and strategic
partners in US defense procurement processes and guarantee acquisitions of
rare-earth elements to meet pressing warfighter and industrial needs. For example,
in August 2020, Ellen Lord, Department of Defense undersecretary of defense
for acquisition and sustainment, announced the Pentagon was in early talks with
Australia to have the country process a significant portion of rare-earth materials
for the US military.39 Also, three US and Canadian companies have joined
efforts to set up a supply chain using radioactive monazite sands—a mining
by-product. This collaboration will integrate the different phases of production,
including mining and refinement, and will produce enough monazite to meet
half of the United States’ needs.40
End users of rare-earth elements are also key stakeholders who can shape
the market through their procurement practices because lower-tier managers
often make procurement decisions driven mostly by low-cost considerations,
translating to purchases of cheap Chinese supplies. The United States needs
a more strategic and coordinated approach to procurement that should involve
38. Pothen and Fink, “Political Economy,” 13.
39. Reuters Staff, “Pentagon in Talks with Australia on Rare Earths Plant: Official,” Reuters (website), August 27,
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-rareearths-australia/pentagon-in-talks-with-australia-on-rare
-earths-plant-official-idUSKCN1VH1UY.
40. “A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” Exec. Order 13817,
December 26, 2017, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/12/26/2017-27899/a-federal-strategy-to
-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-of-critical-minerals.
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chief executives and government agencies. Finally, ongoing efforts to increase
processing and manufacturing efficiency would lower material intensity and
minimize waste. A new major technological breakthrough in the industry
could make an impact akin to the contribution of fracking technology to
US energy independence.
Conclusion
Rare-earth elements are strategic resources with multiple business and
technological applications. Due to China’s global dominance in the market,
the US manufacturing and military sectors are vulnerable to potential Chinese
political and economic aggression. Control over the supply chains should be
an issue of extreme concern for Western nations because it has been for the
Chinese government. While the vulnerability of the US military complex
often captures headlines and the attention of policymakers, the threat to the
economy is much broader and more concerning.
For example, commitments made by US and international automakers to
increase the number of electric vehicles in their fleets is gaining momentum.
With its vertically integrated supply chain, China now holds over 70 percent
of the world’s electric-vehicle battery manufacturing capacity, whereas the
United States possesses less than 10 percent of the share. Moreover, Beijing
has set the goal to produce 50 percent of the world’s electric vehicles and 50
percent of the world’s hybrid vehicles by 2025.41 Any delays in the development
of alternative REE supplies gives the PRC more time to consolidate its market
position and develop new monopolies in these fast-growing economic sectors.
Following the 2010 market disruption and decades of talks, good intentions,
and feeble financial commitments, Western nations have yet to change the status
quo. This lack of action was partly due to Beijing’s decision to flood the global
market with rare-earth elements at subsidized prices, driving out for-profit
competitors and dissuading new market entrants. A new window of opportunity
is opening for Western businesses as demand for rare-earth elements in the
PRC currently exceeds domestic supply.42 Facing its own shortages, China will
no longer be able to use limit pricing as it did in the past. This new market
reality, coupled with financial backing from their respective governments, could
provide Western producers enough time to emerge. Furthermore, Beijing knows

41. Smyth, “Washington Revives Plans,” 7.
42. Yu and Sevastopulo, “China Targets Rare Earth,” 4.
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any overly aggressive move it makes will further galvanize its rivals to develop
their own production and processing capacities.
Establishing a viable supply chain for rare-earth elements will take years
and will require the United States to remain focused on long-term solutions.
These efforts should include stockpiling and recycling, increasing domestic
production and refining, and investing in joint ventures with trusted strategic
partners. In order to succeed, these ventures will require significant public
investments and enduring public support. Heavier involvement of Washington
in this market may face domestic political headwinds and challenges in the
international arena (for example, Beijing leading a complaint at the World
Trade Organization). As China continues to lose market power and domestic
political backing for REE independence gains momentum, the United States
is well-poised to use the defense complex and create cutting-edge industries to
break this long-lasting dependency.
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Chinese and Western Ways of War and Their Ethics
C. Anthony Pfaff

ABSTRACT: US officials often portray the Chinese government as having few,
if any, ethical boundaries in its pursuit of power. This article argues China, like
Western countries, has a rich ethical tradition of constraining its use of military
power. With a focus on the relationship between ways of war and ethics of war,
this article relies on traditional and contemporary scholarship from both the East
and the West to highlight differences in how each culture views the practical and
ethical aspects of war and how these views can interact. Understanding the ethical
logic available to one’s rivals can enable US leaders and planners to leverage China’s
behavior and optimally shape US policies and actions.

Keywords: comparative ethics, just war theory, China, military ethics,
strategic competition

T

he claim that the Chinese government cares little for ethical norms is
commonly made in the context of national security. For example, in December
2020, then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe stated the
Chinese government had “no ethical boundaries” in its pursuit of power.1 As Ratcliffe
further pointed out, the Chinese steal defense and proprietary secrets; suppress free
speech, even outside China’s borders; and regularly bully their neighbors over boundary
issues. Thus, the Chinese government’s apparent ethos is, as Ratcliffe describes it,
a radical utilitarianism in which the good of the Chinese Communist Party is the
only concern. Strategists might further conclude the behavior of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) in war would be no less constrained.

The fact the Chinese government might not accept US norms, does not mean it
accepts no norms. Ethics at the strategic level are about reconciling the demands of
national security with the near-universal sentiment of limiting human suffering and
the desire to conform to cultural values.2 To understand another culture’s military
ethic, strategists must understand how the culture reconciles the achievement of
success with those values and how a country’s way of war shapes its ethics of war.
Both Western and Chinese strategic traditions regarding armed conflict are rich with
strategic and ethical analysis.
In general, a Western way of war emphasizes the imposition of one’s will on an
opponent, and the Chinese way of war emphasizes convincing an adversary to accept
1. John Ratcliffe, “China Is National Security Threat No. 1,” Wall Street Journal (website), December 3, 2020,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national-security-threat-no-1-11607019599.
2. Martin Cook, The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the US Military (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2004), 21.
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Chinese interests. The ethic resulting from the former is one of competing
principles, where the task is to eliminate the enemy’s ability to resist while
avoiding harm to persons and things not necessary to this resistance and ensuring
the least expense of blood and treasure. The ethic that arises from the latter is one
of virtue that appears more permissive in terms of means and ends. The ethic,
however, deemphasizes destruction and constrains means and ends—in the ideal,
at least—by the demands of justice and benevolence.
Both East and West are inconsistent in following the practical and normative
principles of these traditions. This article, therefore, avoids assessing how well
either side lives up to its traditional ideal. Inconsistency, does not necessarily rob
these traditions of their power. Rather, inconsistencies highlight an ideal against
which state behavior can be assessed. The US commitment to human rights,
for example, was used to criticize the nation’s post-9/11 policies on interrogation
and its use of air strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan—criticisms that led to policy
changes. China has sometimes proved similarly sensitive. Despite Ratcliffe’s
charge that the Chinese government is conducting genetic experiments with its
soldiers, the country established a bioethics committee after a researcher edited
the genomes of two infants, an act the government also condemned.3
Ways and Ethics of War
Sociologist Martin Shaw describes a way of war as a method of organizing
armed conflict that reflects patterns in the practice of warfighting. Ways of war
are inherently practical and primarily focused on the threats a security community
faces and the tools it has to confront them.4 How these tools are used depends
on the security community’s understanding of the character of war, which in turn
informs its way of war, which is how it will compete and, when necessary, fight.
These choices include how to organize and equip militaries, and they determine
which strategies to adopt against a given foe. Presumably, state actors organize
their militaries to respond to the most dangerous perceived threat, and, from any
national security perspective, these threats (and the responses to them) determine
the way of war the security community adopts.5
As an ideal, ways of war inform practice, but they do not determine it. If a
country organizes to face its most serious threat, the country will not necessarily use
the same capabilities in other contexts. The United States’ commitment of military
forces to peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, for example, does not suggest
3. Hepeng Jia, “China Approves Ethics Advisory Group after CRISPR-Babies Scandal,” Nature (website),
August 8, 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02362-5; and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 129–30.
4. Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005), 29, 42.
5. Colin S. Gray, “War—Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity,” Parameters 50, no. 2
(Summer 2010): 7.
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the country has changed its view of international competition or warfighting.
Moreover, the relationship is not unidirectional. Ethics also inform the way of war.
For example, a commitment to minimizing collateral harms, however motivated,
can encourage the development of increasingly precise weapons. Understanding
the ideal helps strategists see why opponents choose capabilities, strategies, and—
most important for this discussion—practical and ethical norms that guide how
opponents compete and fight.
Western Way of War
Drawing on the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz’s writings, the US
military, (and Western militaries more generally) tends to view the aim of war as
imposing its will on the enemy.6 While the logic of this kind of war is simple in
expression, it is difficult in application. A state has imposed its will successfully
when the enemy no longer has the capacity to resist and when it eliminates the
enemy’s capacity to resist by shutting down the enemy’s combat capability faster
than the enemy can eliminate its own. Doing so relies on a strategy of annihilation
and attrition that destroys as much enemy military capability as possible.7
The existential nature of the threat the enemy poses is another critical aspect
of this view. To underscore the close association of existential threat with the
Western way of war, Pamela Creed notes how President George W. Bush
positioned the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an existential threat that created
“character polarities” between the American people (who sacrifice to defend
their rights) and the enemy (who was fueled by an “irrational hate” for the
American way of life).8 Rather than adjudicating whether this characterization
of al-Qaeda was fair, this description was as much a response to the feeling the
United States was at war as it was a reflection of the cultural views of what it
takes to win wars.
The point here is not that the United States only goes to war against existential
threats. Rather, organizing to fight such a threat shapes the capabilities the US
military creates and the strategies it adopts. When conflict arises, an existential
threat provides little room for negotiation, leaving little else to do but eliminate
the enemy’s ability to resist. This approach closely identifies military objectives
with political ones because destroying military capability, in this view, entails
victory. This point is important. Imposing one’s will on the enemy does not mean
the enemy must adopt new goals. It simply means eliminating the enemy’s ability
to prevent the realization of goals.
6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1968), 101.
7. C. Anthony Pfaff, Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2011), 9.
8. Pamela Creed, Ethics, Norms, and the Narratives of War (New York: Routledge, 2013), 23.
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Put another way, imposing the United States’s will means preserving its
freedom of action while limiting the enemy’s. Imposing this will is like Max
Weber’s concept of domination. For Weber, domination entailed involuntary
obedience. He contrasted this obedience with power, which reflected an actor’s
ability to obtain voluntary compliance.9 For example, whether Saddam Hussein
accepted regime change did not matter because he could do little to prevent it. The
refusal of many, if not most, Iraqis to accept the new order did matter. Thus, the
annihilation-based strategy that worked so well in 1991 and 2003 failed against
terrorist and insurgent groups. The United States’ 2003 description of its strategy
to defeat Hussein as “shock and awe” was probably no coincidence.10
Western Ethic of War
The Western just-war tradition began with Aristotle and the tradition took
form as St. Augustine and his successors in the Roman Catholic Church wrestled
with the demands of state. Then, thinkers such as Hugo Grotius secularized its
principles. Grotius is generally credited as being one of the first jurists to describe
a set of laws for armed conflict. Beginning in the 1860s, when Henri Dunant
proposed the first Geneva Conventions and Francis Lieber drew up a code
of conduct for Union soldiers in the American Civil War, the principles of the
just-war tradition found their way into international law.11
In general, the just-war tradition permits war for self-defense or the defense of
others against an act of aggression, which is understood as a violation of political
sovereignty or territorial integrity.12 Although not every violation of sovereignty
or territory represents an existential threat, the idea of such a violation is central
to justifications for war. For example, though Iraq was not an existential threat
to the United States in 1991, the existential threat it posed to Kuwait featured
prominently in the rationale for war.13 Violating another’s sovereignty or territory
may be permitted to prevent a gross violation of human rights or a humanitarian
disaster, both of which are existential in nature. Other conditions must
also hold, including legitimate authority, public declaration, last resort, likelihood
of success, proportionality, and proper intent, for some just-war thinkers like
9. Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978), 53.
10. John T. Correll, “What Happened to Shock and Awe?,” Air Force Magazine (website), November 3, 2003,
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/1103shock/.
11. Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press, 2006), 9–26; and “The ICRC
and the Geneva Convention (1863–1864), International Committee for the Red Cross (website), December 29,
2004, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/57jnvt.htm.
12. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book II, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2005), quoted in The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse,
and Endre Begby (Malden, MA: Blackwell Press, 2006), 401–404; and Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 62.
13. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 220.
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St. Augustine.14 Taken together, these conditions constrain when the US
military may pursue even a just cause, thus ensuring violence is not committed for
trivial or futile ends.
In this view, winning wars emphasizes the destruction of enemy military
capability and logically excludes things that do not directly contribute to this
capability. Combatants must discriminate between targets associated with the
enemy’s military capability and those that are not, and only use force proportional
to the value of the military objective. The Western just-war tradition also
excludes other things, regardless of how they contribute to enemy military
capability, such as hospitals and infrastructure associated with food and water,
even if they are used by the military. Justifications for these exclusions include
human rights and setting conditions for a better state of peace.15
For ethical decision making, the Western military ethic places three
imperatives in tension: the imperative to win, the imperative to protect the
force, and the imperative to avoid noncombatant and other collateral harms. The
imperative to win draws moral justification from the justice of the cause. The
imperative to protect the force draws justification from both the conservation of
forces from the standpoint of the first imperative and soldiers having the right not
to be sacrificed for inadequate reason. Finally, the imperative to avoid harming
noncombatants and committing other collateral harms draws justification from
the notion that doing so is gratuitous in some cases and unethical in others.
Even when excluded things might facilitate the destruction of enemy forces,
avoiding them does not prevent it.16
The United States and its partners have not always used force as discriminately
as their ethics generally require, but violating a norm is different from rejecting
it. Normative power is expressed both in terms of compliance and in terms of
how others respond to violations. For example, Sir Arthur Harris, also known
as “Bomber Harris,” who directed an indiscriminate bombing campaign against
German cities in World War II, was “slighted and snubbed” after the war and
did not receive the honors others of similar rank and experience did. Moreover,
though the names of the fighter pilots who died during the Battle of Britain
are inscribed on plaques at Westminster Abbey, the plaques do not mention the
Royal Air Force Bomber Command or its crews.17 In fact, despite conducting
indiscriminate bombing campaigns against Japanese cities after the war, the
14. Orend, Morality of War, 31–62, 90–96.
15. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 135; and Jeff McMahan, “Realism, Morality, and War,” in The Ethics
of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1996), 88.
16. Pfaff, Resolving Ethical Challenges, 8.
17. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 323–25.
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United States endorsed additions to the Geneva Conventions that reinforced the
protection of civilians as a legal requirement.18
Chinese Way of War
Both Western and Chinese views on military matters have a long, complex,
and intellectually rich history. Strategists must be careful about reducing these
matters to one school of thought, much less one thinker. Nonetheless, just as
Clausewitz has an outsize influence on Western thinking, Sun Tzu has the same
effect on Chinese thought. Ping-cheung Lo, a contemporary scholar of Chinese
military ethics, remarks that contemporary Chinese discourse on The Art of War
is “dominated by PLA authors.”19 Of course, both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are
read in both the United States and China. Sun Tzu’s methods, however, have
not informed the US way of war in the same way they appear to have informed
the Chinese way.
Western readers are likely familiar with Unrestricted Warfare, one of the
most prominent applications of Sun Tzu. Written by Chinese then-colonels
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, this book contrasts Sun Tzu with Clausewitz,
arguing China should follow an unrestricted warfare strategy because no
competitors are able to impose their will on the United States, given its
conventional superiority. The colonels call for “using all means, including armed
force or nonarmed force, military and nonmilitary, and lethal and nonlethal
means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”20
This view would exploit the point where the Western way of war closes
the gap between military and political objectives. Since political and military
objectives do not have a necessary connection, success depends on bringing to
bear other elements of national power and integrating them into the military
effort. This feature necessarily draws in nonviolent means of competition that
emphasize coercion and deception, which Weber would have referred to as
“power,” as opposed to brute force and attrition, which he would have referred
to as “domination.”21 While brute force has its place, its use reflects a failure of
the ideal and, thus, should be the exception rather than the rule.22 Moreover, this
view connects the nature and quality of civil governance with military capability
because the civil government wields the full range of the tools of conflict. In this
18. Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, ed., Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press, 1989), 271–72.
19. Ping-cheung Lo, “Warfare Ethics in Sunzi’s Art of War? Historical Controversies and Contemporary
Perspectives,” Journal of Military Ethics 11, no. 2 (August 2012): 124.
20. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing
House, February 1999), 7.
21. Weber, Economy and Society, 53.
22. Lo, “Warfare Ethics,” 122.
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context, Confucian writers notably prefaced their works on military affairs with
discussions of statecraft.23
Additionally, each way of war seeks to realize the ends of war differently.
In A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, François Jullien
contrasts Western “means-ends” thinking with Chinese “opportunism.”24 Although
the term “Western” may not accurately and completely describe US strategic
decision making, Jullien observes Western military thinking determines the
right objective and then tries to organize the resources available to
achieve it. In this way, a general engaging in battle is much like a ship
captain undertaking a voyage. As Jullien observes, “[B]oth operate within
constantly shifting fields, full of unpredictabilities, to the very end never certain
of triumphing over the enemy or making it to port.”25 Success is never guaranteed;
friction and chance can always undo the best plans.
According to Jullien, Chinese thinking analyzes a situation in terms of the
potential to gain from it. The generals’ role here is to understand what factors
promote their interests and then act when those factors align to advance the
interests. Sun Tzu captures the difference in chapter four when he states,
“The victorious troops thus begin by winning and only then engage in battle,
whereas the defeated troops begin by engaging in battle and only then try to
win.”26 Put another way, the troops see the potential first, and then they engage
to realize the potential. Like Jullien’s description of the Western view, the
Chinese view acknowledges some factors will always be uncontrollable. Rather
than trying to control or to minimize the factors’ effects on achieving the intended
objective, the Chinese view avoids setting a single, discrete objective in the first
place and seeks to identify and act on opportunities to improve one’s situation
relative to the enemy. In further describing the Chinese view, Jullien states,
“[C]ircumstances may often be unforeseen, even unforeseeable, and
unprecedented, which is why it is not possible to draw up a plan in advance.
Rather, they contain a certain potential from which, if we are agile and adaptable,
we can profit.”27
The approach described here is reflected in Chinese doctrine. In response to
superior US conventional capabilities, the PLA employs a concept of shashoujian
or “assassin’s mace,” an umbrella term that refers to the doctrinal development
and acquisition of weapons systems aimed at enabling the inferior to defeat
23. Ping-cheung Lo, “Varieties of Statecraft and Warfare Ethics in Early China,” in Chinese Just War Ethics:
Origin, Development, and Dissent, ed. Ping-cheung Lo and Sumner B. Twiss (New York: Routledge, 2015), 8.
24. François Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, trans. Janet Lloyd (Honolulu:
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004).
25. Jullien, Treatise on Efficacy, 40–41.
26. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samul B. Griffith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1971), 55,
quoted in Jullien, Treatise on Efficacy, 42–43.
27. Jullien, Treatise on Efficacy, 38–39.
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the superior.28 This doctrine relies on surprise and deceptive and unorthodox
methods “unknown to an adversary.” The means employed under this doctrine—
such as those described above—are intended to achieve the effects of deterring,
decapitating, blinding, paralyzing, or disintegrating enemy forces. Interestingly,
disintegration in this context refers to breaking down command and control.29
“Destroying” the enemy does not make this list. This omission fits into a view that
sees the use of force—and the other elements of national power—as a means to
limit conflict and avoid escalation to conventional war—which, being the weaker
power, the PLA would likely lose.
Paradoxically, a view that seeks to limit conflict can expand the roles force
can play. As Zheng Wang argues in Never Forget National Humiliation, China’s
perceived humiliation by the West serves as a barrier to negotiation and trust
and places the West and China in conflict from which they cannot escape.
Consequently, future perceived humiliations could paradoxically escalate
into war. For example, in 1995 after the Clinton administration permitted
then-President of Taiwan Lee Teng-hui to travel to the United States to
deliver the commencement address at his alma mater Cornell University, China
recalled its ambassador from Washington, rejected the appointment of a new
US ambassador to China, and conducted large-scale military exercises. As Wang
describes, “A very strong sense of crisis and insecurity has become an important
theme of the national political discourse in China.”30 Nothing indicates the
situation would have escalated to violence; however, the inclusion of the
military in China’s response to the perceived political affront underscores
the seriousness with which the Chinese take such offenses. Imagining a set of
circumstances that would lead to a greater crisis is difficult.
Fear of future humiliation is not the only normative principle driving
Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, nothing in this analysis should suggest
China’s competition with the United States is motivated by anything but a desire
to surpass it as a global power, as described in Jonathan Ward’s China’s Vision of
Victory, or to establish an international order China considers more favorable,
as described in Rush Doshi’s The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace
American Order.31 Nor should this analysis suggest China and the United States’
28. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (July–August 2009);
and Jason E. Bruzdzinski, “Demystifying Shashoujian: China’s ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Concept,” in Civil Military
Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2004), 333.
29. Bruzdzinski, “Demystifying Shashoujian,” 341, 344.
30. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 132, 165, 184.
31. Jonathan D. T. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory (Arlington, VA: Atlas Publishing and Media Company
LLC, 2019), 20; and Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 3.
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views of just order are moral equivalents. However, an ethic exists that can guide
both the ends China seeks and the means used to seek them.
Chinese Ethic of War
In practice, the PLA grounds its military ethics in Marxist-Leninist ideology,
which typically expresses itself as a kind of utilitarianism in which socialism is
to be advanced to the maximum extent practicable.32 Nevertheless, since the
1980s, traditional Chinese thought, especially Confucianism, has found its way
back into Chinese civic culture as an antidote to encroaching Western values.33
Not surprisingly, such thinking has migrated to the military, which has integrated
traditional views with its military ethics programs that reflect a socialist foundation
with Chinese characteristics.34 These traditional ethics took shape largely during
the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), during which boundaries were
in flux, leading to brutal wars as larger states consolidated power. This competition
gave rise to schools of thought that asked the question, “Can a nation govern so
well that it becomes a great power, and how should it moderate the destruction
that works against its great-power status?” Eventually, Confucianism would
be established as a kind of state religion that informed how dynasties that
consolidated power would govern and fight.35
The writing of contemporary PLA scholar Zhao Feng reflects these ethics.
Zhao Feng argues for “moral warfare,” in which one seeks to be morally superior
to one’s enemy.36 Such a view may appear on the surface as a particularly cynical
form of information warfare. Yet, for moral warfare to be effective, practitioners
must make an honest attempt to be moral. If not, they must present a stronger
moral case than the enemy does. This observation opens the door to the kind
of traditional just-war thinking described above, which, like its Western
counterpart, generally favors avoiding aggression and employing means that
limit destruction and the loss of innocent lives.
On the surface, an ethic of war based on Sun Tzu’s work seems odd.
Indeed, Chinese works on war during the Warring States period often offered no
moral justifications for the resort to, or the use of arms, against another state and
often argued resorting to war to increase the state’s territory or power was equally
32. Mark Metcalf, “In the Service of Military Combat Readiness: A Survey of 21st Century PLA Scholarship
on the Role of Military Ethics in Warfare” (unpublished manuscript, December 6, 2019), Microsoft Word file.
33. Yi-Huah Jiang, “Confucian Political Theory in Contemporary China,” Annual Review of Political Science
21 (2018): 156–63; and Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness.”
34. Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness.”
35. Lo, “Varieties of Statecraft,” 3–7.
36. Zhao Feng, “军事伦理学应当研究道德战范畴” [Military ethics should investigate the scope of moral
war], 南京政治学院学报 [ Journal of Nanjing Institute of Politics] 19, no. 4 (2003): 86–88, quoted in
Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness.”
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justified as wars of defense.37 Sun Tzu’s work falls into this category of amoral analysis
of warfare. Of the seven military classics, Sun Tzu’s is best known for the
absence of ethical thought and was criticized by contemporary Confucian thinkers
for this absence.38
Confucian thought makes an important contribution to Chinese military
ethical traditions. For example, Mencius, an early Confucian thinker, condemned
aggressive wars intended to expand territory and, in the spirit of the Western
concept of jus ad bellum (or the “justice of going to war”), “encourage[d] wars of
self-defense against aggression” as well as “punitive expeditions” undertaken by
rightfully authorized state actors to address a perceived wrong.39 The Spring and
Autumn Annals, believed to have been written by Confucius himself, specifies
self-defense, rectifying an injustice, and humanitarian intervention as conditions
for a just war while excluding preemption. Also, like Western just-war traditions,
these works include conditions such as legitimate authority, right intention,
and public declaration.40 Unlike the Western tradition, Confucius’s view, at
least as expressed in the Spring and Autumn Annals, qualifies the granting of
permission to go to war with the concept of ren, which places an emphasis on
humanity. So, even a putative just cause like self-defense may fall short of being
moral if its pursuit diminishes human flourishing.41
Mencius advocated for jus in bello (or “justice in war”) notions of immunity for
noncombatants and limited destruction. Other thinkers, like Xunzi, contributed
concepts such as “legitimate authority,” which includes justice and humanity as a
prerequisite for this legitimacy—an inclusion compatible with Western views.42
Moreover, this justice and humanity extend from the character of the ruler to the
conduct of war itself.43 In this way, the just (yi) and benevolent (ren) character of
the ruler constrains both when he can fight and how.44
Although this Confucian contribution arose out of concerns that views like
Sun Tzu’s did not adequately address ethical matters, the interpretation of The Art
of War as amoral may not be the best one. Prudential and moral norms are found
throughout the entirety of the text. Emphasizing restraint, Sun Tzu argues at the
beginning that war should be avoided, but when this fails, one should only rely “on
37. David Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” in The Prism of Just War: Asian and
Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military Force, ed. Howard M. Hensel (New York:
Routledge, 2016), 196–97.
38. Lo, “Varieties of Statecraft,” 115.
39. Aaron Stalnaker, “Xunzi’s Moral Analysis of War and Some of Its Contemporary Implications,” Journal
of Military Ethics 11, no. 2 (August 2012): 98.
40. Kam-por Yu, “Confucian Views on War as Seen in the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and
Autumn Annals,” Dao 9, no. 1 (March 2010): 104–5.
41. Yu, “Confucian Views on War,” 110.
42. Stalnaker, “Xunzi’s Moral Analysis,” 98.
43. Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 200.
44. Lo and Twiss, Chinese Just War Ethics, 8.
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smart strategies and tactics rather than a display of maximum force.” Moreover,
Sun Tzu, argues for a way of war that prefers preservation to destruction,
even when considering enemy formations.45 Of course, practical reasons for
preferring preservation exist. As Andrew Seth Meyer observes, Sun-Tzu insists
“every casualty of battle represents a loss for the victorious commander and his
ruler: every friendly soldier killed was of course an asset lost, but every enemy
soldier killed, every enemy provision destroyed, and every enemy fortification
razed were also potential assets forfeited.”46
In this regard, the interpretation of Sun Tzu’s work as “coldly pragmatic” is
not surprising.47 His concern was armies consume resources, and, as a result,
their use of resources must generate more resources than have been consumed;
otherwise, both war and the state are unsustainable.48 Understanding the continuity
between governance and military affairs not generally present in Western
thought is important. For both Sun Tzu and Confucian thinkers of the time,
“virtue, benevolence, and righteousness” served a “force multiplier” that increased
one’s chance for, if not guaranteed, victory. Sun Tzu may have diverged from
Confucian thinkers on the last point. He saw moral superiority as an advantage,
but one that was neither a necessary nor sufficient requirement for victory.49
Mencius and Xunzi, like others at the time, did see moral superiority as such
a requirement.50 Sun Tzu’s preference for restraint seems to arise from previous
moral commitments to a just and benevolent order, not simply a means of
effective resource management. Thus, Lo sees Sun Tzu’s ethics as similar to
those argued for by Henry Sidgwick, whose utilitarian “two-fold rule” insisted
force should only be used in pursuit of objectives that will lead to victory,
which serves a just cause—and, even then, only as much as is proportional to
the value of the objective.51 Although such an ethic does not fully account for
all intuitions about the morality of war, it does prohibit attacking purely civilian
targets and the disproportionate uses of force, regardless of the argument
made about the overall effect on ending the war successfully. Moreover, as
Michael Walzer notes, Sidgwick’s rule—and, by extension, Sun Tzu’s preferences—
at least establishes rules of war exist, which further distinguishes it from
murder or robbery.52

45. Lo, “Warfare Ethics,” 118.
46. Andrew Seth Meyer, trans., The Dao of the Military: Liu An’s Art of War (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2012), 13.
47. Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 202.
48. Meyer, Dao of the Military, 14.
49. Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 209, 201.
50. Stalnaker, “Xunzi’s Moral Analysis,” 101; and Graff, “Concept of Righteous War,” 200.
51. Lo, “Warfare Ethics,” 120–22; and Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 129.
52. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 128.
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Sun Tzu’s account is not entirely utilitarian in the same way Sidgwick’s is.
Maximizing victory in service to a just cause says nothing about the justice of
an act. Indeed, a major criticism of Sidgwick’s view is it permits too much: No
act, no matter how vicious or indiscriminate, would be impermissible as long
as it contributed to victory and the harm that was committed was proportional
to the contribution. If strategists accept Sun Tzu’s view is—or at least can be—
compatible with the Confucian concerns described, then acts of violence and
coercion maximizing a just and benevolent order would be insufficient because
these conditions would not stray very far from Sidgwick’s view. Rather, to the
extent acts of violence and coercion serve justice and benevolence, they must retain
the character of these virtues.
Many of these ideas have been expressed in some form in official Chinese
documents. Three scholars from the PLA Army Engineering University pointed
out China’s 2013 national defense white paper intentionally promulgated a military
ethic centered on the ideas of “justice, peace, and humanitarianism” that drew on
both historical and contemporary texts.53 These sentiments are reaffirmed in the
2019 national defense white paper.54 Although neither paper specifically references
military ethics, each expresses a set of norms Confucius would recognize. Thus,
blending Sun Tzu and Confucian views on the conduct of war, strategists end
up with an approach that more closely resembles neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics,
emphasizing the agent as opposed to the act.
Like utilitarian accounts, virtue ethics do not rule out any act. Unlike
utilitarianism, virtue ethics include character traits associated with the human
good.55 This complex idea of human good, often described as “flourishing,”
rests on the notion that virtues facilitate the fulfillment of human potential.
Thus, these traits would rule out acts that maximize a good, like happiness or
interest, if the acts did not also reflect the virtue. Since agents must discern the
best way to achieve an end, practical reason is inseparable from virtue.56 What
matters is what the virtuous person would do given the alternatives at hand. If
all the alternatives are terrible, then the virtuous person may do terrible things,
though the person would generally choose the least terrible alternative.

53. Zheng Zhen, Zhang Liping, and Hao Lihua, “Transcending Language and Promulgating Military
Ethics from the English Translation of the 2013 China National Defense Strategy,” Journal of English Studies
1 (2015), quoted in Metcalf, “Military Combat Readiness”; and State Council Information Office of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: State Council
Information Office of the PRC, 2013).
54. State Council Information Office of the PRC, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing:
State Council of the PRC, 2019).
55. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 25.
56. Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (New York: Clarendon Press,
1989), 3–4.
TOC

Understanding a Changing China

Pfaff 85

Similarly, a Confucian ethic requires the authority who wages war to have
the “mandate of heaven,” which requires rulers to possess the virtues of justice
and benevolence.57 Such virtues, when applied to war, may also appear utilitarian
in application; however, they are constrained by nonutilitarian, humanitarian
concerns associated with the relevant virtue. To the extent such an ethic is
followed, it will constrain action where Sidgwick does not. Possessing these
virtues requires rulers to subordinate their interests to the good of the people
over whom they rule, suggesting an independent standard against which rulers
can be criticized. For example, a ruler of the Zhou dynasty putting the interests
of his concubine over the needs of his army was seen as a moral failure subject
to criticism, if not remorse.58
Although Sun Tzu’s ethics may not be as fully developed as those of other
thinkers of the time, the privileging of just and benevolent governance as
the authority for the use of force suggests his commitment to restraint is
not merely pragmatic; rather it rests on a deeper notion of human flourishing.
Considered this way, Sun Tzu’s work may be more compatible with Confucian
thought than it first appears to be. This notion of restraint harmonizes with
an understanding of war that sees its purpose as shaping interests rather than
imposing will. Shaping interests requires the adversary to have sufficient
capability and capacity to act in a desired way; widespread destruction would
undermine this end.
Shifting the emphasis from imposing the state’s will to changing the enemy’s
mind means focusing on engaging the people rather than destroying the enemy.
Whereas the Western ethic seeks to employ the most force permissible; given the
limits of discrimination and proportionality, the Chinese view seeks to use the
least force possible given the demands of a just and benevolent order.
Conclusion
This article has avoided assessments of how well the United States and
China uphold their traditions. The deceptive practices former Director of
National Intelligence Ratcliffe complained about may be violations by traditional
Chinese standards. The employment of these practices, however, can appear
justified, given both their efficacy and their lowering of the chance of escalation.
Still, when a government does not adhere to its ethics, it becomes vulnerable
to moral critique, which can have practical consequences should the critique
undermine the actor’s legitimacy.
57. Philip J. Ivanhoe, “ ‘Heaven’s Mandate’ and the Concept of War in Early Confucianism,” in Ethics
and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 272.
58. Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1993), 3–4.
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This article should clearly convey Western and Chinese just-war traditions
have more similarities than differences. Whatever happens in practice, both
cultures rely on long traditions that specify when war is justified and constrain the
actions taken in its conduct. In addition, these permissions are similar because they
incorporate conceptions of justice and permit war only to promote this justice,
and both traditions recognize certain persons and things should be excluded from
harm, independent of how this exclusion would impact the chances for victory.
To the extent Western and Chinese war-ethics traditions are different, these
differences may lie in the Chinese emphasis on humanity and human flourishing
that can look like consequentialist reasoning and, when done poorly, likely is.
In fact, the Marxist-Leninist ethic, which clearly places the party’s good above
just about everything else, is frequently in tension with China’s more traditional
ideals, often resulting in catastrophic decisions, such as the one to intern
ethnic Uighurs.
This article has focused on ideals within two rich and complex traditions. As
a result, the utility of its analysis is limited to the extent the practical and moral
traditons discussed here have impacted Western and Chinese views. The literature
suggests this impact has been influential in each case. Human difficulty with ideals,
however, ensures there will be numerous exceptions to the ideals. Moreover, war is
evolutionary, and no way of war or its ethic is static or enduring. Although a way
of war like Sun Tzu’sm which relies on coercion and deception, may prevail over
one that emphasizes firepower and destruction, a new way will evolve in response.
Strategists developing this new way of war will be responsible for ensuring the
resulting ethic is one that harmonizes with both the requirement to win and the
demands of human flourishing.

C. Anthony Pfaff
Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is the professor for strategy, the military profession, and
ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College and a senior
nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.
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ABSTRACT: This article provides background and context for regional
trends and historic agreements focused on the Nile River Basin, offers a
comprehensive assessment of security challenges, and presents focus areas for
future investment and cooperation. The policy recommendations will serve
American interests better and improve agricultural practices in the region.
Without a marked alteration of existing aid from Western countries, the waterscarcity situation will continue without producing the required infrastructure
improvements.

Keywords: diplomatic history, water management, sub-Saharan
Africa, Nile River Basin, Egypt

O

ver the past decade, analysts and writers have captured public
attention with dire predictions and captivating headlines,
including “Water Wars: The Next Great Driver of Global
1
Conflict?” Population growth is projected to reach nine billion by 2050
and ominous water scarcity statistics center around ecological change
and resource shortfalls such as water and food. 2 Much of the change
will occur in sub-Saharan Africa, which will become the second-most
populous region in the world within the next decade, following Asia. This
area is also home to the largest concentration of “failed states.” 3 While
the United Nations Development Program excludes Algeria, Djibouti,
Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia from the sub-Saharan
Africa label, conflict spreads more easily to surrounding states due to their
geographic proximity. Population growth will further challenge an already
stressed water supply, while the precarious state of governance could
exacerbate conflict in the region. The densely populated area along the Nile

1. Peter Engelke and Russell Sticklor, “Water Wars: The Next Great Driver of Global Conflict?
National Interest (website), September 15, 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/water-wars-the-next-great
-driver-global-conflict-13842; Lauren Risi, “Beyond Water Wars,” Wilson Quarterly (Summer, 2019), https://
www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/water-in-a-world-of-conflict/beyond-water-wars/.
2. Mauro F. Guillén, 2030: How Today’s Biggest Trends Will Collide and Reshape the Future of Everything
(New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2020), 14.
3. Guillén, 2030, 25; and Andreas Karlsson, “Water and Conflicts,” Stockholm International Water Institute
(website), accessed September 3, 2021, https://siwi.org/why-water/water-and-conflict/.
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River is home to the majority of Egypt’s population of 100 million people—
a number that will grow to 128 million by 2030—and particularly vulnerable.4
This strategic policy article, with a historical twist, draws on the rich
history of the Nile River Basin and synthesizes social science studies
and environmental and demographic data to examine past and current
approaches to water scarcity in the region. Using data from the World
Bank and the United Nations regarding population growth, water
scarcity, and other trends to highlight frictions behind water demands,
it highlights lessons that can be learned from past water agreements to
better inform future policy decisions. For this article, countries in the Nile
River Basin are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda,
and the agreements and policies discussed (that serve as the foundation for
successor arrangements) cover these countries. Egypt is the one Nile River
Basin country linked to the Middle East that falls outside the designation
of sub-Saharan Africa, though it is included.
The analysis is broken into three sections. The first section focuses on
the background of the Nile River Basin and regional water challenges, the
second section provides context by reviewing historical agreements and
present policies, and the third section examines future conflict potential
and policy suggestions. Getting all parties as signatories to the 1999
Nile Basin Initiative should minimize intrastate war between countries
such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda, particularly
regarding water use and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. While
this coordination has proven challenging to date, the United States,
as one of Egypt’s largest donors, can encourage Egyptian leaders to
come to the table and reexamine water rights claims based on outdated
colonial agreements. Most of Egypt’s financial resources are directed
toward health and nutrition programs rather than improving agricultural
initiatives and crop yields that would impact nutrition and health over
the long term. 5
Background
While the Nile River Basin might appear to have ample access to
water, many regions along the basin experience water scarcity. Making
4. Omer Karasapan and Sajjad Shah, “Egypt’s Population: Boom then Bust?,” Brookings Institute
(website), May 22, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/05/22/egypts-population
-boom-then-bust/.
5. Thomas F. Husted et al., “U.S. Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview,” CRS Report R46468
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress/Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2020), https://purl.fdlp.gov
/GPO/gpo142314, 4.
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matters worse, these drier regions have large concentrations of people,
which means minor weather changes and population growth further stress
existing water supplies. Although this problem might suggest conflict over
water is common in the basin area, that assumption is not true. Globally,
263 rivers cross international borders, and surprisingly, there were 1,831
conflicts in those regions, though 507 contain secondary drivers related
to water access. 6 While water is vital for life, the economics of water is
often overlooked because, as Adam Smith highlighted in 1776 with the
diamond-water paradox, water is cheap, and diamonds are expensive. 7
Climate change adds to the challenges created by erratic rainfall, which can
cause floods or droughts with devastating consequences, and has impacted
over 300 million people during the past two decades. 8
According to the UN “International Decade for Action ‘Water for Life’
2005–2015” website, over 783 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, and 2.2
billion globally, have no access to clean drinking water. 9 The Nile River, the
second longest river in the world and the primary water source for the Nile
River Basin, covers over 3.2 million cubic kilometers and 12 countries. 10
The Nile consists of two separate rivers, the White Nile, originating in
Lake Victoria, East Africa, and the Blue Nile originating in Lake Tana,
Ethiopia, that span a vast area where the people are mostly poor and live
in several key regions. According to the Human Development Report, all
Nile River Basin countries are classified as low on the human development
index, except Egypt which is classified as medium. This means most of the
population lives in poverty and is susceptible to water and food shortages,
with over 300 million people living on less than $1 a day.11
Agriculture represents the largest source of income for the rural population. At
the same time, most arable land requires rainfall, and only 4 to 5 percent of the
region’s agricultural land contains irrigation systems, drastically limiting the ability
of the population to mitigate rainfall shortages.12 An area is considered waterstressed when each person has access to less than 1,500 cubic meters annually,
while water scarcity refers to levels less than 1,000 cubic meters. Regions with
6. Terje Oestigaard, Water Scarcity and Food Security along the Nile: Politics, Population Increase and Climate
Change (Uppsala, Sweden, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2012), 74.
7. Richard Damania et al., Unchartered Waters: The New Economics of Water Scarcity and Variability
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), 9.
8. Damania, et al., Unchartered Waters, 1.
9. “International Decade for Action ‘Water for Life’ 2005–2015,” United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, accessed March 20, 2021, https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/africa.shtml; and Risi,
“Beyond Water Wars.”
10. “Waternet: On the Geopolitics of Water Scarcity,” accessed February 10, 2020, https://www.waternet
.be/nile.
11. Oestigaard, Water Scarcity and Food Security along the Nile, 33.
12. Damania, et al., Unchartered Waters, 37.
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less than 500 cubic meters would be designated areas of absolute water scarcity.13
The NRB population is highly concentrated and most of the people depend on
agriculture for their livelihood. Some areas of the basin experience higher levels of
precipitation but storage and transmission infrastructure are lacking to collect and
distribute the water. Furthermore, low rainfall levels, some as low as 10 millimeters
per year in Egypt, and the lack of irrigation systems force most of the population
to depend on rainfall for their water needs. Figure 1 illustrates regions experiencing
water scarcity.

Figure 1. Regions experiencing severe water scarcity
(Note: Water scarcity <100 percent reflects a situation where net surface and groundwater withdrawals
plus environmental flow requirements are greater than the available supply. Source: Richard Damania
et al., Unchartered Waters: The New Economics of Water Scarcity and Variability (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2017), ©World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28096 License:
CC BY 3.0 IGO)

Every year, over 100,000 cubic meters of rain falls back to earth. If this water
were collected, it could potentially support every person on the planet with 15,000
cubic meters of water per year.14 The average amount of water required to grow
one calorie of food is one liter. Hence, a healthy diet of 2,000 calories a day
translates to 2,000 liters of water per person per day. Drought and water stress
are of particular concern in the Nile River Basin. While countries along the
Nile have access to water, people who live within walking distance of the river
can struggle to get enough water to survive. For example, in Ethiopia, water
infrastructure is so poor people have less than 50 cubic meters of water per
person.15 Rainfall across the region varies. Egypt, for example, only averages
10 millimeters annually.16 Thus, drought, water stress, and water scarcity are
13. Carlos Pavon, “Water Scarce Countries: Present and Future,” World Data Lab (website), October 15,
2019, https://worlddata.io/blog/water-scarce-countries-present-and-future.
14. Frank R. Rijsberman, “Every Last Drop: Managing Our Way Out of the Water Crisis,” Boston Review 33
(2008): 7–12, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303736864_Every_Last_Drop_Managing_our_way
_out_of_the_water_crisis.
15. Rijsberman, “Every Last Drop.”
16. Africa Water Atlas, United Nations Environment Programme (Malta: Progress Press Limited, 2010), 74.
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acute in the Nile River Basin. World leaders might be quick to disregard the issue,
without realizing there are numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements over
water, clear evidence the water narrative is cooperative rather than combative.17
Historic Agreements
The 1925, 1929, and 1959 historical water agreements remain a governing
element in the basin countries and leaders often cite them. Recently, John Mukum
Mbaku, a nonresident senior fellow for global economy and development with
the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution, wrote, “Over the
years, Egypt has used its extensive diplomatic connections and the colonial-era
1929 and 1959 agreements to successfully prevent the construction of any major
infrastructure projects on the tributaries of the Nile.”18 The factors involved in the
original water agreements need to be placed into a contemporary context that
demonstrates the agreements are no longer relevant. Properly understood, Egypt’s
claim of natural, historical rights must be discarded as an anachronistic legacy.
The British took direct control of Egypt in 1882, and cotton already represented
over 80 percent of the region’s exports to the robust English textile market,
incentivizing active British control of the waterways.19 The Aswan Low Dam (also
the Old Aswan Dam), was completed in 1902 to maximize cotton production
and supply the London mills. Lord Allenby subsequently issued his dictate that
Sudan would increase the farming region in Gezira, invoking the ire of Egypt
and leading to the creation of the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 stipulating
no project would take water from the Nile to “prejudice” the interests or reduce
the quantity of water arriving in Egypt. While the agreement did not guarantee a
specific amount of water, the river’s entire flow was designated for Egypt during
the dry season.
Several agreements were developed between colonial powers and various
basin states. For many years, England tried to secure a contract to build a dam at
Lake Tana. The Ethiopians, however, never conceded, nor were they part of the
Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. When Sudan gained independence in 1956,
the country’s leaders, concerned about the impact of the Aswan High Dam,
declared the country would not abide by the agreement. Tensions between Egypt
and Sudan escalated until 1959 when the strife was resolved with the signing of the
Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (FUNW) agreement, specifying Egypt would
receive 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters (billion cubic
17. Karin R. Bencala and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, “Water Wars: Obscuring Opportunities,” Journal of
International Affairs 61, no. 2 (2008): 21, http://www.jstor.org.ez-salve.idm.oclc.org/stable/24358109.
18. John Mukum Mbaku, “The Controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” Brookings
Institution (website), August 5, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the
-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.
19. Oestigaard, Water Scarcity and Food Security along the Nile, 34.
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meters based on average water levels of 84 billion cubic meters at Aswan) of water
from the dam, though no other countries were included in the agreement.
Egyptian references to the agreement with countries that fall outside the
colonial legacy raise the hackles of their neighbors. The historical 1929 and
1959 Nile Waters Agreements arose from British rule to support cotton
production in Egypt and farming in Sudan, none of which are relevant today.
Tensions over control of the Nile grew heated in 1997, prompting Egypt to cite
historical rights based upon the colonial agreements, suggesting all modern
states are bound to abide by these documents. Consequently, Sudan refused to
follow them, and Ethiopia reminded all parties it never signed the Nile Waters
Agreeement or the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters agreement; Tanzania,
Uganda, and Kenya had already adopted a position that current states were not
obligated to follow legacy treaties that do not serve current state interests.20
These frictions generated the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) for all riparian
states and established a cooperative framework for the use of the Nile, sustainable
water practices, and trust and transparency over water use for everyone in the
basin. Egypt and Sudan never signed the agreement (South Sudan is not a
member, and Eritrea is an observer) designed to promote constructive dialogue,
training, and collaborative development of sustainable water practices in the
Nile River Basin. Some friction exists with countries located downstream,
specifically Egypt and Sudan that want other members to request permission
before engaging in activities impacting the basin. The two controversies applicable
today are Egypt’s insistence on following a framework based upon colonial
agreements and Egypt and Sudan wanting NBI decisions to be based on
consensus rather than a majority. This method would ensure Egypt and Sudan
are not marginalized since they believe their colonial history grants them special
water access status.21
On March 30, 2011, Ethiopia announced construction of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile to provide much-needed electricity for its
population, once again raising the specter of water cooperation and questions
about access to the Nile. Egypt strongly opposed the construction of the dam,
however, the Arab Spring and the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
in April 2011 facilitated Ethiopia’s seamless inception of the project. Strangely,
Essam Sharaf, a former Egyptian prime minister, mentioned the dam as a benefit
for the region. Like Egypt, Sudan was too distracted by the secession of South
Sudan to engage over Ethiopia’s plans for a dam. Rather, the Sudanese were
more concerned about jurisdiction over petroleum and other natural resources
20. Oestigaard, Water Scarcity and Food Security along the Nile, 35, 36, 37.
21. Bencala and Dabelko, “Water Wars,” 25.
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than water-related agreements, undoubtedly because, heavy rains during
negotiations satisfied agricultural requirements. Beginning in July 2011 through
the middle of 2012, the entire East African region suffered a drought that
was one of the worst in the past century. The drought also caused a food crisis
in the Sudan region, forcing the Sudanese to focus on water rather than fossil
fuels. Subsequently, South Sudan applied for membership in the Nile Basin
Initiative and was admitted in 2012.22
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
The construction of the dam began while the region was struggling through
a drought and most political leaders were working to provide food and water for
populations on the brink of starvation. Ethiopian leaders focused on building the
dam to improve the lives of their people. More importantly, Ethiopia and other
riparian states insist on an equitable distribution of water. Many of the NRB states
refuse to acknowledge the 1959 agreement which focuses on the use of the Nile
for Egypt and Sudan exclusively, though allowing for 10 billion cubic meters for
seepage and evaporation, while ignoring the water needs of other countries.23
Neighboring countries demanded a more equitable agreement. Although
Egypt used its influence to block funding for Ethiopia’s dam project, Ethiopians
were willing to finance the project with additional loans secured from China,
much to the dismay of Egyptian leaders. The $4.6 billion dam project was
completed on July 22, 2020, and Ethiopia began the lengthy process of
filling the dam’s reservoir, which will reach total capacity in 2023.24 The dam’s
construction without any disagreements is not an indicator that all the riparian
states (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Uganda, Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan) are supportive. The apparent
peace is due to environmental factors having not significantly strained existing
water supplies.
The process of filling the dam is taking place without significant objections
from the Nile River Basin community. The dam, however, is likely to incite
disagreement. One way to head off potential conflict is to reach an agreement on
the discharge of water downstream during water shortages. Currently, no specific
agreement on water sharing and the impact of water diversion exists between
Egypt and Ethiopia. Furthermore, data are lacking on how the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam will change downstream water flow in both predictable and
22. Oestigaard, Water Scarcity and Food Security along the Nile, 42, 48.
23. Mbaku, “The Controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”
24. Elias Mesert, “Ethiopians Celebrate Progress in Building Dam on Nile River,” Washington Post
(website), August 2, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopians-celebrate-progress-in
-building-dam-on-nile-river/2020/08/02/77041354-d4e8-11ea-a788-2ce86ce81129_story.html.
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unpredictable ways. It will take years to determine the dam’s repercussions from
variables such as rainfall, how well Ethiopia adjusts to environmental changes
during the filling process, the consequences of filling the dam, and Sudan’s use
of the Nile.25 Another important consideration is the amount of water utilized
for irrigation in Sudan and Ethiopia. Noticeable impacts on the Nile might
automatically be attributed to Ethiopia and the dam and exaggerated or distorted
by public opinion and social media, which could transform into widespread
protests that could turn violent.
The Nile River Basin, a region with dense communities, poor water
infrastructure, and some rain flow averages as low as 10 millimeters annually,
has seen riots over food insecurity in the past. Water has the potential to drive
conflict and impact food production. A severe drought might tip the scales. Many
Nile River Basin countries have limited military capabilities. Egypt, however,
has the most significant military assets and the means to engage in conflict if
one erupted. When a population lives on the edge between survival and death,
seemingly minor changes can spark large-scale protests and violence. For example,
the spread of protests around the Middle East during the 2011 Arab Spring
was fueled by a spike in food prices, specifically rising bread prices in Tunisia,
culminating with demonstrators in Cairo shouting, “Bread and freedom.”26 Egypt
remains a major importer of wheat, providing generous subsidies to ensure bread
is affordable for the masses of people who live in poverty.
The Nile River is also a source of revenue and sustenance for communities of
fisherman who have lived off the river for generations. It is possible the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will further degrade the dwindling supply of fish
and eliminate the livelihoods for entire communities. Ethiopia did not conduct
studies to examine the dam’s impact to downstream fishing villages. While
violence has not erupted along the Nile over fishing rights, it has in other areas.
For example, in 2009, conflict erupted between Kenyan and Ugandan troops
over ownership—and the attendant fishing rights—of Migingo Island in Lake
Victoria. Fortunately, the incident did not turn violent. Lakes are drying up in
the region, however, and altering traditional livelihoods. Thriving fishing
communities around Lake Haramaya have disappeared, while other places such
as the Lake Chad area in Central Africa have lost 90 percent of their water due
to irresponsible practices, climate change, deforestation, and changes in the lake,
with many Nigerians migrating to Cameroon. Their settlement prompted a war
between the two countries in the 1990s. The International Court of Justice
eventually ruled in Cameroon’s favor in 2002. There are multiple factors involved
25. Kevin G. Wheeler et al., “Understanding and Managing New Risks on the Nile with the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” Nature Communications 11, 5222 (2020): https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020
-19089-x.
26. Oestigaard, Water Scarcity and Food Security along the Nile, 78.
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in the depletion of African freshwater sources, but the trend is clear. Satellite
images show many of the continent’s large 677 lakes are shrinking noticeably,
which must cause concern and drive more sustainable practices and awareness to
utilize freshwater sources better.27
Water and food shortages can easily promote riots, and the violence can
quickly spin out of control and turn deadly. The infamous 2007–08 African food
riots were driven by food prices doubling, sometimes in a matter of months,
spreading from Egypt and Ethiopia to Senegal and even further south into
Mozambique. In the future, it is likely irregular periods of dry weather will
intensify competition over scarce water resources and cause riots. Evidence
suggests the average riot in the in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2012
led to 66 deaths.28 A few notable examples took place in 2001. Two groups
fought over access to the river and 130 people were killed. In Kenya in 2012,
over 100 people were killed when violence erupted between Pokomo farmers and
Orma nomadic cattle herders over access rights to the Tana River.
Although the Grand Ethiopian Renaisance Dam appears to be ramping up
for full use with very little vocal opposition, a drought in the coming years could
quickly alter the amiable mood of the Nile River Basin states. Christian Almer
et al. have demonstrated water scarcity in agricultural communities will generate
social tensions when there is cultural diversity or multiple ethnic groups.29
To foster peace and social stability and avoid conflict and the loss of lives,
regional leaders must address these challenges and demand policy changes and
updated agreements.
Future Regional Strategic Implications
Regional leaders need to address three key areas to promote better
development in the Nile River Basin, the second-most populated continent on
the planet. The first area is better agricultural practices. The second area is the
effective use of dams to control water during floods, provide electricity, and serve
as an insurance policy against drought. The last area is improved stewardship,
policies, and water-irrigation infrastructure to manage water as a resource. Along
with these changes, the United States can encourage Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan,
South Sudan, and Uganda to reach an agreement regarding water use and the
27. Ernest Waititu. “Diminishing Water Resources Threaten Peace.” Washington Times (website),
May 26, 2009, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/26/diminishing-water-resources-threaten
-peace/
28. Christian Almer, Jeremy Laurent-Lucchetti, and Manuel Oechslin, “Water Scarcity and Rioting:
Disaggregated Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 86
(August 2015): 24, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34487/.
29. Almer, Laurent-Lucchetti, and Oechslin, “Water Scarcity and Rioting,” 2, 193–209; and Risi, “Beyond
Water Wars.”
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role of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in regulating the waterways of
the Nile before a drought impacts the region and tensions escalate.
Some agricultural practices need to be revised to achieve better crop yields.
Education programs can assist farmers and demonstrate the benefits of crops that
can tolerate frequent dry spells, which are becoming more common crops in the
basin. A few more easily implemented solutions include efficient crop rotations to
balance soil nutrients and minimize the need for mineral fertilizers, which are not
practical for local farmers. Additionally, educational programs can be developed
to promote phosphate application, implement manure as fertilizer, and utilize
disease-resistant varieties and species of plants that mature more quickly and help
local farmers improve yields.
Promoting the use of hybrid seed might be counterproductive. These seeds
create a dependency on chemicals and fertilizers that are unaffordable for
most farmers. Furthermore, conservation farming can save ground preparation
and make better use of rainfall, maximize moisture retention by maintaining
open soil surface conditions, promote deep rooting zones, and help navigate
intermittent rainfall patterns. Education programs on easier-to-grow crops should
be introduced to heighten awareness of alternative food sources. For example,
cassava is a naturally pest-resistant and resilient tuber that grows well in arid
regions. It takes less water to grow than wheat and is naturally gluten free and
an excellent source of carbohydrates with a lower sugar load than wheat.30 The
Portuguese introduced cassava to Africa in the sixteenth century, though it
is currently cultivated on small farms only and is not widely known in the
region.31 Exploring agricultural solutions that can provide better crop yields while
educating local farmers about sustainable growing practices is crucial in raising
awareness, improving farming methods, and scaling solutions to larger farms to
maximize production.
Africa has the potential to become the world leader in hydroelectric power,
and aid from the United States could help expedite the process. Dams can
provide energy and water security for people in Nile River Basin communities.
The region contained over 257 million people in 2016–or more than 20
percent of the total population of Africa.32 Many of these people live without
electricity, and the number of people without electicity will likely continue to

30. Guillén, 2030, 27.
31. Dunstan Spencer and Associates, “Cassava in Africa: Past, Present, and Future,” Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (website), accessed December 14, 2020, http://www.fao.org/3/a0154e
/A0154E04.HTM.
32. Stephan Deconinck, “The Nile River Basin – An Introduction,” Waternet: On the Geopolitics of Water
Scarcity (website), April 12, 2021, https://www.waternet.be/nile.
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grow. By 2030, there will be over 650 million people without electricity on the
continent and 90 percent of them will live in sub-Saharan Africa.33
Africa could be the leader in hydropower as a renewable energy source,
though it currently only produces 80,000 megawatts.34 Power Africa is a US
Agency for International Development (USAID) program created to add 30,000
megawatts of clean energy to sub-Saharan Africa. The program funds small
uncoordinated projects around the region but none focused on the Nile River
Basin.35 China, widely considered a leader in global dam construction, has invested
heavily in Africa (including backing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam);
meanwhile the United States has many programs in place through USAID. If
the United States and China were to cooperate, they could create and execute a
comprehensive development plan that would provide much-needed resources
and stabilize local governments and economies.36
The construction of effective irrigation systems can provide higher crop
yields and increase farming production through technology that prevents
water-transmission losses. Most Nile River Basin farmers lack irrigation, though
there are a few exceptions. World Bank estimates the cost at between $13,000
and $18,000 (US) per hectare.37 Sudan is the exception with 20,000 kilometers
of irrigation, but its very old system loses significant amounts of water.38 While
Sudan has some existing infrastructure to maximize the agricultural yields, it
would require significant investment to irrigate its 48,000 kilometers of arable
land that depends exclusively on rainfall. Although 20,000 kilometers of arable
land are covered with legacy systems, the systems lose significant amounts of
water.39 Even in areas of the Nile River Basin with sufficient access to water,
infrastructure is a problem. One official in South Sudan’s water authority
remarked they had enough water to serve the 10 million residents, but they
cannot build comprehensive water infrastructure to facilitate distribution.40
The money is available, but US assistance is directed at a broad array of
projects in sub-Saharan Africa and must be better coordinated by the State
33. Megan Rowling, “650 Million People Will Still Have No Access to Electricity by 2030, According to a
New Report,” World Economic Forum (website), May 23, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05
/patchy-progress-on-electricity-access-casts-shadow-on-global-goal.
34. Anita Marangoly George, “Done Right, Hydropower Can Help Fight Energy and Water Poverty,”
World Bank Blogs, September 2, 2014, https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/hydropower-s-role-energy-water
-poverty-nexus.
35. Power Africa, “About Us,” USAID (website), n.d., accessed May 3, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov
/powerafrica/aboutus.
36. Philip Andrews-Speed, “China’s International Energy Engagement,” Handbook on the International
Political Economy of China, ed. Ka Zeng (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 139.
37. Oestigaard, Water Scarcity and Food Security along the Nile, 81.
38. Africa Water Atlas, 80.
39. “Development Aid at a Glance: Statistics by Region, Africa, 2018 Edition,” Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (website), https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development
/development-finance-data/Africa-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance-2018.pdf.
40. Risi, “Beyond Water Wars.”
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Department and USAID. As depicted below in figure 2, agriculture and economic
initiatives only received 8 percent of program funding in 2019. While there are
many humanitarian issues in Africa, South Africa and Nigeria top the list of
aid recipients. Egypt does not appear at all. The only Nile River Basin countries
listed are Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Rather than scattering US aid dollars around a vast region, localized
concentration in regions might produce better, longer-lasting results. Granted,
in some countries, armed terrorist groups greatly exacerbate the humanitarian
crisis, though eliminating militants has proven more complex in countries such as
Nigeria and Mali.

Figure 2. US assistance to Africa by program area
(Notes: Funding allocated from global or functional programs, including emergency humanitarian
assistance is not included. International food assistance, provided under Title II of the Food for Peace Act
(P.L. 480), is also excluded, whether for humanitarian or development purposes. Source: CRS calculation
based on FY2019 sectoral data provided by USAID, February 2020.)

Prioritizing regions such as the Nile River Basin could improve water practices
and crop yields, ensure dams provide water during droughts, and increase crop
yields, which would better the nutrition and health of the population and reduce
the long-term humanitarian requirements and costs referenced in figure 2.
Health programs represent a short-term need, while distributing a more
significant percentage of aid to agriculture would strengthen agricultural value
chains and enhance crop yields that would pay dividends in the future, thereby
reducing the programmatic need for health and nutrition services. In addition to
reallocating funding to achieve these goals, the United States must leverage its
existing relationships in the region.
In May 2021, the United States and Egypt worked together to reinforce
a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militants. This action underscores
the importance of Egypt’s role in a region that continues to loom large for
American policy interests and shows President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi can be an
effective partner in ending violence. Egypt continues to be the largest recipient of
US assistance, averaging between $7 and $8 billion annually between the
Obama and Trump administrations. The United States can leverage Egyptian
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aid to encourage Egypt’s leaders to collaborate with regional partners to sign
water-sharing agreements that would address the long-term needs of many
countries in the region.
Conclusion
The US Congress must divert some of the aid earmarked for Egypt to other
countries to develop better water-irrigation methods, increase stewardship
over precious water supplies, and assess and improve water use for agricultural
purposes, including more sustainable practices and metered programs for
high-volume users to guard against waste. Agricultural studies highlight poor
farming practices, poor soil structure, loss of organic material, insufficient crop
rotation or diversification, and impediments to plant root structure, which
drastically reduces the effectiveness of crop yields.41 A more holistic approach—
to include tracking water withdrawn, applied, consumed, and lost—will provide
more meaningful numbers and must be considered for a complete picture of water
conservation in arid regions.
In addition, better coordination among agencies and other countries in the
Nile River Basin can produce stronger policies and promote long-term solutions
that will improve the lives of the people and reduce the likelihood of conflict
due to growing populations, water shortages, droughts, and other environmental
stressors exacerbated by climate change. This action would require the United
States to engage China on the continent and synchronize efforts to promote
better agricultural practices, build dams, and create irrigation infrastructure to help
farmers better steward the available water. The United States would also need to
share short- and long-term plans for aid to sub-Saharan Africa. While regional
tensions are currently low, environmental instability can lead to drought and
place water at the forefront of tensions between states in the region.
Along with policy changes, the United States must take the lead in the
development of water-sharing agreements for all riparian states that foster
an inclusive Nile Basin Initiative. This action will dictate influencing Egypt
and Sudan to abandon old colonial agreements and create dialogue all states
in the region would embrace. The time to broaden signatories to the initiative
is urgent—before passions become inflamed. All regional communities must
sign the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative to include Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, and South
Sudan, and the rest of the world (and donor countries) should use aid to facilitate
the process. In the basin, both private and public use of agricultural water
resources must focus on more efficient transmission methods, given the results of
single-factor studies, to maximize crop yields. The design and potential
41.

Africa Water Atlas, 159.
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application of irrigation systems must consider the sustainability of groundwater
and the larger hydrologic cycle overlooked when focusing on single-factor
productivity studies used for purchasing and fielding equipment for large-scale
agricultural uses.42
Strategists can learn from past water agreements to inform contemporary
challenges, and agreements involving all stakeholders can establish a foundation
to minimize future conflict. Investment and aid will flow into the continent, and
American leadership can provide an overarching plan to improve the lives of the
people. Unless changes are made to existing US policies and strategy, violent
extremist groups can easily spread as they exploit the failures of the states and
destabilize the region. While the US military and United Nations have missions
in the Sahel to combat terrorism, not addressing the issues surrounding water
scarcity and usage could fuel conflict and violence, creating another region on the
continent that requires a large peacekeeping force and more humanitarian aid.
The threat of water wars, while not dire (yet), should draw attention to policy
changes and water-sharing agreements in the Nile River Basin to ensure the next
environmental crisis does not incite violence in the region. America can lead
these efforts to provide long-term solutions to the people’s food insecurity and
electrical needs, which will make the population more resilient during droughts
and other environmental challenges. Egypt is the keystone in the Nile River
Basin. American policy needs to influence al-Sisi to negotiate a water distribution
agreement with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam before the next drought
can cause conflict and further destabilize the basin. Furthermore, improving
dam infrastructure can provide energy and water security and make a difference
between life and death for populations living on the brink of existence.
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Lessons in Inoculation to Disinformation
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ABSTR ACT: While propaganda and disinformation have been used
to destabilize opposing forces throughout histor y, the US militar y
remains unprepared for the way these methods have been adapted to the
Internet era. This article explores the modern history of disinformation
campaigns and the current state of US military readiness in the face of
campaigns from near-peer competitors and proposes education as the
best way to prepare US servicemembers to defend against such campaigns.

Keywords: propaganda, disinformation, media literacy, military
education, inoculation

P

ropaganda and disinformation are powerful tools of influence. The
former can be defined as “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape
perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a
response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”1 Meanwhile, the
latter is a “deception technique based on the dissemination of untrue information
with the intention to deceive, manipulate and mislead,” exploiting human
emotions as a means of influence.2 Throughout the twentieth century, allies and
adversaries have employed these tools to achieve their strategic goals. American
President Dwight D. Eisenhower repeatedly recognized the chance of an “all
out shooting war is far less than the danger we face on a political warfare front.”3
And, today’s digital landscape means false narratives can spread further and
faster than ever before.

Indeed, there is evidence countries like Russia have already made a significant
impact on rival nations through these tactics. Numerous scholars point to the 2016
US presidential election as a prime example.4 In these instances, disinformation
relies on exploiting preexisting tensions in a target society (for example, race,
1. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 6th ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications, 2015), 7.
2. Matthew Duncan et al., Coronavirus and Disinformation: Narratives, Counter-strategies and the Inoclation
of Audiences, DRDC-RDDC-2020-L096 (Ottawa, ON: Defense Research and Development Canada,
April 2020), 1.
3. President Dwight D. Eisenbower as quoted in Kenneth A. Osgood, “Form before Substance:
Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy,” Diplomatic
History 24, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 405.
4. Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns: Hearings before the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate Panel II, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of
Thomas Rid, Professor of Security Studies), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg25998
/html/CHRG-115shrg25998.htm.
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ethnicity, and class) to create division. As a result, these narratives frequently
place vulnerable communities at risk and put institutions made up of diverse
groups under strain, including the US military, which draws on Americans from
all social, cultural, religious, political, and economic backgrounds.
Disinformation poses a threat to these kinds of organizations and by
extension, countries. In 2019, the United Kingdom’s cross-party committee on
Digital Culture, Media, and Sport described the spread of false information
online as an existential threat to democracy.5 The gravity of this challenge
requires close analysis. This article argues education is the optimal strategy
to counter disinformation, identifies lessons learned from nations that have
been a target of disinformation, reviews the evolution of disinformation as a
tactic of information warfare, looks at the psychological mechanisms through
which adversaries manipulate online, assesses the threat disinformation poses
to institutions like the military, and reflects on the potential education has to
inoculate targeted groups and help everyone survive and thrive in an increasingly
digital world.6
How Propaganda and Disinformation Work
State and nonstate actors have long used propaganda and disinformation
to gain strategic advantage. The arrival of modern mass media in the early
twentieth century, however, allowed their efforts to take on global dimensions.7
During both world wars, propaganda was an important tool employed
to achieve a range of goals. For example, radio allowed key leaders like
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill to address domestic audiences directly in their own
homes, informing them and influencing their perceptions of the war. Film was
similarly employed to boost morale and drive recruitment efforts. Directed by
Oscar-winning filmmaker Frank Capra, the Why We Fight documentary series
is still considered one of the best examples of such material. The impact of
these efforts cannot be underestimated. Some historians even contend the
information war unleashed by the Allies was central to victory. Messaging at
home was combined alongside actions in the field by organizations like Britain’s

5. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’:
Final Report (United Kingdom: House of Commons, 2019).
6. Ritu Gill et al., “Managing Cyber Risk to Mission: Disinformation in the Cyber Domain Detection,
Impact and Counter Strategies,” in 24th International Command and Control Research & Technology
Symposium (ICCRTS) Proceedings (Laurel, MD: International Command and Control Institute, 2019),
10; and Elinor Carmi et al., “Data Citizenship: Rethinking Data Literacy in the Age of Disinformation,
Misinformation, and Malinformation,” Internet Policy Review 9, no. 2 (2020): 2, 4–5.
7. Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 7.
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Political Warfare Executive, which engaged in operations to undermine enemy
propaganda, which proved increasingly out of sync with the reality of events.8
Throughout the Cold War, influence continued to play a central role, and
disinformation formed a pivotal element of Soviet active measures, or “overt
and covert techniques for influencing events and behaviour in, and the actions
of, foreign societies,” with estimates Warsaw Pact countries ran over 10,000
disinformation operations from 1945 to 1989.9 No matter the form it takes,
disinformation is intended to exploit an adversary’s weaknesses.10 As Thomas
Rid of Johns Hopkins University explains, “the tried and tested way . . . is to use
an adversary’s existing weaknesses against himself, to drive wedges into
preexisting cracks. The more polarized a society, the more vulnerable it is.”11
Russia’s use of disinformation campaigns continues to be a key part of
its strategy and has taken on a new form in today’s online ecosystem. Russian
disinformation can be broken down into four “Ds”—dismiss, distort, dismay,
and distract—to disrupt critical thinking.12 Societies have trigger topics,
ranging from immigration and abortion to race and religion, which are
likely to incite an emotional response and even lead to what is called an
amygdala hijack. This is a psychological term referring to when the part of a
person’s brain controlling emotion becomes so inflamed the person can no longer
critically reason. In other words, people lose connection to the part of the brain
governing reasoning and evaluation of facts.13
But emotionally charged narratives are only one way adversarial actors can
exploit online audiences who often experience information overload.14 The
human brain, lacking capacity and time, cannot sift through all the information
available.15 This lack of time and cognitive resources means individuals cannot
sort fact from fiction, and they use cognitive shortcuts to process information,
making them susceptible to disinformation campaigns. For example, confirmation
8. Haroro J. Ingram, A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism Strategic
Communications (Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016), 18–19; and Meghan
Fitzpatrick, “Sowing Discord, Countering Fear: Force Protection and Resilience to Disinformation,”
Proceedings of the International Command and Control Research Technology Symposium (November 2020), 2.
9. Roy Godson and Richard Shultz, “Soviet Active Measures: Distinctions and Definitions,” Defense
Analysis 1, no. 2 (1985), 102.
10. Meghan Fitzpatrick, Pandemics and Prophylaxis: Lessons Learned from Pandemics Past about Countering
Mis- and Disinformation (1918–2020) (Ottawa: DRDC, 2020), 3.
11. Disinformation: A Primer, 2.
12. Ben Nimmo, “Anatomy of an Info-War: How Russia’s Propaganda Machine Works and How to
Counter It,” Stop Fake, May 29, 2015, https://www.stopfake.org/en/anatomy-of-an-info-war-how-russia-s
-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/, accessed February 13, 2019.
13. Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than the IQ (New York: Bantam,
1996); and Rebecca Goolsby, “Developing a New Approach to Cyber Diplomacy: Addressing Malign
Information Maneuvers in Cyberspace,” in Senior Leadership Roundtable on Military and Defence Aspects of
Border Security in South East Europe, ed. Itamara V. Lochard (Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2019), 105–16.
14. Gill et al., “Managing Cyber Risk,” 7.
15. Duncan et al., Coronavirus and Disinformation, 1–14.
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bias involves searching for, interpreting, and recalling information consistent
with one’s beliefs and attitudes. Individuals accept information that is congruent
with their perspective as opposed to taking the time to process information
that is contradictory. For instance, a 2019 study in the journal Science Advances
found individuals who lean toward conservative politics tend to share social
media posts from Republicans.16
Online actors are further able to exploit biases using rapidly emerging
technologies, including deepfakes or AI-manipulated audio or video content
either AI-rendered, edited or recut, misappropriated, or misattributed. Deepfakes
may increase the ability of malign actors to exploit emotions and cognitive biases.17
Images have been found to be more impactful than text alone.18 Words are
“abstract symbols that need to be reconstructed into a mental image of reality.”19
In contrast, images appear to offer a direct reference to reality that reduces the
suspicion of manipulation.
Armed Forces and Disinformation
Like the nation it protects, the US military is increasingly diverse. Women
made up 16 percent of the active-duty force in 2017, and ethnic minorities
currently comprise 42 percent of military personnel.20 This diversity can leave the
military, like the country at large, vulnerable to disinformation campaigns. These
campaigns represent a serious challenge to operational security and the overall
cohesion of the armed forces, their allies, and the wider defense community.
For example, adversaries have consistently targeted the forces making
up NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland. In 2020, Russian-sponsored actors released a forged letter online where
Polish Brigadier General Ryszard Parafianowicz appeared to criticize openly
the American presence in his country during the US-led exercise DefenderEurope 20. During the same exercise, Russian sources also claimed the US
military had ignored COVID-19–related travel restrictions, even though US
officials had reduced the size and scope of Defender-Europe 20 due to public
16. Andrew Guess, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua Tucker, “Less Than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors
of Fake News Dissemination on Facebook,” Science Advances 5, no. 1 (2019): 1–8.
17. Robert Chesney and Danielle K. Citron, “Disinformation on Steroids: The Threat of Deep Fakes,”
Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program, Council on Foreign Relations, October 16, 2018, https://www.cfr.org
/report/deep-fake-disinformation-steroids.
18. Michael Hameleers et al., “A Picture Paints a Thousand Lies? The Effects and Mechanisms of
Multimodal Disinformation and Rebuttals Disseminated via Social Media,” Political Communication 37,
no. 2 (2020): 281–301.
19. Hamleers, 297.
20. Amanda Barroso, “The Changing Profile of the U.S. Military: Smaller in Size, More Diverse,
More Women in Leadership,” Pew Research Center, September 10, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2019/09/10/the-changing-profile-of-the-u-s-military/.
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health considerations.21 The threat of influence no longer exists only during
deployment but also in garrison because of “the collapsed nature of
communication . . . and . . . porous boundaries between war and everyday life,”
which means geography is no longer enough to act as a defense.22
Hostile actors consistently target members of the US armed forces and
veteran communities online. Beginning in 2017, Vietnam Veterans of America,
a congressionally chartered nonprofit organization, began a two-year investigative
study and discovered, “persistent, pervasive, and coordinated online targeting of
American servicemembers, veterans, and their families by foreign entities.”23 The
report demonstrated servicemembers and their social networks are vulnerable
to disinformation. Foreign entities see members of the military community,
who often have access to confidential and classified materials, as an attractive
target. What is more, active members and veterans are a significant influence
demographic in US political life. A team of Vietnam Veterans of America
researchers inspected hundreds of Facebook pages and social media accounts
and found American servicemembers, veterans, and other social media followers
of several veterans organizations were specifically targeted by foreign entities.24
They also found individuals from over 30 countries administered the sites
they reviewed, and that administrators of these imposter Facebook pages
infiltrated other public and private groups.
Imposter pages and accounts built a following by impersonating legitimate
military and veterans groups, like the Vietnam Veterans of America, and used
camaraderie and community as a way to attract new members. This activity
was so prolific Facebook shut down a third of the reviewed accounts for
inauthentic behavior or “misleading actions to deceive others about who an
individual/group is or what the individual or group is doing.”25 Before the
shut down, the pages drew over 32 million users. Foreign administrators had
used the platforms to “try to drive wedges between groups along varying
racial or ethnic identities or prejudices, often pitting law enforcement against
minorities.”26 This action frequently involved posting divisive content designed
to polarize group members, from sharing pictures of NFL quarterback Colin
Kaepernick to spreading false information about controversial public figures like
21. “NATO’s Approach to Countering Disinformation: A Focus on COVID-19,” NATO, updated
July 17, 2020, https://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm.
22. Lisa Ellen Silvestri, “Friended from the Front: Social Media and 21st Century War” (doctoral thesis,
University of Iowa, May 2014), 6.
23. Kristofer Goldsmith, An Investigation into Foreign Entities Who Are Targeting Servicemembers and
Veterans Online (Silver Spring, MD: Vietnam Veterans of America, 2021), 6.
24. Goldsmith, Investigation into Foreign Entities, 12; and Dominique Laferrière, Meghan Fitzpatrick,
and Janani Vallikanthan, An Ounce of Prevention, A Pound of Cure: Building Resilience to Disinformation
(Ottawa, ON: DRDC, 2022).
25. Goldsmith, Investigation into Foreign Entities, 18.
26. Goldsmith, Investigation into Foreign Entities, 35.
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Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and posting xenophobic statements
like “VETS BEFORE ILLEGALS” to play on sensitive topics like immigration.27
Disinformation targets fault lines within a society, and military personnel are not
immune to these tactics.
Adversary disinformation campaigns undermine servicemembers’ ability
to discern fact from fiction. These campaigns penetrate their social networks
and make them susceptible to conspiracy theories and extremist groups, which
degrades unit cohesion and presents a real force protection threat. Although
there are no indications an adversary was directly responsible for the US Capitol
attack of 2021, years of influence operations culminated in a distorted cognitive
environment—an alternate reality—for many who participated in the riots, and
implanted a lasting social and political division that could continue for years.28
Using the attack as an example, adversaries will continue active disinformation
campaigns and employ all information domain tools to exacerbate discord and
strengthen their position.29 Russia has used digital media to fan the flames
following the Capitol attack, and China’s media has taken the opportunity
to create false equivalencies to justify its behaviors and undermine faith in
democratic processes and US legitimacy as a global leader.30
These effects offer clear evidence online conspiracy theories and
disinformation do not remain online only but can and do culminate in violence.
While disinformation is insidious and creates long-lasting effects at the
national, strategic, and tactical levels, it can be mitigated through awareness
and education.
Education: Inoculation to Disinformation?
There is debate about how to deal with disinformation. Mounting evidence
from the humanities and social sciences suggests the best long-term solution is
27. Goldsmith, Investigation into Foreign Entities, 7, 38, 94, all caps in original.
28. Joan Donovan, “How Social Media’s Obsession with Scale Supercharged Disinformation,”
Harvard Business Review, January 13, 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/01/how-social-medias-obsession
-with-scale-supercharged-disinformation; and Scott Rosenberg, “Disinformation’s Big Win,” Axios,
January 8, 2021, https://www.axios.com/disinformations-big-win-russia-trump-5e6a9cc6-4bf b-456d-9712
-d97bd4b2a6cb.html.
29. Stratfor Analysts, “Opinion: For U.S. Adversaries Including Russia, Iran and China, the Capitol
Siege Offers a Window of Opportunity,” Stratfor (website), January 11, 2021, https://www.marketwatch
.com/story/for-u-s-adversaries-including-russia-iran-and-china-the-capitol-siege-offers-a-window-of-opport
unity-11610379131.
30. “After Capitol Riots, Russia Slams US’s ‘Archaic’ Electoral System,” Al Jazeera (website),
January 7, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/7/russian-officials-say-us-democracy-limping
-after-capitol-riot; Agency France-Presse, “ ‘Beautiful Sight’: China Mocks US Capitol Siege Online,
Recalls Nancy Pelosi’s Remark on Hong Kong Protests,” Firstpost (website), January 7, 2021, https://www
.firstpost.com / world / beautiful-sight-china-mocks-us- capitol-siege-online -recalls-nancy-pelosis- remark-on
-hong-kong-protests-9180311.html; and Tracy Wen Liu, “Chinese Media Calls Capitol Riot ‘World
Masterpiece’,” Foreign Policy (website), January 8, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/08/chinese-media
-calls-capitol-riot-world-masterpiece/.
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to educate the public to recognize disinformation.31 Numerous organizations
have stressed the value of education in combating hate. In 2018, the European
Commission developed a digital literacy plan for implementation across the
European Union.32 The same year, the London School of Economics Truth,
Trust, and Technology Commission called on the British government to
incorporate media literacy as part of its national curriculum.33 Although many
countries have just begun to recognize and implement educational programs
to counter disinformation campaigns, several countries have proven systems
in place.
The Scandinavian and Baltic countries provide a template for how to
implement these disinformation education programs. Their experience is unique
since “Few [regions] have been subject to more consistent Russian information
manipulation over the past four to five years,” including Finland, which has been
a consistent target of Kremlin-backed propaganda since becoming independent
in 1917.34 Analysts from RAND Europe argue several factors contribute to
Finland’s resilience to foreign influences, including high rates of media literacy.35
The Finnish government has achieved media literacy through educational
campaigns, including a 2014 initiative to teach students, journalists, politicians,
and the public how to recognize fake news. Students in primary and secondary
education were also tested on their ability to recognize deepfake videos and
exercise critical-thinking skills. These programs, and others like them, are “just one
layer of a cross-sector approach that Finland is taking to prepare citizens of all
ages for the complex digital landscape.”36
Working together toward a common goal, the Lithuanian government
frequently partners with these groups to increase levels of academic research that
survey the public on this issue, and media projects focused on debunking and
fact-checking. It has also provided funding and/or support for the development

31. Ritu Gill, “Understanding Influence in the Digital Information Environment and the Impact on
Audiences and Actors,” (speaking notes, DRDC, Ottawa, ON, 2019).
32. Carmi et al., “Data Citizenship,” 7–8.
33. Gianfranco Polizzi and Ros Taylor, Misinformation, Digital Literacy and the School Curriculum, Media
Policy Brief 22 (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2019), 4-5.
34. Michael J. Mazarr et al., Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 210–11.
35. William Marcellino et al., Human-Machine Detection of Online-Based Malign Information
(SantaMonica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), 11–13.
36. Marcellino et al., Human-Machine Detection, 13.
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of an AI-driven platform to monitor media (Debunk.eu) and the creation of
media literacy projects for vulnerable groups (elderly, minority populations).37
Disinformation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic is a global issue and
similarly to the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, other nations have taken
effective countermeasures to address associated disinformation. The Taiwanese
government collaborated with the Taiwan FactCheck Center.38 As described
by Gill and colleagues, Taiwan used a social-media platform similar to
WhatsApp to disseminate accurate information to counter online
disinformation.39 Additionally, the government increased disinformation
monitoring to prevent its spread and worked with Facebook to gray
out disinformation on Facebook timelines. Lastly, guides were created
on how to distinguish between real and fake accounts and suspicious
and credible information. Lien and authors noted such collaboration,
platforms, and guides were critical in fostering Taiwan’s resilience to China’s
COVID-19 disinformation.40
Recommended US Military Media Literacy Training
The Department of Defense (DoD) must mandate a standardized,
multifaceted media literacy program to provide servicemembers with the skills
required to confront disinformation. The US population from which the armed
forces recruit is significantly undertrained and underprepared to compete with
disinformation. While a small minority of US schools teach media literacy,
most youths and adults lack the skills to analyze critically the information
they consume.41 If this deficiency is not addressed, servicemembers will remain
vulnerable to cognitive shortfalls, and ideological divisions will undermine force
resiliency. While the Department of Defense has developed initiatives to train
servicemembers to combat adversary influence, a combination of public-sector
best practices and DoD resources can produce a more comprehensive program,

37. Vytautas Kersanskas, Deterring Disinformation? Lessons from Lithuania’s Countermeasures since 2014,
Hybrid Center of Excellence Paper 6 (Helsinki: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid
Threats, 2021), 10–12.
38. Ritu Gill et al., “Coronavirus: Gray Zone Tactics in Cyberspace” in 25th International Command
and Control Research and Technology Symposium Proceedings (Laurel, MD: International Command and
Control Institute, 2020).
39. Ritu Gill et al., “Coronavirus: Gray Zone Tactics.”
40. Yi-Ting Lien, “Why China’s COVID-19 Disinformation Campaign Isn’t Working in Taiwan,”
Diplomat (website), March 20, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/why-chinas-covid-19-disinformation
-campaign-isnt-working-in-taiwan/.
41. Media Literacy Now, “U.S. Media Literacy Policy Report 2020,” January 6, 2020, https://
medialiteracynow.org/u-s-media-literacy-policy-report-2020/.
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consisting of an annual online training course and an in-person course, to arm
DoD personnel and families against disinformation.
In 2018–19, the DoD Joint Staff developed and launched the
Joint Knowledge Online ( JKO) J3ST-US1396 Influence Awareness
computer-based course. The 90-minute course educates participants on adversary
and competitor initiatives to influence US and DoD personnel, discusses
near-future challenges in the information environment, and briefly introduces
tools to counter influence. The course is not mandatory or well advertised, and
its static content is becoming stale as the information environment evolves.
Although the course’s primary objective is to increase awareness of online
influence activities, it is prefabricated and inflexible, and its focus on crucial
media literacy skills is underdeveloped. Participants cannot ask questions
or practice the dynamic skills needed to develop healthy online information
consumption habits on the personal devices used most often: cellphones,
tablets, and laptops. In addition, the course does not assess participants
or gather performance data to inform course refinement. These shortfalls
critically hinder the course’s ability to arm DoD personnel against
disinformation. The incorporation of best practices from the public sector
could mitigate these gaps.
The Department of Defense would greatly benefit from partnering
with public-sector media literacy leaders to develop a dynamic in-person
training program. Programs, such as the International Research Exchange
Board’s (IREX) Learn to Discern and the Stanford History Education
Group’s Civic Online Reasoning, are making great strides in meeting the
challenges of the evolving information environment and offer many of the
core media literacy skills servicemembers need. These private-sector programs
provide the hands-on, real-world applications JKO lacks, such as practical
exercises that test the ability to search for, evaluate, and verify information
online and to make informed decisions using healthy media literacy habits
while accessing personal devices. They also compel students to analyze
consumption habits and take ownership of decisions to click, share, read,
like, or interact with content online. Students leave the courses with a better
understanding of how their actions shape the information environment
of their friends, community, and the nation. These programs are designed
to be taught by a facilitator through easily accessible, professionally guided
in-person or online courses. The main shortcoming of these programs is they
do not specifically address adversary and competitor disinformation efforts
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that threaten servicemembers, though they could be tailored to meet these
requirements in a partnership with the Department of Defense.42
Private-sector best practices and DoD resources could be combined to
develop a comprehensive media literacy training program consisting of an
annual online course and a small in-person class that would benefit DoD
personnel and family members. The Joint Staff J-7 and its JKO training staff
and platform are best positioned to develop and implement a computer-based
media literacy training course across the force. Like annual cybersecurity
training, all personnel—including civilians—should be required to complete
the annual training that should establish a baseline of participants’ media
fluency and track changes across demographics. Participant performance
data could inform course refinement and, similar to a command climate
survey, the course could aggregate concerning trends for the attention of the
service chiefs or higher, if necessary. The course should test the ability of
servicemembers to demonstrate media literacy skills, such as differentiating
between a fact and an opinion, verifying sources, identifying altered visual
information, identifying imposter social media accounts, and recognizing
targeted divisive material, and also instill a sense of responsibility when
sharing or interacting with information online.
In addition to the computer-based training, the service components should
also implement focused in-person media literacy training at the company level.
Sessions should be held in small classrooms or town halls and led by DoD
facilitators, from public affairs or communication strategy and operations,
who have been trained by leading public-sector practitioners. The training
should address trouble areas flagged by the annual computer-based class
and facilitate practical application exercises that test the students’ ability to
recognize and counter disinformation using personal devices. The practical
application exercises would model leading public-sector courses but would
focus on DoD equities. The in-person class would also offer an opportunity
for servicemembers to discuss ongoing adversarial cyberattacks, media
influence, military actions, challenges faced by partners and allies, and foreign
interference in domestic events.
In addition, family predeployment briefs should integrate media literacy
training to increase awareness before a servicemembers’ deployment.
Although the Department of Defense cannot mandate family members take
online media literacy training, many are concerned about the threat of false
42. “About Us,” IREX, https://www.irex.org/about-us, accessed December 15, 2020; “Randomized Control
Trial Finds IREX’s Media Literacy Messages to Be Effective in Reducing Engagement with Disinformation,”
IREX, October 20, 2020, https://www.irex.org/news/randomized-control-trial-finds-irexs-media-literacy
-messages-be-effective-reducing-engagement; and “Civic Online Reasoning Curriculum Collections,”
Stanford History Education Group, https://cor.stanford.edu/curriculum/.
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information and welcome opportunities to understand and protect themselves
from these threats.43 Family readiness officers and key spouse leaders are also
conduits to promote and share online media literacy education opportunities
and encourage awareness.
Servicemembers and their families must learn and practice media literacy
skills so they can protect themselves and counter adversary initiatives.44
Awareness programs would help them realize the disinformation threat and
encourage them to defend themselves.45 A DoD-mandated, standardized, and
multifaceted media literacy program that combines public-sector best practices
and DoD equities can produce a comprehensive computer-based course and
an in-person course that provides servicemembers and families the skills they
need to confront adversary disinformation threats successfully.
Conclusion
The pace of technological acceleration and the division inherent in recent
politics shows no signs of abating. As a result, the world will continue to face
a proliferation of disinformation in online spaces, enhanced by sophisticated
technology like deepfake videos.46 These advancements make it difficult to
determine attribution or debunk disinformation and create a serious threat to
democratic institutions, which are increasingly diverse in composition.47
While decisionmakers have considered a variety of solutions, none are
likely to have the lasting impact of thorough media literacy education.48
In 2017, former “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph
Dunford Jr. . . . designat[ed] information as the seventh joint warfare
function.”49 For troops to be effective warriors, they must possess the skills
needed to navigate a deceptive environment and recognize when and how they
43. Lloyd’s Register Foundation/GALLUP, “The Lloyd’s Register Foundation World Risk Poll,” 2019
Executive Summary, 5, https://wrp.lrfoundation.org.uk/.
44. Peter W. Singer and Eric B. Johnson, “The Need to Inoculate Military Servicemembers against
Information Threats: The Case for Digital Literacy Training for the Force,” War on the Rocks,
February 1, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/we-need-to-inoculate-military-servicemembers
-against-information-threats-the-case-for-digital-literacy-training/.
45. EU East StratCom Task Force, “25 Ways of Combatting Propaganda without Doing CounterPropaganda,” Euromaidan Press (website), June 16, 2017, https://euromaidanpress.com/2017/06/16/ways-of
-combatting-propaganda-without-counter-propaganda/.
46. Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron, “Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War: The Coming
Age of Post-Truth Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 1 (January/February 2019): 147, https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war.
47. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Who Said What? The Security Challenges of Modern
Disinformation (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2018), 16–17.
48. Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why It
Might Work and Options to Counter It, Perspective (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 2.
49. Linton Wells II, “Cognitive-Emotional Conflict: Adversary Will and Social Resilience,” PRISM 7,
no. 2 (2017), 4–17, https://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-7-2/Article/1401814/cognitive-emotional-conflict-adversary
-will-and-social-resilience/.
TOC

116

Parameters 52(1) Spring 2022

are being manipulated online. In “Deepfakes and the New Disinformation
War,” Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron argue, “democracies will have
to accept an uncomfortable truth: in order to survive the threat . . . they are
going to have to learn how to live with lies.”50 If democratic societies are to
function effectively, everyone will have to learn to survive and thrive in a
complicated digital landscape.
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ABSTRACT: The root cause for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the
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U

nleashed by Azerbaijani aggression on September 27, 2020,
the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War concluded with the
cease-fire on November 9, which many Armenians were quick
to dub capitulation. This war was the latest entry in a conflict that has
played out for more than three decades. The conflict emerged in 1988 in
the wake of Glasnost in Soviet Union and saw the rise of a strong sense of
self-determination by the largely Armenian population of the NagornoKarabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan. Baku’s attempts at
quelling Nagorno-Karabakh’s aspirations for independence by force
escalated the conflict to a war in 1992. Eventually, with the Republic
of Armenia’s support, the Nagorno-Karabakh forces defeated
Azerbaijan, liberated most of the territory, created a security belt
by taking control of adjacent Azerbaijani districts, and forced a
cease-fire in 1994, thus winning independence for the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic (later renamed the Republic of Artsakh). This agreement,
however, failed to mature into full-fledged peace. Ongoing armed
confrontation between the Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan, ultimately
led to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
The reasons for the defeat of the combined forces of the Republic of
Artsakh and the Republic of Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh
War are manifold. At first glance, insufficient resources allocated to defense
and shortcomings in technology, operations, training, and mobilization led
to Armenia’s loss. These shortcomings, however, all originate from a flawed
military doctrine inherited from the Soviet Union and based on attritional
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warfare. Doctrine is defined here as the ways and methods of conducting
operations or, as defined by the US Department of Defense (DoD) as
“fundamental principles that guide the employment of . . . military forces in
coordinated action to achieve a common objective.”1 Armenian forces failed
to adapt to the changing character of warfare and find viable solutions in
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war due to a confluence of
impediments to military innovation. Among the most salient of these
impediments were unbalanced civil-military relations within the defense
establishment and between the military and its political masters, as well as
the entrenched values of the general staff of Armed Forces of the Republic
of Armenia. While the first stumbling block prevented a robust civilian
intervention to spur innovation, the latter obstructed the push for reform
exerted by military professionals.
The complacency leading to Armenia’s defeat in the Second NagornoKarabakh War provides a critical lesson for modern militaries and their
political masters: greater introspection is necessary to mitigate the main
impediments to military innovation and reform. The arguments and evidence
presented here show no single theory can provide exhaustive answers to
diverse cases of military innovation. This overview of the outcome of the
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War exposes the effects of lack of innovation,
while looking to flawed doctrine as the main cause of defeat. It then addresses
scholarship on how institutional change occurs and concludes with applying
these theoretical frameworks to the changes, or lack thereof, made in the years
between the First and Second Nagorno-Karabakh Wars.

1. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), 114, last updated August 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36
/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=QkmPX3lFZqhMjdEGeSoB4A%3d%3d.
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Analysis of the Azerbaijani Victory
Officials and analysts have proposed several reasons for the war and
Azerbaijan’s eventual victory. Some Armenians attribute the debacle to
treason amongst Armenian political and military leadership. Others claim
Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia conspired against Armenia to settle the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict forcefully once and for all. Still others contend
Azerbaijan enjoyed wholesale military support from Turkey and enlisted the
services of a significant number of Syrian mercenaries affiliated with terrorist
organizations, whereas Armenia was left on its own by Russia, its security
guarantor.2 Charges of treachery among the Armenian political and military
establishment are merely conspiracy theories. There have been cases of
panic and faintheartedness among Armenian decisionmakers and operators,
however, though these cases are by-products of the problems that led to the
fiasco and not the main cause.
More rational pundits point to the numerical advantages of the Azerbaijani
forces against the Armenian opposition as the main cause of Armenian
defeat. Looking at force correlation at the onset of hostilities reveals the
belligerents could have been assigned equal odds whereby the Armenian
side had enough defensive capacity to withstand the onslaught. One analyst,
citing Azerbaijan’s narrow margin in several major weapons systems,
forecasted the conflict would not result in a serious alteration to borders since
no side had resources to achieve a complete victory.3
An even greater number of analysts ascribe the Azerbaijani victory to
their technological edge. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) played a
significant role, inflicting great losses to Armenian personnel and military
equipment. The use of UAVs in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts and the
Nagorno-Karabakh war shows the utility of trading losses in drones for enemy
fatalities in manpower and the advantage of beating the enemy in the race to
faster integration of drone warfare technologies and techniques into military
doctrine.4 Azerbaijan’s successful use of drones proved a tactical sensation and
reaffirmed the potentially devastating effects of airpower on ground forces
with unsophisticated air defenses.
2. Cory Welt and Andrew S. Bowden, Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,
Congressional Research Service Report (CRS) R46651 (Washington, DC: CRS, January 7, 2021), 6, 12,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46651.
3. Leonid Nersisyan, “Противостояние: что известно о боевом потенциале ВС Армении и
Азербайджан,” [Confrontation: What is Known about Combat Potentials of the AFs of the Republic of
Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan], Izvestija, September 28, 2020, https://iz.ru/1066374/leonid-nersisian
/protivostoianie-chto-izvestno-o-boevom-potentciale-vs-armenii-i-azerbaidzhana.
4. Ridvan Bari Urcosta, “Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh,” Small Wars Journal, October 23, 2020, https://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-nagorno-karabakh.
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The Armenian forces’ air defense system failed to mount viable resistance.
More importantly, the Armenian forces’ air defense system failed to put up a
viable resistance, a setback attributable not only to the inventory of air defense
systems per se but, more importantly, to the force structure they support.5
While the increasing variety of affordable UAVs can provide belligerents
with air power at a fraction of the cost of maintaining a traditional air force,
ground forces trained to fight in a “drone-saturated” battlespace are crucial.6
Well-trained and skilled personnel are still the most important asset on the
modern battlefield, and they are key to employing weaponry properly and
defending from enemy engagement.
The effective use of any weapon system should be studied within the larger
continuum of sociological and doctrinal considerations that make up the
two cardinal determinants of military readiness. Sociological considerations
examine the extent to which a nation is ready to sacrifice funding and lives in
a particular conflict. As the Nagorno-Karabakh wars make apparent, there was
a limit to the sacrifices Armenian society was ready to make to continue the
struggle for the security of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia against serious
military threats from Azerbaijan and Turkey. Nor did Armenia’s state policy
toward the conflict and corresponding military strategy match the resources
allocated to defense throughout the 26 years that elapsed since the end of the
First Nagorno-Karabakh War of 1992–94.
A comparison of Armenian and Azerbijani defense expenditures as a
percentage of GDP reveals Armenia was not devoting a considerably larger
share of its available national resources to defense. During the period
2000–19, Armenia’s military expenditures as a percentage of GDP averaged
3.65 percent, not much higher than Azerbaijan and its average of 3.44
percent. Moreover, there have been periods when Azerbaijan’s military
expenditures as a share of GDP exceeded Armenia’s expenditures by 0.3 to
0.9 percentage points (in 2006 and 2011–15).7 In this regard, a legitimate
question to ask is whether Armenia was serious about its defense. With
significant dissonance between military reality and investments, Armenia
proved unready for the war and “steadily marched toward a military disaster.”8
5. Michael Kofman, “A Look at the Military Lessons of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Russia Matters,
December 14, 2020, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/look-military-lessons-nagorno-karabakh
-conflict.
6. Robyn Dixon, “Azerbaijan’s Drones Owned the Battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh—and showed
future of Warfare,” Washington Post (website), November 11, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
europe / nagorno-karabkah-drones-azerbaijan-aremenia / 2020 / 11 / 11 / 441bcbd2- 193d-11eb-8bda-814ca56e
138b_story.html.
7. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Data for all
countries from 1988–2019 in constant, (2018), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20
all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP.pdf.
8. Kofman, “Military Lessons of the Nagorno-Karabakh.”
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Flawed Doctrine—the Main Reason for Armenia’s Defeat
The remainder of this article examines military innovation in the
Armenian defense establishment through the determinant of readiness—
doctrinal considerations. In hindsight, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
clearly demonstrated the Armenian military was clinging to the dogmas
of attritional war, whereas its foe was employing the precepts of maneuver
warfare. Whereas the Armenian forces fought according to the primer—
Soviet doctrine of land operations dated 1989—the Azerbaijani army had
adopted the concept of light composite assault units in the early 2010s. These
mobile groups could exploit the seams in the Armenian battle line of troops
stretched thin along the perimeter of the forward edge of the battle area and
attack objectives deep in the Armenian rear. This tactic exploited the other
chief shortcoming of the Armenian army—a lack of mobile combined-arms
and artillery units.9 The Armenian army had to rely on an obsolete system of
cumbersome fortified areas and massive marching columns and proved unable
to assign the necessary number of mobile teams, and thus became powerless
against enemy action.
The mismatch between Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s ways of war and was
most apparent in the fight for Shushi, the strategically crucial town whose
seizure decided the campaign’s fate. While the Azerbaijani army managed
to bring its mobile assault units to the outskirts of Shushi, effectively sealing
off the roads to the settlement, the Armenian command assumed its enemy’s
infantry could not cope with the Armenian units without the support of
tanks, artillery, and UAVs.10 The problem was the continued reliance on
Soviet-legacy military thinking and operational art without attention to the
peculiarities of Armenian military culture (that proved victorious in the First
Nagorno-Karabakh War) or the changing character of warfare and specificities
of the theater of operations. The Soviet military school overly focused on
mathematical algorithms and operational art and had a hard time clarifying
the boundary between the latter and military strategy, instead emphasizing
human and material resources to be expended in attritional warfare.11

9. Aleksey Ramm, “Карабах: бои без победы: Современное оружие не стало фактором успеха,”
[Karabakh: Hostilities without Victory: Modern Weapons Have Not Become a Factor of Success], Nezavisimoe
Voennoe Obozrenie, November 27, 2020, https://nvo.ng.ru/wars/2020-11-05/5_1116_wars.html.
10. Aleksey Ramm, “Карабахский провал: Падение Армении предопределила техническая
несостоятельность,” [The Karabakh Downfall: The Fall of Armenia Was Predetermined by a
Technical Destitution], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, December 10, 2020, 3, https://nvo.ng.ru
/realty/2020-12-10/1_1121_karabakh.html.
11. Artsrun Hovhannisyan, Ռազմարվեստ, Հատոր II․ Ցամաքային ճեղքում [Military Art, Volume II:
Land Breakthrough] (Yerevan: Voskan Yerevantsi, 2020), 43.
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Literature Review on Military Innovation
During the 26-year peace dividend following the First Nagorno-Karabakh
War, Armenia needed a major innovation across its armed forces to create a
unique Armenian way of war and attendant theory of victory. This section
lays down the theoretical framework, which will determine the factors that
either facilitate or hamper military innovation. It draws on scientific research,
bureaucratic politics, and civil-military relations, but it begins with the
definition of innovation and the scope of change it entails. As Peter Rosen
posits, a major innovation implies a change in the concepts of operation,
namely, the ideas governing the ways of using forces to win a campaign.
A major innovation also involves alteration to the essential workings of
the larger organization and priorities assigned to any given arm, while
“downgrading or abandoning of older concepts of operation and possibly of
a formerly dominant weapon.”12 Major innovation embraces the marriage of
technology and doctrine to produce a revolution in military affairs.13
First, to delineate the entities responsible for innovation in the Armenian
armed forces and how they enact change, it is necessary to distinguish the
different paths military innovation can take in diverse security situations.
The balance of power theory clarifies the differences between organizational
dynamics accompanying change. According to Barry Posen, the organizational
dynamics necessary to effect change are more likely to occur during peace
time, whereas during war they are likely to be overturned by both military
leaders and statesmen. As the historical record shows, many militaries have
been greatly imperiled and even destroyed outright when attacked by their
foes amidst an ongoing reorganization.14
According to James Russell, however, the successful wartime adaptation
of American units in the Anbar and Ninewa provinces of Iraq in 2005–07
goes contrary to prevailing theory, which argues that peacetime presents the
most conducive circumstances for military innovation to happen.15 Indeed,
the two most frequent catalysts of innovation are “a significant organizational
challenge,” or “an emerging opportunity.”16 Russell goes on to define two
directions of military innovation: top-down, and bottom-up. In peacetime,
the impetus for innovation will likely come from the higher echelons of
12. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991), 7–8.
13. Bradd C. Hayes and Douglas V. Smith, Gregory A. Engel, The Politics of Naval Innovation, Research
Report 4-94 (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 1994), 3.
14. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 30–31.
15. James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa
Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 205.
16. John J. Garstka, “Patterns in Innovation,” in Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for
International Security, ed. Scott Jasper, 57–78, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 57.
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command and be communicated through explicitly structured guidance.
In wartime, new ideas typically arise organically from field units empowered
through decentralized authority.17 An important point for the Armenian
case is that peacetime innovation, often more systematic and deliberate,
enables time to search for optimal solutions through trial and error. Military
conflicts are fought with the army using equipment at hand, and operational
possibilities during war are largely determined by decisions made long before
the outbreak of hostilities.18
If innovation questions the established beliefs, a paradigm change in
organizations, explanations, and models of describing and dealing with
certain phenomena is required. According to Thomas Kuhn, paradigms in
scientific research are universally recognized “achievements that for a time
provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.”19
These past achievements constitute a foundation of so-called normal
science, upon which further practice is built. Since normal science cannot
be used to uncover empirical and theoretical novelties, it is unable to lead to
a paradigm change.
Paradigm changes occur in the course of scientific revolutions—
extraordinary events encompassing the shift of professional commitments
necessary to deal with anomalies of research outcomes that subvert the
existing traditions of normal science. Scientific revolutions unfold through
discoveries that establish a novelty of fact or inventions validating novelty of
a theory. A discovery is achieved through the following phases of cognition:
previous awareness of an anomaly, gradual and simultaneous emergence of
both observational and conceptual recognition, a consequent change of
paradigm categories and procedures often accompanied by resistance, and
adjustment of conceptual categories so the previously anomalous has become
the anticipated. An invention, on the other hand, represents a large-scale
paradigm destruction following a crisis in normal problem-solving theory
and techniques. A direct response to a crisis can be the emergence of a novel
theory that will embrace certain solutions which were partially anticipated yet
ignored prior to the crisis.20
Sometimes, neither gradual understanding of new realities nor a dramatic
crisis in old beliefs are enough to produce the paradigm change necessary
for launching an innovation. Scholarship on bureaucratic politics posits one
17. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, War, 31.
18. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 31.
19. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962), viii.
20. Kuhn, Structure Scientific Revolutions, 6, 10, 52, 62–64, 67–68, 74–75.
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such obstacle to innovation is the tendency to treat institutions like the
military as a single monolithic entity rather than as a federation of smaller
suborganizations pursuing their parochial interests. As Graham Allison
and Morton Galperin argue, an organizational policy, instead of being an
output of one rational decisionmaker, is the product of a conglomerate of
communities and political actors competing to have a say in the parent
organization’s decisions and actions. This bureaucratic politics model views
organizations as actors focused not on a single overarching goal but rather
on their own conceptions of national security and sectional and personal
interests.21 Russell builds on this conclusion in his theory of military
innovation and adaptation, postulating that successful military innovation
should overcome bureaucratic resistance to change and alter the bureaucratic
behavior of the organization.22
The subfields of political science and civil-military relations provide
additional insight into how the interests of, and relationships between,
civilian and military entities unfold in the process of change and innovation.
Posen contends military organizations are reluctant to innovate in
peacetime if left to their own devices. Instead, innovation is spurred by the
intervention of civilian leaders, who are assisted by “military mavericks”—
senior military officers who provide technical knowledge and substantive
expertise. Moreover, Posen argues more civilian intervention and less military
autonomy will occur within a nation when waging a defensive war.23
Deborah Avant’s study of how the strategic relationships between
politicians and bureaucracies affect military innovation takes a more moderate
view of civilian influence. In her opinion, civilian choices on the organization
of a military institution affect the degree of the latter’s integrity—
the ability to articulate and present a unified position on any issue of
importance as political actors—and its preferences, which are biased toward
specific responses. Her comparative analysis of British and American military
innovation demonstrates the institutional division between the executive
and legislative branches enabled the military to mitigate civilian control by
appealing to the legislature when they were dissatisfied with the executive.
As a result, while the US Army only reluctantly embraced counterinsurgency
as its doctrine of necessity in Vietnam, British counterparts successfully
adopted imperial warfare in the Boer War and fought that conflict to a

21. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications,” World Politics S24 (Spring 1972), Theory and Policy in International Relations, S42–43.
22. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War, 24–25.
23. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 50, 174–75, 224.
TOC

128

Parameters 52(1) Spring 2022

successful end.24 Avant concludes the level of responsiveness of a military
to the imperative for change is largely determined by its preferences,
degree of integrity, and the type of civilian intervention necessary to
promote innovation, which are all determined by the structure of domestic
political institutions.25
Rosen holds a diametrically differing position on the distribution of
roles in military innovation between civilians and militaries. He suggests
innovation in peacetime should be driven from within a military organization
where all the civilians can do is support the senior military officers who
(akin to Posen’s military mavericks) formulate intellectual and organizational
components of a strategy for innovation.26 As Rosen contends, military
innovation is an ideological struggle aimed at the redefinition of values
that will legitimate the activities of a certain group in the military and the
political community. This ideological struggle should concentrate on a new
theory of victory and an appropriate way of war to achieve that victory. One
of the ways to win in the struggle for innovation is to create new promotion
pathways for young officers, who advocate a new way of war, allowing them to
rise to senior ranks within a period of generational change.27
Military Lessons Not Learned by Armenia
In the Armenian case, military innovation was likely to be motivated by
top-level guidance, since the country enjoyed a peaceful quarter century and
had enough time to prepare for its next military confrontation. The Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War was preceded by two relatively major escalations
in the conflict in April 2016 and July 2020. These flare-ups strengthened
the belief of Armenian senior military leaders that future operations would
be positional in nature and fought with an attritional approach against an
opponent who pursued limited offensive objectives. Glaring issues identified
in the wake of these hostilities in technological and operational domains were
largely ignored.
In the technological realm, among the main deficiencies identified for
the Armenian units were the enemy’s incipient attack-drone capabilities and

24. Deborah D. Avant, “The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,”
International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1993), 410–17.
25. Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1994), 12, 130.
26. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 174–75; Rosen, Winning Next War, 21.
27. Rosen, Winning Next War, 19–20.
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the vulnerability of their tanks’ lack of active-reactive armor.28 Oblivious to
these new realities following the hostilities, the Armenian side dismissed the
drone threat. According to the first deputy minister of defence: “it [is not]
necessary to buy expensive drones when it is possible to hit the target with a
conventional grenade launcher.”29
In the operational realm, an important lesson to be gleaned from the
hostilities in 2016 was the expanded deployment capacity of the Azerbaijani
army. That operation tested Azerbaijan’s capacity to use two railways around
Nagorno-Karabakh—the first one running from the rear to the front and
another larger one running parallel to the front—to raise troops rapidly
on alert and redeploy them to the frontline. This mode of transportation
proved indispensable for operational mobility manifested during the Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War where the Azerbaijani army had at least tenfold the
capacity of its opponent for the daily deployment of troops to the frontline.30
Recalling the paradigm change, expounded by Kuhn, in doctrinal
matters, an innovation might have been attained in Armenia through both
discovery and invention.31 First, most of the phases of cognition described
by Kuhn as precursor to discovery existed. The awareness of problems in
the Armenian military’s current philosophy of command and control and
the larger notion of operational concepts, along with their observational
and conceptual recognition, were formed long ago amongst farsighted
defense professionals and consequently reflected in the high-level guidance
documents issued by the minister of defense. Particularly, the ministerial
vision issued to the force in 2018 and mid-2020, respectively, underscored the
importance of overhauling forms and methods of warfare and communicated
the imperative to eliminate complacency with outdated military thinking,
weapons systems, combat manuals, and command and control practices.32
Second, if the cognition necessary for the discovery described above was
insufficient, a crisis in warfighting practices in the Armenian forces could
have spurred the destruction of the doctrine33 In the case of the Armenian
28. Ilja Topchij, “Карабах-2020: 50 тезисов о войне Азербайджана и Армении. Почему пала оборона
Карабаха,” [Karabakh-2020: 50 Theses about the War between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Why the Defense
of Karabakh Fell], ANI Armenian Research Center, November 25, 2020, https://expert.ru/expert/2020/48
/karabakh-2020-voenno-analiticheskij-razbor/.
29. Urcosta, “Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh.”
30. Urcosta, “Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh.”
31. Kuhn, Structure Scientific Revolutions, viii, 6, 52.
32. Davit Tonoyan, “The Vision of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Armenia,” July 9, 2018, 5,
https://mil.am/en/news/5402; and Davit Tonoyan, “ՀՀ պաշտպանության նախարարի տեսլականը
պաշտպանության ոլորտի և զինված ուժերի զարգացման առաջնահերթությունների վերաբերյալ,”
[The Vision of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia on the Priorities of the Development of the
Defense Sector and Armed Forces], June 9, 2020, 4–6, https://mil.am/hy/news/7931.
33. Kuhn, Structure Scientific Revolutions, 62–75.
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military, an instance of crisis occurred in the command and control domain
during the April War of 2016. Driven by the legacy of the Soviet system
of directive (restrictive) control, and pending explicit orders, some units fell
short of taking the initiative to react to the large-scale enemy assault. Even
though there were definite assumptions about the weakness of the established
model, however, no novel theory of command and control emerged as a
response to the crisis.
Paradigm change failed in the Armenian military because it was not
immune to the pathologies of the bureaucratic politics model described by
Allison and Halperin.34 It also proved unable to alter its behavior for, as
Russell sees it, overcoming the resistance to change.35
Indeed, bureaucratic infighting was in full swing in the Armenian military,
whereby the parochial interests of various branches of the armed forces made
the strategic planning process of the Armenian Army difficult to implement.
The resultant tug-of-war was aggravated by ineffective civil-military relations
and the weak leeway the nominal coordinating body—Strategic Planning
Division of the General Staff—had in assigning priorities for branch
requirements. Consequently, the strategic planning process resembled a
clearinghouse for meeting the needs of the branches through the proportional
cutting of corners to fit the defense budget, with no assignment of
priorities. More important though, all alternatives generated by the general
staff for army construction revolved around the same scientific algorithms,
to be implemented by different options for force packages, which were all
permeated by the same attritional mindset.
In the case of Armenia, the ideological struggle to see innovation
through, as depicted by Rosen, was carried out by the Western-educated
field-grade officers and Ministry of Defence’s civilian experts.36 They joined
hands with the strategic planning division of the general staff to conduct
two strategic defense review processes which strongly recommended
the armed forces’ doctrine undergo a thorough revision. Regrettably for
Armenia, these efforts proved unsuccessful. The two main reasons for the
outcome were the organized resistance of the general staff and the inability
of the Ministry of Defence to surmount that resistance. The General Staff ’s
organizational culture was antithetical to the idea of revising Armenian
military doctrine. At the same time, the officers with Western professional
military education who were aspiring military mavericks alluded to by Posen
34. Allison and Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, 42–43.
35. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War, 24–25.
36. Rosen, Winning Next War, 19–20.
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were largely barred from promotions to key decision-making positions.37
This factor impeded innovation, and it runs contrary to Rosen’s key
argument that attributes innovation’s success to the creation of new promotion
pathways for young champions of reform within the officer corps.38
An even more important a factor for the success or failure of military
innovation in Armenia was the state of civil-military relations in the defense
establishment. The importance of civilian control over the military and
the civil-military cooperation had been emphasized time and again and
enshrined both in the legislation and the chain of command. Thus, taken at
face value, civilian control was exercised through the civilian politicians and
officials, who spanned the decision-making hierarchy from the commander
in chief, through the minister of defence and his deputies, to the head of the
Ministry of Defence’s Defence Policy Department. The reality, however, was
different and in most operational matters, the elected and appointed civilian
masters largely deferred to the expertise of military professionals, thereby
playing almost no role in technological and doctrinal innovations. To explain
the causes of this phenomenon, one needs to borrow insights from Avant’s
institutional theory of military innovation.
According to Avant’s analysis, an organizational dynamic akin to
US civil-military relations before and during the Vietnam War also played
out in Armenia.39 The roots of the skewed relationships stretch back to
1992 and the founding of the national army, which used the Soviet model
of army construction and way of war underpinned by relevant scientific
algorithms. The degree of integrity within the general staff was high
since all general officers and senior colonels were graduates of the same
institution (Russian National War College) and/or had shared comabat
experience in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Thus, the general staff was
able to put up a unified front in presenting its preferences for Armenian
doctrine. These preferences were biased toward attritional warfare, a
positional defense, and restrictive control and leaned heavily on air defense
and artillery branches—to the detriment of a potent air component and
an infantry arm, which was not agile enough to churn out units other than
fortress defenders. Given the great attention Armenian heads of state paid
to the affairs of the military and the paltry involvement of the parliament in
doctrinal and equipment-specific matters, the senior leaders of the general
staff were virtually free to bypass the ministry of defense and gain the support
of state leadership for its preferences.
37. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 174–75.
38. Rosen, Winning Next War, 20.
39. Avant, Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine, 415–17.
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Recalling Posen’s argument about the risky nature of wartime military
innovation, the reluctance of the Armenian general staff to undergo
major change is understandable, given the fact that since 1994 no peace
accord had been signed with Azerbaijan and skirmishes along the border
were an everyday occurrence. Given the protracted nature of the conflict,
however, Armenia’s leaders had to realize complete peace was an unlikely
proposition and postponing major reorganization until after it came about
was an unwise judgment.
The conservative stance of top military officers on innovation matters
could be mitigated by the intervention of civilians, who, according to
Posen, can spur change in peacetime. Moreover, in the light of Posen’s other
argument, the civilian dictate in military affairs had to be strong in Armenia
since the country sought to maintain the status quo and was preparing
to conduct explicitly defensive operations in a specific terrain against a
specific enemy.40 Nevertheless, the confluence of elected officials’ deference
to senior leaders in military matters and the relatively low level of the
innovation-minded organizations and personalities within the military did
not enable sufficient pressure to promote major innovation.
Conclusion
The main reason for the defeat of the Armenian forces in the Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War was their failure to carry out major innovation
in military doctrine and to adapt to the changed character of war. The
Soviet-legacy operational concepts prevented the Armenian forces from
conducting maneuver warfare during the war proper and preordained
the decisions made apropos sources of military power well before the hot
phase of the conflict. Examining the Armenian case through the lens of
various established theories of military innovation leads to several conclusions,
some troubling.
On the one hand, the Armenian innovation had all the chances to
succeed as it met the fundamental requirements of Kuhn’s paradigmatic
change in terms of previous awareness of the new theory and the crisis to
substantiate that understanding. Moreover, being, according to Russell,
necessarily a top-down process, the innovation was carried out in preparation
for a defensive war and, as Posen maintain+s, had to see more involvement
by civilians. On the other hand, possible change was not accompanied
by the creation of new promotional pathways as described by Rosen,
which would allow “maverick” soldiers to bulldoze their concepts through.
40.

Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 30–31, 50, 224.
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Nor was Avant’s organizational dynamics and the state of civil-military
relations favorable for successful innovation, whereby the highly integrated
general staff professed scientific approaches and advanced its biased
preferences against the background of anemic civilian authority. As this case
study demonstrates, the theoretical underpinnings auspicious for the success
of military innovation in Armenia fell short of offsetting the ones that
conspired to relegate it to the status of miscarried endeavor.
By way of a more general insight, military innovation has more chances
to succeed if it is carried out in an environment where there is a consensus
among civilian and military elites about the direction, substance, and timing
of changes. Such an environment will create necessary support (manifested
both in resource allocations and the promotion of key military personnel)
for innovation efforts by the civilian leadership and will enable the military
to devise a reform strategy and implementation plan that transcends most
intra-organizational parochial interests and have an almost uniform buy-in.
Divisions amongst elites will result in incoherent strategies and poor execution
of programs of change, causing the atomization of military innovation
efforts, which will yield suboptimal results and potentially bring about
military calamities.
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ABSTRACT: This Canadian contribution to Parameters’ Strategic Lieutenant
series shows how domestic context creates the conditions for professional
military education reform to a greater extent than the global strategic context.
The article assesses the junior officer education delivered by Canada’s military
colleges and analyzes interviews with key stakeholders responsible for the
formulation and implementation of reform at the military colleges.
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T

he first article in Parameters’ Strategic Lieutenants series posed the
question: “What leads governments to reform entry-level officer
professional military education: the global strategic environment
or the domestic political environment?” The Canadian answer—associated
with post-Cold War reforms to the Canadian officer corps—tends toward the
latter.1 The Canadian contribution to the United Shield Task Force in Somalia
in 1992–93 was marred by the shooting of one Somali civilian and the torture
and death of another while in Canadian custody, as well as the mishandling of
the incidents by Canadian military authorities. In the wake of the Somalia
affair, the Canadian public demanded the armed forces reflect societal values. A
wide-ranging government inquiry into the affair recommended a restructuring
of military culture to preserve the military’s self-governance and credibility in
society.2 These demands in the national and operational environments generated
in Ottawa and the court of Canadian public opinion ultimately led to the
reformation of the Canadian Forces—renamed the Canadian Armed Forces
(CAF) in 2013—officer education program. The CAF had to take charge of
reform or be subjected to it. When choosing reform, they included entry-level
education for officers as a vital component of long-term change.
Reforms to entry-level officer military education from the end of the Cold
War to 2017 were the product of the domestic political environment. Domestic

1. Scott A. Silverstone, “Educating Strategic Lieutenants at West Point,” Parameters 49, no. 4 (Winter 2019–
20): 65–76. Other works in the series include: An Jacobs, “Educating Strategic Lieutenants at Sandhurst,”
Parameters 49, no. 4 (Winter 2019–20): 77–90; Dorthe Bach Nyemann and Jørgen Staun, “Denmark’s Strategic
Lieutenants,” Parameters 50, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 91–104; and Carsten F. Roennfeldt, “Norway’s Strategic
Lieutenants,” Parameters 50, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 79–90.
2. See Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy:
The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to
Somalia, 5 vols. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2017), https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/70385/publication
.html.
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reactions to incidents that occurred in Somalia in 1993 led to a renewed emphasis
on post-secondary education. Reforms were shaped by resource constraints,
as part of government efforts to economize and reduce debt in response to
globalization, and by shifting government priorities. This article summarizes the
delivery of entry-level military education in Canada, assesses perceived changes
in the global strategic and domestic environments, and shows how reforms result
from the domestic environment.
Canada’s Military Education System
Military education in Canada is a joint affair based on three sets of
specifications: the needs of the CAF, the service (navy, army, and air force), and
the individual (based on specific occupation). Canadian military colleges are
designed to educate officers, regardless of service or occupation. For the purposes
of this article, the term “lieutenant” is inclusive of all CAF junior officers at the
officer-1 level, be they 2nd lieutenants (Canadian Army and Royal Canadian
Air Force), lieutenants (Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force), acting
sub-lieutenants (Royal Canadian Navy), or sub-lieutenants (Royal Canadian
Navy).The CAF handles personnel training common to all services, while the
army, navy, and air force provide specific service and occupational training
during summers and post-graduation. Military college graduates represent
25 to 30 percent of Canada’s annual officer intake; the remaining officer slots
are either directly recruited university graduates or students attending a civilian
university in lieu of military college.3
There are two Canadian military colleges: the Royal Military College of
Canada (RMC) in Kingston, Ontario, and the Collège militaire royal de
Saint-Jean (CMR) in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. The CMR Saint-Jean,
closed in 1994 due to federal budgetary constraints, reopened in 2008 to deliver
the Collège d’enseignement général et professionnel—or “general and professional
teaching college”—curriculum under Quebec’s pre-university system. Upon
receiving a university degree after one year, CMR Saint-Jean students join their
counterparts at the RMC. The CMR Saint-Jean returned to degree-granting
status in 2018, which means some, but not all, students remain at the institution
for their degree.
The staffs of the Royal Military College and CMR Saint-Jean are composed
of military personnel, civilian and military professors, and civil servants. Programs
are based on four pillars or components of the Regular Officer Training Program:
academic (degree attainment), military (leadership development), athletics
3. John Scott Cowan, “The Impact of the Withers Report: Initial Implementation, Subsequent Adaptation
and Relevance Today” (unpublished manuscript, 2005), 5, Microsoft Word file.
TOC

Educating Military Officers

McKay, Breede, Dizboni, and Jolicoeur 137

(physical fitness), and bilingualism (proficiency in French). Unlike American
service colleges, little service-specific “military training” occurs during the
academic year. Service and branch training does not always occur in the summer
but may be off cycle or the summer may be dedicated to other activities like
French language instruction or on-the-job employment. The program produces
“Officers well educated,” meaning fit, bilingual young officers with university
degrees and leadership competencies that can be developed further within the
context of service and occupation-specific training.4 A year after graduation,
most officers are assigned junior command or staff positions in their service. The
most common aspects of their employment involve training and leading
people, as well as mastering specific occupational skills. Canadian junior officers
perform tasks and functions similar to officers from other countries.
Sources of Change
The push to reform the Canadian Armed Forces through the RMC arose
from several interconnected sources within Canada. The end of the Cold War
meant there was less justification for funding a large defense complex, and the
absence of a clear outside aggressor led the country to look inward and take stock.
As a result of this assessment, Canadian defense spending flatlined in the 1990s.
A former chief of defence staff dubbed this period “the decade of darkness.”5
Several factors contributed to a decline within the ranks, including overseas
base closures and force reductions, a federal pay freeze affecting military members
and civil servants, and an increasing operational tempo with new deployments paid
from a declining budget. There were also public calls for the CAF to adopt a force
structure optimized for peace support operations and humanitarian assistance.6
The Canadian military experience until this time had been characterized by stable
commitments and training oriented toward preparation for a war with the Warsaw
Pact, which never came. An incident of poor Canadian military performance in
the early post–Cold War period led to a loss of confidence among the Canadian
public in the armed forces.
In 1993, after an earlier deployment to another UN mission was canceled,
Canada deployed the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG)
to Somalia. The ensuring affair threatened the CAF’s reputation for reliability
4. The phrase originates from Major General Eric Tremblay, a former commandant of the Military College,
and appears in college briefings during and after his tenure.
5. Ronald G. Haycock, “ ‘Getting Here from There’: Trauma and Transformation in Canadian Military
Education,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 32, no. 2 (2004): 43–67; and Rick
Hillier, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009),
107–32.
6. Bill Bentley, Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
Strategic Studies, 2005), 98–100.
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in increasingly complex peace missions. Two specific incidents, stemming from
attempts to curtail theft of materiel from the CARBG’s compound, contributed
to the Somalia affair: the shooting of two Somali civilians, one of whom was
killed, and the torture and death of another while in military custody. Both incidents
became national scandals because the nature of both incidents disturbed the
Canadian public and concerns grew about potential cover-ups of the shooting
incidents in Ottawa and Somalia.7 Outraged by the military’s conduct, the Canadian
public demanded reform.
An inquiry into the Somalia affair subjected the operation and the command and
control of the Canadian Armed Forces to close scrutiny. While the report was farranging in scope, its authors most notably urged
. . . [the] senior leaders of the CF to redefine the characteristics and values
of the Canadian military and to establish the capability to monitor the CF
on an ongoing basis. In that process it will be critical to confirm those core
values without which the health of the military profession in Canada cannot
be restored. In the process of this re-assessment, the CF leadership should be
guided by the imperative that they must be prepared to conduct operations
in peace and war in accordance with Canadian standards, values, laws,
and ethics.8

The inquiry concluded in 1997, and Lieutenant General Maurice Baril, the
chief of the defence staff (CDS), asserted, “It is clear . . . that we need to do
business in new ways.”9 He was not alone in his concern for the future. Canadian
military historian David J. Bercuson observed the Minister of National Defence
M. Douglas Young was concerned as early as 1996 that the commission, as opposed
to the government, might set the future agenda for the Canadian Armed Forces.10
In effect, the armed forces had a choice—reform themselves or be subjected to
reforms by others. One year later, Young issued a report on reforming the leadership
and management of the Canadian Armed Forces.
The Young report was an action plan for reform, and two parts are especially
relevant for understanding education’s role in the reform process. First, the report
mandated the Canadian Armed Forces include a formal statement of official values
and beliefs in all recruiting, training, and professional development activities.11
The mandate was justified by the belief the CAF had not evolved with changes in
7. Commission of Inquiry, Dishonoured Legacy, 1:306–11 and 5:1126–44. See also Bernd Horn and Bill
Bentley, Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015), 23, 36.
8. Commission of Inquiry, Dishonoured Legacy, 5:1450.
9. Anthony Depalma, “Canada Accuses 47 of Misconduct in Bosnia,” New York Times, January 18, 1997.
10. David J. Bercuson, “Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the
Somalia Affair,” Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 3 (2009): 35–36.
11. Government of Canada, Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Forces
Leadership Institute, 2009), Chapter 2, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate
/reports-publications/duty-with-honour-2009.html.
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Canada and the international community.12 Second, and more importantly, the report
mandated all officers not commissioned from the ranks must have degrees. The
report also called for a review of officer professional development at all levels,
including additional strategically oriented training for general and flag officers.
Recommendation 12 contained the following direction:
Begin immediately a thorough review of the undergraduate program
at the Royal Military College. This review will ensure for each graduate
a broad-based education, well grounded in the sciences and humanities,
with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics
and the leadership skills needed to prepare officers for responsibilities and
service to country.13

The combination of the officer corps with degrees, the reshaping of officer
professional development, and the reviews of the undergraduate program at RMC
were an attempt to leverage education as the engine of reform. The Royal Military
College—as well CMR Saint-Jean—played (and continue to play) an important role
in the education and socialization of Canadian junior officers, who with additional
experience and training could become proficient at drawing connections between
strategic and operational-tactical levels.
Recommendation 12 provided the impetus for follow-up efforts like the Withers’
Study Group, which focused on how to achieve the requirements and goals outlined
in the Young report. In 1997, the group convened to review the undergraduate
program at the Royal Military College of Canada and produced a 1998 report with
34 recommendations.14 First, the group expanded the mandate of recommendation
12 beyond a narrow interpretation of the Young report. In the preface of the
Withers report, they stated that examining the academic component to the
exclusion of the military, physical fitness, and language components would not
meet the intent of developing values, ethics, and leadership skills.15 The study group
explained the strategic context had changed both domestically and internationally,
which necessitated changes to education and training. Their logic was
straightforward. They first established “the strategic context within which the
Canadian Forces would operate in the 21st century.”16

12. M. Douglas Young, Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces
(Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 13–16; see also Bercuson, 34; and Horn and Bentley, 36–37,
99–100.
13. Young, Report to the Prime Minister, 17.
14. John Scott Cowan, principal emeritus of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), interview by
author, August 23, 2018; and Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 2.
15. R. Withers et al., Report of the RMC Board of Governors by the Withers’ Study Group: Balanced Excellence
Leading Canada’s Armed Forces in the New Millennium (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998), 5.
16. Withers et al., Report of the RMC Board, 4.
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They then examined how this new context placed demands on CAF officers
and explicitly mentioned both domestic and international pressures contributing to
those demands.17 The study group also examined the gap between the actual training
cadets received and the ideal and determined options for addressing the gap. The
Withers’ Study Group proposed three big new ideas in the report. The first idea
was to increase the degree of connection—or “reciprocal commitment”—between
the Royal Military College of Canada and the broader Canadian Armed Forces.
The second idea was to address issues with recruitment and selection of officers.
The third idea was to strengthen the military pillar, under which they noted, “the
critical challenge will be to bring about the vital integration of all four pillars
to achieve the full synergy available.”18 The group emphasized the inclusion of
military-relevant content in educational activities to create synergy between the
academic and military pillars when possible. Reciprocity would require effort and
resources from the Canadian Armed Forces, which needed to believe there would
be a return on investment.
The public response to the Somalia affair and the political environment
following the end of the Cold War led to a reassessment of the Canadian
Armed Forces. The conclusions and recommendations made in the Young
and Withers reports emphasized the need to focus on reform at the junior
officer-level and consequently the approach taken by Canada’s military colleges.
Reforms Planned
The Young and Withers reports set the stage for a series of reforms establishing
how Canadian military colleges would educate officers. A close examination of
the Withers report reveals much about the Royal Military College’s role as an
engine of reform. Recommendation 3 of the Withers report directly addressed
the first big idea recommending a closer relationship between the Royal Military
College and the Canadian Armed Forces. The Young report had suggested
integrating CAF training and educational institutions under a single umbrella
with the mission of stimulating strategic thinking, leadership skills, and ethics.
The Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was created in 2001–02 to serve as a
custodian of the profession of arms, provide oversight of joint training and
education, and offer steering and direction to three campuses: Collège militaire
royal de Saint-Jean, the Royal Military College of Canada, and the Canadian
Forces College (a CAF staff college as opposed to a service-level staff college).19

17. Withers et al., Report of the RMC Board, 8.
18. Withers et al., Report of the RMC Board, 8–9, 18.
19. “Canadian Defence Academy,” Government of Canada (website), modified November 13, 2020, https://
www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/cda.page. See also Horn and Bentley, 101–11.
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The Royal Military College of Canada created a Division of Continuing Studies
to oversee the new policy, with an emphasis on distance learning.
Four recommendations from the Withers report (16, 18, 19, and 21) pertained to
how the military should select and post personnel into the Royal Military College
of Canada for the training and education of cadets. Recommendation 16 stated all
officers serving at the college were role models for future generations of officers
and emphasized selecting the best possible officers and NCOs for these positions.
Recommendation 18 advised the commandant should be a five-year post for the
sake of stability, and recommendation 19 suggested the director of cadets should
be a navy colonel or captain as opposed to a lieutenant colonel or commander.
Finally, recommendation 21 suggested increasing the number of senior
noncommissioned members supporting the military pillar.20
The Withers’ Study Group viewed the Royal Military College of Canada
and the CMR Saint-Jean as engines of reform for the Canadian officer corps.
Evidence of this argument is contained in the fifth recommendation of the
Withers Report: “Seek through the MND [minister of national defence] and the
Armed Forces Council to increase the percentage of RMC graduates in the CF
[Canadian Forces] officer corps from the current 25% to approximately 35-40%.”21
John Scott Cowan, a member of the study group and principal emeritus of the
Royal Military College of Canada, confirmed the intent of increasing the intake
was to foster change across the officer corps as a whole, and the study group felt
the intake had to be greater than 33 percent.22 The military pillar emphasized
teaching young officers how to lead others, with the hope military college graduates
would transmit their learning experiences to colleagues commissioned from other
sources. These graduates would be agents of socialization post-graduation.
The Withers report, despite its emphasis on the military pillar, also contained
several recommendations for institutional reform, including the maintenance of
high standards to ensure the Royal Military College maintained its academic
credibility, a five-year term for the principal, and a review process for degree
programs. Yet, recommendations 13 and 14 were the most germane in regards
to the inculcation of strategic-mindedness. Recommendation 13 proposed the
Royal Military College develop and implement a “core curriculum” of academic
material deemed necessary for officers that would complement the degree
programs cadets followed in arts, science, or engineering. Recommendation 14
suggested the first-year curriculum focus on core courses to provide additional
structure to the academic pillar and demonstrate education could have greater
20. Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 12–14.
21. Withers et al., Report of the RMC Board, 24.
22. Cowan, interview; and Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 5.
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utility in fostering officership.23 By delivering the core curriculum through
courses, academic departments could cultivate an officer corps with the capacity
to examine problems through various methods and synthesize solutions creatively.
This approach recognized officership must take a multidisciplinary approach to
prepare officers for serving in a dynamic and evolving world.
Finally, the Withers report made several recommendations on how the
pillars could be made mutually supportive. For example, recommendation 24
suggested to “[u]tilise the ‘core’ curriculum recommended in the academic pillar
to bridge the two pillars. Comment: Appropriate military examples for relevant
courses given in the academic pillar should be derived from activities taking
place in the military pillar.”24 In other words, while reforms were necessary, there
might not be a significant influx of additional resources available to carry them
out, which made synergies between pillars all the more important. Reforms would
need to be as resource efficient as possible. The effect of resource availability on the
achievement of goals is a major theme of this article.
Reforms Carried Out
To trace the effects of domestic and international strategic contexts on
reforms, it is first necessary to scrutinize the implementation of these reforms.
The overall timeframe for the reformation of Canada’s military colleges began in
1999, as stated by the unpublished paper of Cowan, an informed participant in the
formulation and implementation of the Withers report circa 2005. Cowan was
also appointed the principal of Royal Military College in that year and wrote a
paper about the implementation of the Withers report in 2005.
The next reform effort in 2017 came from two sources. In March 2017, the
CDS directed a special staff assistance visit (SSAV) to examine RMC’s “overall
climate, training environment, culture, and Regular Officer Training Plan
(ROTP) programme construct.”25 While some argue the visit was ordered to
preempt a report from the parliamentary auditor general due to be published
later that year, the findings show a continuity of intent with the Withers report.
The office of the auditor general reviewed the Royal Military College to ensure
the insitution’s value for money and compliance with federal legislation, and

23. Withers et al., Report of the RMC Board, 28–31, 32.
24. Withers et al., Report of the RMC Board, 37.
25. G. R. Maddison et al., “Special Staff Assistance Visit – Report on the Climate, Training Environment,
Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada – Kingston” (Ottawa: Department
of National Defence, 2017), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports
-publications/special-staff-assistance-visit.html.
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concluded in 2017 that the college was an expensive way to produce officers.26
Focusing on efficiencies and costs, however, obscures the college’s role as an
engine of reform for the officer corps and fails to realize the value of institutions
that foster officership.27
The recommendations of the various reports provide a checklist to measure
progress over time. In 2005, Cowan noted the connections between the Canadian
Armed Forces and the Royal Military College had strengthened, the CDS and
service leaders frequently visited the college, and college leaders realized the
desirability of increased utility to the Department of National Defence and the
Canadian Armed Forces.28 Thus, some of the recommended reforms were being
implemented at that time.
Nonetheless, the idea of using the RMC as the engine of reform for the
Canadian officer corps was never fully realized. Cowan stated this effort was
. . . the one that got away. It was to go from 25% of officer intake to
approximately 35-40%. While events in Saint Jean help take some of
the pressure off, ultimately, what we need to understand is the original
reasoning. This was essentially cultural. There are 110 universities in
Canada, but we only control the culture in one of them. If you want
to evolve the culture of the officer corps through an institution at
the input end of the spectrum, you need to broaden the flow through
that institution.29

While the percentage grew to approximately 28 to 29 percent of the officer
intake in 2005, it remained short of the target.30 The SSAV noted the percentage
in 2012–13 was approximately 25 to 27 percent of intake, with RMC graduates
comprising 55 to 57 percent of the general and flag officers in the Canadian Armed
Forces.31 This number should not be interpreted as a sign the core curriculum
was producing generals. In 2012–13, the majority of the general and flag officers
had over 25 years of service, which meant they were commissioned in the
mid- to late-1980s. Royal Military College graduates were retained longer or
progressed faster than peers commissioned by other means. Exactly why this
phenomena occured is not easily determined.

26. Gordon Stock et al., “Report 6—Royal Military College of Canada—National Defence,” in Office of
the Auditor General of Canada, 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada to the Parliament of Canada
(Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2017), https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl
_oag_201711_06_e_42671.html.
27. Stock et al., “Report 6.”
28. Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 4.
29. Cowan, interview.
30. Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 5.
31. Maddison et al., Special Staff Assistance Visit, “Annex I,” 11.
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Synergy on RMC’s grounds emerged from the reforms. Examples include the
creation of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) and the Canadian
Military Journal. The CFLI, a small institute devoted to the study of military
leadership and writing of leadership doctrine for the CAF, was moved from the
Royal Military College to CDA in 2003 and eliminated in cost cutting in 2013.32
The cost-cutting efforts resulted from measures to reduce the federal deficit and
a strategic review within the Department of National Defence. Cowan remarked
the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute “was specific and useful—doctrine and
training on leadership. This was the case for a decade.”33 By 2017, RMC’s military
pillar found itself subjected to scrutiny under the special staff assistance visit,
which concluded the college’s purpose and content were inconsistent.34
Yet, the core curriculum, a significant part of the academic pillar, remained
throughout the period. Cowan stated:
The core curriculum before Withers had become very weak. There
were 16 or 17 subjects that were seen as useful to officership. This wasn’t
someone’s imagining. We took the Officer General Specification extant
at the time and we looked at what the desirable characteristics were and
related them to subject areas.35

Elements of the core curriculum later became the basis of the Officer
Professional Military Education (OPME) program, which all junior officers
were required to pursue regardless of entry scheme and date.36 The program
led to more resources for the Royal Military College and favored graduates
who completed the requirements as part of their degree. The OPME program
proved to be another mechanism to foster change within the officer corps by
increasing the amount of education required by officers. In 2013, however,
the program was replaced with distance education to reduce completion time
and cost and realign it with the Officer General Specifications.37 Junior officers
took a smaller set of purely military subjects through distance learning instead
of university-level courses. This decision followed the Department of National
Defence’s strategic review and the Government of Canada’s Deficit Reduction
Action Plan in the early 2010s.
Even without the additional mandate and resources, the core curriculum was
intended to link education and military service. For example, academic courses
32. Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 14.
33. Cowan, interview.
34. Maddison et al., Special Staff Assistance Visit, “Annex I.”
35. Cowan, interview.
36. Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 11–12.
37. D. A. Paterson, Reply to “Future of the OPME Program/Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about
OPME,” Canadian Forces Junior Officer Development Programme, Canadian Forces General Messages,
November 2, 2012, https://army.ca/forums/index.php?topic=105553.150.
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were overhauled to include military examples and materials.38 Some of the same
ideas would reappear in later years, suggesting the issues with the curriculum
were either unresolved or structural. For instance, the SSAV recommended the
Royal Military College improve its effectiveness and efficiency by better unifying
and synchronizing the delivery of the pillars.39
The SSAV also suggested increasing the staffing of the Training Wing, the
military organization responsible for training and mentoring cadets. Many of
these recommendations were identical to suggestions provided by the Withers
report, especially those pertaining to the desired rank and quality of personnel
in the Training Wing.40 These incidents show that while the Withers reforms
were initiated, a number were not fully realized—appearing again in the SSAV
recommendations almost two decades later.
The implementation of reforms depends on the level of resources—
funding, personnel, and monitoring efforts—sustained over time. Reform efforts,
however, often compete with other priorities for personnel and funding. From
2003–11, the Canadian Armed Forces’ operational tempo focused on commitments
in Afghanistan, meaning military staffing priorities favored operational units—
which is neither surprising nor a criticism. In 2003, Canada committed a
battle group for service in Kabul, Afghanistan, with the International Security
Assistance Force. By 2006, Canadian commitments grew to include a battle group,
provincial reconstruction teams, and security force capacity-building activities
in Kandahar province. Although these combat operations commitments
ended in 2011, Canada continued to provide a smaller force of trainers in
NATO-led activities in Kabul until 2014. These events show operational priorities
took precedence over sustaining reform efforts.
Following 2011, the Canadian government sought to reduce its deficit and
conducted a strategic review of the Department of National Defence, which led
to unintended consequences for the Royal Military College. First, since staffing
priorities were higher for operations than for force generation, military staffing
levels declined. Second, around 2011–12, the federal government’s review of
priorities and effort to reduce the deficit led to a size reduction of the civilian
workforce, including RMC faculty. Both efforts emphasized efficient use of
resources in accordance with government priorities, however, their effect on
reforms suggests the existence of a recurring pattern in professional military
education in Canada. In times with competing priorities for limited resources,
military leaders preserve combat capability at the expense of other efforts.41 While
38.
39.
40.
41.

Cowan, “Impact of the Withers Report,” 15.
Maddison et al., Special Staff Assistance Visit, “Annex L.”
Maddison et al., Special Staff Assistance Visit, “Annex L”; and Withers et al., 32–37.
Horn and Bentley, 121–25. They present a cultural argument for this preference, however.
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context certainly matters to reform efforts, the domestic context seems to trump
the international context.
While it may be too soon to tell if the reforms were successful, it is possible
to draw lessons from the Canadian experience. Military institutions are subject
to the priorities established by political and military leadership. Reform efforts
require resources and the likelihood of successful reform declines as resources
are constrained. Since professional military education is a proverbial long game,
it is vulnerable to cuts by decisionmakers seeking easy wins when the pressure is
on to reduce government spending.42
Conclusion
Reviewing the two decades, it is hard to argue Canadian military leaders
moved quickly to address a major change in the strategic environment through
innovative education. Nonetheless, circumstances presented Canadian soldiers
with new challenges and some, but not all, lived up to national expectations.
While the Young and the Withers reports were clear and insightful on the
role precommissioning education could play in professional renewal for the
Canadian Armed Forces, they did not address the development of strategic
thinkers for a new and evolving world order. By matching the core curriculum
of science, social science, and humanities to a general officer specification, the
Royal Military College has created a means of finding synergies between the
education and military training of future officers.
Reform efforts also provided important contributions to the profession
of arms, including expanding critical thinking through a common OPME
distance-education curriculum, developing leadership knowledge through
Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, and disseminating military knowledge
through the Canadian Military Journal. The reforms, however, did not
constitute a deliberate effort to develop strategic thinking early in the careers of
military college graduates. Nor did these institutional aspects last in the
face of resource pressures.
More seriously for military college graduates, the changes in the global
strategic context since the Cold War—including globalization, America’s
challenges, China’s initiatives, and environmental threats—have not led to
a renaissance in professional military education in Canada. The domestic
context has eclipsed the global strategic context. The demands of the future are
less certain and more fluid than the demands of the past, which has created a
need for professional military education throughout an officer’s career. The
42. In general, the military has suffered this fate. See Kim Richard Nossal, Charlie Fox Trot: Fixing Defence
Procurement in Canada (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2016).
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education provided at the entry level is foundational and should prepare future
officers for uncertain and fluid situations. This reality means playing the long
game, associated with a changing global strategic context, even when reform
efforts, faced with resource scarcity, are forced into the short game of an evolving
domestic context.
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n 2008, I began my first joint tour of duty at then-United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM). Returning from a deployment to Iraq during
the Surge with the 25th Infantry Division, the assignment was my
introduction to planning for the military challenge the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) presented to the United States, its allies, and its partners—
especially Taiwan. For the next three years, the joint planning team I
helped lead focused on studying the emerging capabilities of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) and what the appropriate responses ought to be
should the PRC initiate military operations against the United States, Taiwan,
and other countries.
During this time, among US military officers, the potential PLA military
threat was not a settled matter. Even some senior leaders serving in the
region questioned whether China could mount a credible threat to Taiwan or
anyone else. Many of them still viewed the PLA and its ground, air, and naval
components as a Cold War–era mass-conscription force, armed with relic Sovietand Chinese-produced knockoff equipment, that had no recent operational
experience. And, the most recent experience of the PLA was, at best, an
inconclusive four-week-long 1979 invasion of Vietnam which ended with China
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withdrawing all its units after suffering thousands of casualties at the hands
of a force composed mainly of Vietnamese militia. Further, as these skeptics
pointed out, Taiwan has an 80-mile wide moat between it and mainland China,
and Taiwan fields a small but capable, modern military force equipped by the
United States. Russia or violent extremist groups, especially radical Islamists
such as al-Qaeda, were certain to be the threats worthy of US military attention
for the foreseeable future—or so the predominant thinking went. After all, thenSecretary of Defense Robert Gates explicitly stated in 2008 the United States
had to focus on winning the ongoing war in Iraq even if it meant diverting
resources and energy from preparing for future threats.
These assessments did not take into account (or were even wholly ignorant
of ) the rapid advance of PLA warfighting capabilities made in the preceding
decade-plus since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. When our team briefed the
new PLA capabilities in reconaissance, command and control, long-range
precision fires, air combat, air defense, anti-surface warfare, and many other areas,
we could see some senior leaders were beginning to understand the problem—
the PRC was building a suite of advanced combat means that could overwhelm
the Taiwan military and prevent the US military from effectively intervening in
a conflict near Taiwan. At the same time, the term “anti-access and area-denial”
(A2/AD) entered the common professional security parlance.
The US consensus view of the PRC threat relative to others has changed much
since 2008. Violent extremism remains a pernicious problem but one that now
seems manageable through intelligence, law enforcement, special operations forces,
and partner forces. Further, US defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, while ragged and
senseless, have not yet created an existential threat to American security. Russia
has demonstrated it is a serious threat to European security (as well as in Syria
and elsewhere) but has limited options beyond aggression against its immediate
neighbors, especially if NATO chooses to act in a concerted way. Iran and North
Korea remain destabilizing threats, particularly with their developing nuclear
programs, but their effective reach for now is limited, and the United States has
options to check major moves either country might make against others.
Thus, with continued rapid growth in all forms of the PRC’s power, the
United States finally recognizes, correctly, the PRC is the single greatest
threat to US security. As the current US interim national security strategic
guidance states, only the PRC is “capable of combining its economic,
diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to
a stable and open international system.” And it is likely to remain so for many,
many years. This is why the same interim guidance centers on the need for the
United States to “prevail in strategic competition with China” (Biden, Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, 2021, p. 20).
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Despite this clarity of guidance and focus on the PRC, there understandably
remain those who worry an excessive focus on preparation for conflict w ith t he
PRC is dangerously misplaced. Beyond the salient point that this focus might
beget the war it seeks to prevent, there is the open question of whether the focus
is necessary. It seems apparent the PLA has reached parity with many US combat
capabilities and strives to reach parity, and even superiority, in many others. But,
if the PRC does not intend to compete directly with the United States, and
has no serious designs on displacing US influence globally or even regionally,
then the current US preoccupation with the PRC is possibly a serious mistake.
The question of whether China has a grand strategy to replace the
United States as the global hegemon is the central question of Rush Doshi’s
The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order, and the
title makes his conclusion clear. Doshi, the founding director of the Brookings
China Strategy Initiative and current director for China on the US National
Security Council (he completed the book prior to joining the council),
makes a compelling argument the PRC has patiently planned for decades to
overtake the United States as the world’s dominant power. As a China scholar
and a proficient Mandarin speaker, Doshi draws heavily from a variety of
publically available but hard-to-obtain PRC documents to build a convincing case
for the existence of a deliberate PRC grand strategy to counter the United States.
He defines a grand strategy as “a state’s theory of how it can achieve its strategic
objectives that is intentional, coordinated, and implemented across multiple means
of statecraft—military, economic, and political” (6).
Doshi charts the evolution of the PRC’s grand strategy to displace American
order beginning with its emotional roots in China’s “Century of Humiliation”
but forged critically by a “traumatic trifecta” of major events: the US reaction
to the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the US Gulf War against Iraq in
1990–91, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (11). He briefly mentions
the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 and the errant US strike on the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade in 1999 (though he says nothing about the EP-3 incident near
Hainan Island in 2001) but his main focus is at the grand-strategic level with most
discussion centered on political and economic issues. He addresses the military
aspects of the PRC’s strategy (mostly maritime issues) in two dedicated chapters
that take a supporting role to the full body of the narrative.

Doshi frames this strategy as one intended to displace the United States as
a regional and global hegemon by first b lunting t he U nited S tates’ e xercise
of control over affairs regionally, then building the PRC’s control over others
regionally, and finally e xpanding t hese t wo e fforts gl obally. In itially, Ch ina
followed a “hide and bide” approach to quietly blunt US control so as not to elicit
negative reactions or countermeasures from the United States and others. Then,
with new direction from then-President Hu Jintao, and with the 2008 global
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financial crisis apparently weakening US power, the PRC shifted its approach to
“actively accomplishing something” as it began to build its control in the region.
Now, Doshi argues, following the election of President Trump in 2016 and
the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Xi Jinping, the current Chinese president,
considers time and momentum on China’s side and has firmly shifted the PRC
to expanding its blunting and building efforts globally. Doshi dedicates an entire
chapter to examining in impressive detail the political, economic, and military
aspects of all three phases.
The book has its limitations though. Doshi does not address PRC espionage or
influence operations inside the United States nor does he meaningfully consider
options the United States could take to deter China from continuing to pursue its
strategy. Nonetheless, he provides the real gem of the book in the final chapter—
the strategy the United States should follow to answer the PRC’s challenge.
His set of recommendations are thoughtful and compelling and fundamentally
recognize the growth of PRC power must be dealt with directly in a concerted,
grand strategic way.
In The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power
Conflict, Elbridge Colby argues a similar premise but arrives at slightly different
and more detailed prescriptions. Like Doshi, Colby has deep experience
with national strategy formulation as a former deputy assistant secretary of
defense for strategy and force development who led the development of the
2018 National Defense Strategy. Where Doshi focuses on grand strategy,
Colby centers squarely on defense and military strategy. He unabashedly
argues “because force is the foundational form of power and the ultimate
arbiter of disputes in the anarchic international arena, the regional balance of
power is at its core a question of military power” (17). He further suggests the
United States must accept China will not suddenly disappear as a threat
and will continue to seek to grow its power. As such, Colby calls for the
United States to play a balancing role in the Indo-Pacific and create an
“anti-hegemonic coalition” to prevent the PRC from becoming the dominant
power in the region. More specifically, the United States should pursue a
denial strategy only, not more aggressive strategies to replace the communist
party in China or more accommodating strategies that focus on influencing the
PRC to act more in line with US interests. Colby describes how this US-led
anti-hegemonic coalition should array a geographical defensive perimeter,
add certain nation states as members, and potentially consider providing
nuclear-strike capabilities to select members.
The aim of this approach would be to deny the PRC its best (not most
likely or most dangerous) course of action—a limited war to seize control of
Taiwan forcibly to remove it from, and break, the coalition. This distinction as
the best strategy is important since it addresses the view that conflict over
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Taiwan is not likely. Colby argues a focus on likely options—such as gray-zone
competition with the PRC—risks expending resources on inconsequential
matters, and most destructive options—such as nuclear war with the PRC—
are highly unlikely and have effective counters in place already. He makes a
persuasive case that seizing Taiwan is the best option for the PRC because
of the many important benefits it affords them toward gaining regional
hegemony. Hence, the United States and the coalition must focus on denying
China such a potential large gain in power.
Colby also notes US and coalition preparations for a limited war over
Taiwan would certainly build readiness to deal with other contingencies.
If his argumentation suffers, it is in his dismissal of the importance of
the gray zone as a “euphemism for actions that do not cross the threshold
of major significance” (105). This could be true when considering any one or just
a small set of actions. But, the PRC seeks to accrete the benefits of many such
actions over time for decisive effect while avoiding the risk of war directly with
the United States and its allies.
Additionally, Colby forgoes operational assessments of relative military
strengths and weaknesses between the PRC, the United States, and others.
He outlines a conceptual framework for building a defense strategy that
should be resilient beyond any discrete or purely military considerations. Yet,
he also aims for the framework to be detailed enough to provide a clear focus
for concerted action. He generally succeeds but never convinces readers his
strategy is resilient enough to deal with the extreme asymmetries in military
capabilities the PRC seeks to build.
Despite their minor shortcomings both books are strong works of
strategy. They succeed because they accurately assess the security problem the
United States faces, and they offer novel and realistic solutions.
Doshi and Colby are clear-eyed and frank about the potentially severe
threat the Communist Party of China-led PRC poses to the US-led liberal
order that underpins US security and freedom. The very nature of PRC
strategic aims and of its authoritarian political and economic systems are at
fundamental odds with that of the United States’ own. If the PRC were to realign
most of the global order under its standards, there is no doubt the US position in
the world would decline and US security would suffer. Also, both books rightly
recognize the PRC challenge is likely to intensify as the country’s economy
continues to grow larger than the economy of the United States, its already
much larger population becomes increasingly wealthy, and the Communist Party
of China grows increasingly nationalistic and confident. Both authors propose
complementary strategies that are excellent for many reasons.
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First, Doshi and Colby recognize the United States must achieve focus.
It should concentrate on, and orchestrate, a strategy to deal with the central
security problem posed by the PRC while managing other security issues that
warrant secondary attention. Without a consistent and coordinated long game of
its own, centered on a strategy of denial, the United States risks being distracted
by the here and now of regional problems at the expense of the global threat.
Second, both authors propose the United States adopt asymmetric strategies
that do not seek merely to match Chinese moves but instead endeavors to leverage
US advantages. This approach is necessary because, as noted, the PRC enjoys
real advantages over the United States which past serious threats such as Nazi
Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union never came close to enjoying. And
given the trajectories of growth of these advantages, were the United States to try to
outspend the PRC on, say, military platforms and technology, it would be making
a mistake similar to the one the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.
Instead, the authors correctly advise the United States to build upon its
current advantages in a robust network of allies and partners to thwart the
growth of PRC power. As Doshi frames it, the United States would employ its
blunting and building strategy through political, economic, and military means
coordinated with allies and partners. For Colby, the anti-hegemonic military
coalition is the bulwark. Both approaches are necessary because of the added
resources these partners will bring and because regional partners especially
are needed to answer the “first-mover advantage” the PRC enjoys with its
geographical position and short lines of communication.
Finally, Doshi and Colby propose strategies which advance US
thinking about its response to China’s challenge. Both note the current
US debate over how to deal with the PRC is mired between the two poles
of accommodating or changing—trying to get along with Beijing and generally
accepting its growing power, or influencing the Chinese to change their behavior
fundamentally to suit US interests. The authors recognize both strategies
are dead ends. Instead, they propose strategies that account for PRC power,
and reduce it, while rebuilding US power. Thus, Doshi and Colby resolve
a false and unproductive dichotomy in US thinking and provide a
much-needed evolution in US strategy development.
Properly recognizing and dealing with the potential threat China and the
PLA pose is the most pressing security problem the United States faces now
and in the near future. Both The Long Game and The Strategy of Denial are
important, if not vital, contributions to the study of this problem and demand
the attention of military professionals.
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Dealing with the Russians
By Andrew Monaghan
Reviewed by Dr. Bettina Renz, professor of international security,
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham

A

ndrew Monaghan’s book, Dealing with the Russians,
begins with an unambiguous warning: “so let us be
clear from the start: Russia poses a major challenge to the
Euro-Atlantic community. This challenge is serious and there
should be little doubt about it” (10). Moscow’s aggression against
Ukraine, ongoing since spring 2014, demonstrates Vladimir
Putin’s willingness to violate the most fundamental tenets of
international law. The string of hostile actions that followed set
Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press, 2019
Russia on a collision course with the United States and its allies.
160 pages
Russian military operations in Syria breached international
$59.95
humanitarian laws and risked the escalation of tensions.
Active measures, most prominently interference in the 2016 US presidential
elections, targeted democratic processes in western states. In response to these
aggressions, the Euro-Atlantic community adopted a series of measures for
dealing with the Russian threat, such as reinforcing NATO’s posture (especially
in Eastern Europe), imposing economic sanctions, and securing itself against
various hybrid threats.
In his cogently written and argued book, Monaghan diagnoses why the
Euro-Atlantic community’s efforts to date have failed to constrain Moscow’s
aggressive behavior. He argues although the community clearly agrees about
the severity of the challenges faced, the exact nature of the threat remains
inadequately understood. The United States and its allies lack a coherent strategy,
which is essential for dealing with Russia in the long term. To devise a successful
strategy, the United States and its allies will need a detailed understanding of
Moscow’s foreign policy.
In the chapter “(Mis)Interpreting the Russian Threat,” Monaghan discusses
how the uncritical use of historical analogies like the “New Cold War,” the
fixation on questionable abstractions like hybrid warfare or A2/AD, and especially
essentialist assumptions about Russian expansionism have become a “trap for
thinking” in the West (40). The resultant view of Russia lacks nuance and does
not accurately reflect the country’s foreign policy motivations, which are far more
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complex than the current focus on potential challenges to Euro-Atlantic security
suggests. The chapter “From Dialogue to Deterrence” demonstrates how a crude
understanding of contemporary Russia has hindered the identification of policies
suitable for handling the complex problem. Responses like economic sanctions or
NATO reinforcements in Eastern Europe are reactions to individual events rather
than elements of a coherent strategy.
Monaghan argues the perceived dichotomy in Western discourse of either
deterrence of, or dialogue with Russia, is particularly unhelpful. Can deterrence
work if it is based, at best, on a partial understanding of the Kremlin’s motivations
and capabilities? Can dialogue work without a nuanced understanding of the
nature of current tensions, including an appreciation of how the Kremlin’s
views of the United States and its allies have influenced its actions over the
past few decades? Neither deterrence nor dialogue are a panacea or an end in
itself. As Monaghan states, “success in both will be the consequence of a coherent
broader strategy” (85).
Dealing with the Russians provides food for thought for readers seeking a
better understanding of the current crisis in relations between the West and
Russia and possible ways forward to prevent tensions from spiraling. Above all,
the book is explicitly relevant for Western policymakers and decisionmakers
developing future policies vis-à-vis Moscow. Monaghan’s work, based on
extensive personal experience collaborating with policymakers and military
practitioners, is a plea to take the Russian challenge seriously. Doing so, however,
means more than hawkish political statements or the adoption of measures in
reaction to individual events.
In the concluding chapter, Monaghan outlines systematic efforts required,
in his view, to create a coherent future strategy. There is no quick-fix solution.
Instead, a serious investment in reinvigorating the Russian studies community
is required to regain the linguistic skills and country expertise lost since
the end of the Cold War. This focus should not be too narrow. A holistic
understanding of contemporary Russian foreign policy needs to draw on
interdisciplinary insights from history, politics, sociology, and economics.
Institutional partnerships able to coordinate knowledge exchanges between
researchers—academics, think tanks, and independents—and relevant state
structures also need to be strengthened. Most importantly, concerted effort
is required to confront and challenge groupthink in policy- and decisionmaking circles, such as the ongoing fixation on hybrid warfare, which has been
comprehensively debunked by Russian military experts.
The United States and its allies have failed to devise a coherent Russia
strategy not only because of persisting “narrow, abstract and clichéd” views
of Russia, but also because these views have been “impervious to ‘reasonable
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challenge’ ” (92). Policymakers and decisionmakers in the West willing to have
their views challenged in the name of devising a future grand strategy for
Russia should read Monaghan’s book.
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The Art of War in an Age of Peace:
U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint
By Michael O’Hanlon
Reviewed by Dr. Frank Hoffman, US Marine Corps (retired), research fellow,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

H

ow should the United States adapt to today’s challenging
strategic context? It faces a rising China, a reckless
Vladimir Putin in Moscow, diminished credibility among allies
large and small, and a host of underfunded domestic needs—
especially infrastructure and technology—that will impact future
prosperity and security for generations. In this dangerous world,
how can the Biden-Harris administration coherently balance its
aspirational policy aims while constrained by a federal budget
that bleeds red ink?

New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2021
304 pages
$28.00

In The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy
and Resolute Restraint, Michael O’Hanlon, director of research
at the Brookings Institution, offers a trenchant analysis of the challenges and a
strategic outline that avoids the pitfalls of retrenchment and the dangers of
imperial overstretch. His grand strategy, “resolute restraint,” carefully positions
the United States for the long run, without wild alterations that may undermine
global stability or endanger vital US interests (xii).
O’Hanlon carefully distinguishes resolute restraint from “offshore balancing”
and the “restraint” strategy promoted by Barry Posen, which focuses on
US overspending and a reposturing of the US military (37). O’Hanlon’s resolute
restraint seeks more discipline in American interventions but argues, appropriately,
for continuing US alliance commitments. He sees our friends and partners as a
unique strategic advantage that should be sustained, not undercut—a perspective
echoed in Mira Rapp-Hooper’s superlative Shields of the Republic (2020).
O’Hanlon’s version is resolute about the defense of those allies, the rules-based
order, and freedom of maneuver in the global commons. He is restrained about the
use of force in every minor crisis, resistant to growing additional allies or partners,
and opposed to the heavy promotion of values, human rights, and democracy.
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Our current and future allies and partners will not find O’Hanlon’s ideas on
restraint reassuring and, perhaps influenced by the growing narrative about the
erosion of US power and credibility, may hedge against it. The recent fiasco in
Afghanistan will be seen as an example of excessive restraint and, on Washington’s
part, a shortfall in resolute leadership. While deep engagement may be
unaffordable, persistent leadership and true partnership with current and future
allies will be necessary if order is to be sustained.
The chapter on China is extensive, well-balanced, and noteworthy in its
analysis and prescriptions. O’Hanlon acknowledges the Communist Party’s foreign
activities over the past decade “suggest hegemonic temptations of a much more
sweeping character” and a level of ambition that is “a dagger right at the heart of
the rules-based global order” (85). He calls for a smart strategy that recognizes
the inevitability of China’s growing influence and seeks to redirect Beijing’s
progress in nonthreatening directions. O’Hanlon details the relative structural
advantages the United States enjoys in terms of economic potential and offers
several well-founded recommendations to enhance American competitiveness.
O’Hanlon’s unique threat framework is a distinctive element of the book.
While the first section follows the Pentagon’s most recent threat construct, which
covers China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and transnational terrorism (sometimes
referred to as “4+1”), O’Hanlon generates a more functional framework he
calls “the other 4+1” (173). This construct lists the threats from nuclear, biological,
digital, climatic, and domestic support and focuses on the need to buttress domestic
support for a renewed grand strategy, as well as manage our burgeoning debt. We
tend to overlook these challenges, which is a mistake. As O’Hanlon notes:
None of the above are scheming enemies in the traditional sense.
But they pose serious challenges nonetheless. When they interact
with the classic list of threats, they can make every
problem more serious. They can exacerbate, intensify,
or accelerate the dangers post by more classic, human
adversaries; they raise the stakes enormously (161).
This chapter presents a compelling argument for ensuring these issues are
captured within the national security strategy. O’Hanlon offers examples of
actions America can take to remedy our limited preparedness and mitigate these
threats. The one shortfall about the alternative “other 4+1” is it overlooks domestic
terrorism (173). While controversial, the inclusion of the left and far-right
elements of domestic terrorism more accurately reflects contemporary security
challenges in the aftermath of the 2020 election and the pandemic.
After the book’s tour d’horizon of threat actors and functional challenges,
readers will find it difficult to call today an age of peace. Moreover, while
O’Hanlon does offer prescriptions useful as grand strategy, they hardly constitute
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an “art of war.” While this is a quibble, “The Double Threat Matrix” would have
been a more appropriate title, given the double set of threats presented.
O’Hanlon also properly derides Steven Pinker’s thesis about the end of war, calling
the idea of an inexorable path toward global peace “Pollyannaish” (161).
All in all, O’Hanlon’s The Art of War is a sound overview of today’s
accelerating and converging challenges, offering a reasonable strategic approach
that conserves and focuses America’s power on its core interests. This realistic
book merits serious consideration for professional military education reading
lists and is strongly recommended for classroom use in strategic studies programs
due to its balanced and prudent approach.

TOC

Book Reviews: Military History 163

Military History

The Folly of Generals: How Eisenhower’s Broad
Front Strategy Lengthened World War II
By David P. Colley
Reviewed by Dr. Gregory L. Cantwell, colonel, US Army (retired)

D

avid P. Colley’s 2021 book, The Folly of Generals:
How Eisenhower’s Broad Front Strategy Lengthened
World War II, examines Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) military actions and missed
opportunities during the war. An award-winning author,
journalist, and former US Army ordnance branch officer,
Colley believes the SHAEF could have achieved victory seven
or eight months ahead of May 1945. He contends the “ ‘broad
front’ strategy” planned and executed in Europe denied the
Allies the ability to concentrate forces in a decisive point and
exploit success over the course of World War II (xi).

Havertown, PA:
Casemate, 2021
264 pages
$34.95

Much of the historical review on World War II describes the Allied forces as
heroic figures who defeated the forces of evil in Germany. With the discovery of
the concentration camps and systemic genocide of millions of people in Germany
and Poland, it is hard to argue World War II was a war the Allies had to win.
The Folly of Generals does not erase that image, but does shine a light on the
tactical opportunities that could have been exploited if senior Allied commanders
were more aggressive and willing to take additional risk.
Colley cites interviews with several German generals after the war who
admitted to weaknesses in the German Siegfried Line of defenses the Allies
could have exploited. He specifically examines operations at Arnhem in the
Netherlands, Falaise in France, and Valmontone in Italy, as well as Operation
Husky and campaigns to cross the Rhine and liberate Paris. According
to Colley, these operations are examples of tactical opportunities that—
had the Allies been willing to abandon their rigid commitment to a broad front
strategy moving from west to east into Germany—could have led them to
greater success against the Germans. Much of his criticism is placed upon both
the SHAEF and General Dwight D. Eisenhower the SHAEF commander.
Colley refers to the refusal to change strategies “as the US Army’s
(or Eisenhower’s) tactical ignorance” which prevented them from
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reinforcing success or “concentrate[ing] forces on a single objective”
(x). He also notes political considerations, rather than tactical strategy,
played a part in the decision making at SHAEF which rippled down through
the organization.
Much has been written about the impact Winston Churchill,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin had on the strategic conduct of the
war. The Folly of Generals instead focuses on tactical opportunities. For example,
Army group commander Jacob Devers and his forces reached Strasbourg, France,
in November 1944 and had the opportunity to cross the Rhine. He intended
to drive north on the east side of the river to relieve pressure from other Allied
forces in the north. Eisenhower, however, wanted a breakthrough to occur
in the north after he consolidated all forces on the west side of the Rhine and
refused to let Devers cross the river. Colley argues Eisenhower was too cautious.
He cites an intelligence debrief report from the German chief of staff to
SS General Vatterodt, the commander in Strasbourg, which confirmed a
penetration across the Rhine at Strasbourg would have seriously upset the
German forces lightly guarding this sector. Colley contends if Eisenhower had
authorized Devers to cross the Rhine in November 1944, then the Battle of
the Bulge would not have occurred in December.
While Colley’s claim that Eisenhower was too cautious may have some
merit, the SHAEF commander had many challenges to balance beyond tactical
advances and opportunities. Coalition maintenance, wartime production limits,
mobilization and training timelines, sustainment challenges, displaced personnel,
humanitarian support, and political considerations may override the tactical
opportunities division and Army commanders encounter. Eisenhower had to win
the war with the army he had. The broad front strategy might have been designed
to win by attrition rather than by annihilation. Opportunities for tactical victories
and exploitation did exist, but they appear to have conflicted with the Allied
strategy based on attrition on two fronts. Tactics must be nested into higher level
strategy or they are considered a waste of resources.
The Folly of Generals raises, but does not answer, many of the timeless
challenges for a commander in large-scale combat operations at echelons
well above the brigade combat team level. When is a strategy of annihilation
better than one of attrition? Can a theater strategy change between the two?
Command decisions require a commander to make decisions with imperfect
information. Personalities and relationships between commanders may be more
important than command relationships at the senior levels, and sustainment still
determines the feasibility of strategic options. If we are contested in all domains
in the projected future, an expeditionary army can expect sustainment challenges
with long lines of communications.
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Colley’s book provides historical examples, and he supports his argument at
the tactical level. It is difficult, however, to prove a conclusion to the war would
have been achieved sooner at the strategic level based on a tactical victory. The
actions of a committed adversary fighting an existential threat should not be
underestimated. Bold tactical actions could have ended the war; they also
could have deteriorated Allied cooperation and, in one extreme, made postwar
conditions in Europe worse at the start of the Cold War. Historians can talk past
each other when considering the strategic, operational, or tactical level operations
and decisions, and both can be correct. In any war, mistakes that could have saved
lives become clear only in hindsight. As war is a human endeavor, perhaps we
should not judge too harshly the sacrifices of the few who bore the burden of
supreme command and succeeded in winning the war.
I recommend The Folly of Generals for readers interested in the European
campaign who will enjoy the division-level tactical opportunities explored in the
book. It clearly highlights the major challenges of coalition warfare in large-scale
combat operations and demonstrates the differences of perspectives between
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and associated priorities and risk
at each level.
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On “Broken Nest:
Deterring China from Invading Taiwan”
Eric Chan

©2022 Eric Chan

This commentary responds to Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris’s article
“Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan” published in the
Winter 2021–22 issue of Parameters (vol. 51, no. 4).

I

Keywords: Taiwan, Chinese Communist Party, diplomacy, deterrence,
cabbage strategy

n the last issue of Parameters, authors Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris
proposed a novel method of deterring the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) from invading Taiwan without the latent threat of a great-power
war. From their point of view, the best solution would be if Taiwan, with
US assistance, could keep the peace in the event of an invasion by threatening
to target both Taiwan and PRC semiconductor facilities. By threatening high,
lasting economic costs, complemented by conciliatory outreach to “ease China’s
cost of restraint,” the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would have no rational
reason to invade.
Unfortunately, the “broken nest,” scorched-earth solution badly misjudges the
primary reasons behind the CCP’s desire for unification and domestic Taiwanese
politics. Such a solution would not only fail to deter China, it would be an
enormous boon to the CCP’s “United Front” propaganda. In this brief response,
I address the three main problems presented by the broken nest strategy and
why it should not be implemented in its current form.1

The first issue I identify is the belief US/Taiwan attempts to restore a
semblance of deterrence by denial would result in an arms race. Rather, the
Chinese Communist Party has engaged in a single-handed arms race for over a
generation despite remarkably favorable geopolitical conditions.2 Over the last
few years, the United States has begun shifting its defense posture and increasing
security cooperation with Taipei, and Taiwan has significantly boosted defense

1. Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris, “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan,” Parameters
51, no. 4 (Winter 2021–22), 33, italics in original.
2. Paul Huang, “Taiwan’s Military Is a Hollow Shell,” Foreign Policy (website), February 15, 2020, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/china-threat-invasion-conscription-taiwans-military-is-a-hollow-shell/.
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spending as part of a defense reform program.3 It is important to note the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aggressiveness toward Taiwan (and for that
matter, across the region) significantly predates the American and Taiwanese
defense shifts.
Since the mid-1990s, the PLA has enjoyed double-digit annual budget
increases, while the United States was preoccupied with the war on terror and
Taiwan’s military atrophied during the pro-PRC engagement administration
of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–16). As seen in the PRC’s identified
“window of strategic opportunity” (roughly 2002–2020), the PLA received some
of its highest budget increases while testing out gray-zone warfare concepts
now being used against Taiwan.4 For instance, PLA Air Force incursions into
air defense identification zones in the mid-2010s, as a method of operational
attrition/political intimidation, were heavily tested against the Japan Air
Self-Defense Force.5 China integrated Chinese Coast Guard, PLA Navy,
and maritime militia units in a “cabbage strategy” of power projection against
both the Philippines in the 2012 Scarborough Reef incident and Vietnam in
the 2014 Hai Yang Shi You 981 incident.6 These events occurred in an era when
the United States was pursuing engagement with China. At the same time, the
United Kingdom and PRC were discussing a so-called golden era of economic
partnership, and the EU was openly debating lifting the post-Tiananmen arms
embargo. During a period where the strategic environment was particularly
favorable for China, the CCP took a completely opposite tack to the US
peace-dividend era of the 1990s. It is unlikely US or Taiwanese attempts to
restore some semblance of deterrence by denial would result in an all-out arms
race because the PRC has been single-handedly participating in an arms race for
quite some time.
The second point of contention is the driving factor behind Xi Jinping’s focus
on Taiwan. McKinney and Harris identify an increasing “cost of restraint” for
China, as “Taiwan moves further away from the mainland, particularly in terms
of its core national identity.”7 This is an argument directly taken from propaganda
the Chines Communist Party uses to justify the PRC’s aggressive gray-zone
3. Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee, “Taiwan Plans $9 Bln Boost in Arms Spending, Warns of ‘Severe
Threat,’ ” Reuters (website), September 16, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-proposes
-extra-87-bln-defence-spending-over-5-years-2021-09-16/.
4. Christopher K. Johnson, “Thoughts from the Chairman: Xi Jinping Unveils His Foreign Policy Vision,”
Center for Strategic & International Studies (website), December 8, 2014, https://www.csis.org/analysis/thoughts
-chairman-xi-jinping-unveils-his-foreign-policy-vision.
5. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Intercepted Chinese Military Aircraft 675 Times in Fiscal Year 2019,” Diplomat
(website), April 10, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/japan-intercepted-chinese-military-aircraft-675
-times-in-fiscal-year-2019/.
6. Eric Chan, “Escalating Clarity without Fighting: Countering Gray Zone Warfare against Taiwan (Part 2),”
Global Taiwan Brief 6, no. 11 (June 2, 2021): 1, https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GTB
-PDF-6.11.pdf.
7. McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest,” 27.
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actions and various anti-secession laws. Taiwanese domestic politics, however,
demonstrates this claim is false. Taiwanese politics center on maintaining the
status quo, and given the deterrent power from the vast expansion of PRC military
capabilities, this stance has become truer over time. The Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP), the nominally proindependence party, has shifted more and
more toward status quo over the last two decades: the party’s 2008 presidential
nominee, Frank Hsieh, was considered more moderate than Chen Shui-bian, and
the party’s 2012 nominee, Tsai Ing-wen, was considered more moderate still—
and she continued this policy of moderation even after two landslide victories
in 2016 and 2020.8 Without the CCP’s brutal crackdown on the 2019–20
Hong Kong anti-extradition law protests, the 2020 Taiwan presidential election
would have likely gone to the Chinese Nationalist Party candidate Han Kuo-yu,
who favored greater economic and political engagement with the PRC.9
It is true the Taiwanese populace is gradually moving toward a more
Taiwan-centric identity given the passing of the waishengren (the mainland
Chinese migrants who fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek in 1949).
Those same polls, however, also demonstrate a remarkable consistency and
overwhelming public support for the status quo—some 87.4 percent support
in July 2021 polling, in the midst of an aggressive PRC coercion campaign.10
The CCP shift from a hearts-and-mind strategy of economic enticements to
gray-zone coercion/threat of invasion mirrors their actions in Hong Kong and
Xinjiang, where Xi concluded exerting control via a velvet glove over an iron
fist was unnecessary. In Hong Kong and Xinjiang, the Chinese Communist
Party did not face serious threats to its power prior to the crackdowns. Instead,
Xi defined down the cost of restraint to make any challenges, no matter how
minor, unacceptably high. Thus, the authors’ prescriptions to reduce the cost of
restraint for China is meaningless for the Party. The only concession the Party
would appreciate would be the US abandonment of Taiwan and Taiwan agreeing
to unification with the PRC.11
The final point of contention is the proposed stick portion of the authors’
strategy that is based on a misinterpretation of the CCP’s interest in Taiwan.
8. David G. Brown, “Is Frank Hsieh a Moderate?,” Japan Times (website), July 19, 2007, https://www.japantimes
.co.jp/opinion/2007/07/19/commentary/world-commentary/is-frank-hsieh-a-moderate/; and Ryan Hass,
“Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Enters Second Term with a Strong Political Mandate, but No Room for Complacency,”
Brookings (blog), May 13, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/05/13/taiwans-tsai
-ing-wen-enters-second-term-with-a-strong-political-mandate-but-no-room-for-complacency/.
9. Chris Horton, “The Taiwanese Populist Advancing China’s Interests,” Atlantic (website), April 16, 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/taiwanese-populist-han-kuo-yu-china/587146/.
10. Russell Hsiao, “Taiwanese Preference for Status Quo Remains Constant Even as Views Harden,” Global
Taiwan Brief 6, no. 15 (July 28, 2021): 1, https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GTB-6.15
-draft-2-PDF.pdf.
11. Derek Grossman, “Biden Administration Shows Unwavering Support for Taiwan,” RAND Blog,
October 20, 2021, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/10/biden-administration-shows-unwavering-support-for
-taiwan.html; and McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest,” 33.
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McKinney and Harris propose the “United States and Taiwan lay plans for
a targeted scorched-earth strategy” to include the destruction of the Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Taiwan targeting of Shanghai’s
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, and US evacuation of
highly skilled Taiwanese semiconductor engineers. The strategic value of Taiwan
for the CCP, however, is political, not economic.12 The authors reference the
historical precedent of Swedish deterrence of Nazi Germany in World War II
through the Swedish scorched-earth threat to its iron-ore mines. The biggest error
with this analogy is that Hitler’s interest in Sweden as a target largely disappeared
once Sweden and Germany reached an economic agreement for iron-ore exports,
given Hitler’s focus on an impending showdown with the Soviet Union.
In Taiwan’s case, the semiconductors for Xi are a secondary concern at best;
they are an important but not critical part of the Chinese economy precisely
because Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation chips
are considered relatively primitive (compared to the chips of their Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Samsung, and Intel competitors), which
prevents the PRC from being a major player in the global chip supply chain.13
Thus, the threat to destroy Taiwan’s semiconductor industry while targeting
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation is relatively weak,
especially compared to the enormous economic damage any cross-Strait war
or blockade would cause by specifically targeting the semiconductor industry.
The fact that the PLA continues to develop specific capabilities for an amphibious
invasion demonstrates the CCP has “baked in” and will tolerate significant
economic costs to take Taiwan.
In addition to the weakness of the threat, consider how Taiwan would
perceive advice from the United States when asked to be prepared to blow up
its most valuable industry. Such advice would imply the United States considers
Taiwan to be a lost cause, showing the United States as unwilling to fight for its
partners and instead prioritizing the evacuation of those Taiwanese who would
be able to help build up the US semiconductor industry. Past the operational
absurdity of such an evacuation—imagine the panic in Taipei as the US Air Force
attempted to evacuate engineers just before or during the PLA Joint Firepower
Strike campaign—this action would destroy the morale of the Taiwanese
population and armed forces at the most critical point. Any Taiwan president
who cooperated with such a plan would be run out of office (rightfully), and
the CCP’s United Front propaganda apparatus would have a field day showing
how the Americans and the “evil Taiwan independence separatists” were
12. McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest,” 30.
13. Arjun Kharpal, “How Asia Came to Dominate Chipmaking and What the U.S. Wants to Do about It,” CNBC
(website), April 11, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/12/us-semiconductor-policy-looks-to-cut-out
-china-secure-supply-chain.html.
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prepared to blow up Taiwanese industry while the CCP tried to protect the
livelihood of the Taiwanese people.
The rest of the article’s proposed punitive measures all fail along similar
lines. Guerrilla warfare in a Taiwan context is only useful in support of an active
US/Taiwan counterinvasion campaign, but would hold no deterrent power
postwar, where the People’s Armed Police has decades of experience with
concentration camps, group punishment, forced resettlement, and now the
integration of AI-powered facial recognition and biometric systems to control
populations. The United States threatening sanctions and political isolation do
represent some deterrence, but these actions would be seriously, if not fatally,
weakened if Taiwan fell, as that failure would show Chinese power now eclipsed
the United States, that US willpower had collapsed, or both.
Moreover, these threats are not new. The Made in China 2025 program,
the monopolization of the global supply of rare earth elements, and recent
domestic ideological rectification campaigns all indicate the Chinese
Communist Party is aware of the economic-political pressures the United
States could effect—and are already implementing mitigation measures.
Finally, the threats the United States would signal to its allies—that
these countries could now develop their own nuclear arsenals—are also
weak and would be an admission the US nuclear umbrella represented
insufficient protection. In any case, following a US defeat or abandonment of
Taiwan, US allies would probably be discussing the topic anyway.
In the end, I agree with McKinney and Harris that a traditional US
deterrence-by-denial strategy for the defense of Taiwan is weakening, and
deterrence-by-punishment is more compelling. I also agree with their point
that Chinese strategic thinking “emphasizes the possibility and utility of limited
wars and projects confidence in the ability of war handlers to bring such an
engagement to a favorable political outcome,” though I must note CCP
leadership considered the Sino-Indian War and the Sino-Vietnamese Wars not as
political failures, but as worthy successes that should be emulated.14
Deterrence by threat of economic punishment alone is vastly insufficient.
China does not care about the “ire of its Asian neighbors” because the
Chinese Communist Party views neighbors as tributary states that will,
sooner or later, fall into PRC economic domination.15 Nor does it care about
temporary economic disruption in the absence of US military action. Chinese
leaders feel they now have the political and economic tools to counteract the
14. Howard Wang, “The Ideal Tool of Nations: War Control in Chinese Military Thought,” Georgetown
Security Studies Review 7, no. 1 (January 2019): 6–26, http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content
/uploads/2019/01/GSSR-7.1-final-text-updated.pdf; and McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest,” 26.
15. McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest,” 32.
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resulting discontent, especially if they could credibly proclaim to their populace
this step was a necessary sacrifice for the reunification of China and for breaking
the perceived US strategic noose around the country. For good reason, since his
ascension in 2012, Xi has incessantly exhorted the CCP cadre to take more risks
and to accept struggle as a necessary part of China’s national rejuvenation.16
If the goal of the United States is to deter Beijing from invading Taiwan,
then we should seek to deter the CCP. US leadership should clearly state an
armed attack on Taiwan without provocation will be seen as the CCP moving
beyond an “issue of cross-Strait relations” to an all-out challenge of American
power to extinguish a democratic partner, collapse the US presence in the Western
Pacific, and overturn the rules-based world order.17
The only response to such an existential challenge must be a US demonstration
of its ability to destroy the invasion fleet while systematically grinding the rest
of the armed wing of the CCP, also known as the PLA, to dust. Only then
will the threat of economic devastation turning into unresolvable political
turmoil become real. Mao’s dictum that “political power grows out of the barrel
of a gun” holds true for the CCP today with a Mao-era cult of personality—
especially with a leader who has sought to revive Mao-era organizations (the
United Front) and Mao-era vocabulary (“Yan’an rectification campaign”).18
In short, the United States must force the CCP to consider that a Taiwan
invasion would not be a limited war, but a global, great-power war of
indeterminate length, potentially threatening the CCP’s hold on power and the
Politburo Standing Committee, all for the hubris of Xi.19
That is deterrence.
What is not deterrence, is telling our partners we are prepared to help
them blow up the one industry that makes them economically relevant on the
international stage.
Eric Chan
Mr. Eric Chan is the senior Korea/China/Taiwan strategist with the
Headquarters Air Force Checkmate Directorate and a reviewer for the Journal
of Indo-Pacific Affairs. He also serves as a nonresident fellow with the Global
Taiwan Institute.
16. Jun Mai, “Don’t Expect an Easy Life and Be Ready to Struggle, Chinese President Xi Jinping Warns
Officials,” South China Morning Post (website), September 2, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics
/article/3147337/dont-expect-easy-life-and-be-ready-struggle-chinese-president.
17. McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest,” 26.
18. Mao Zedong, Quotations from Chairman Mao, 1964.
19. “China’s Domestic-Security Agencies Are Undergoing a Massive Purge,” Economist (website), March 1,
2021, https://www.economist.com/china /2021/03/01/chinas-domestic-security-agencies-are-undergoing-a
-massive-purge.
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Goliath No More:
Why Taiwan Should Not Rely on American Threats of War

A

Keywords: Taiwan, deterrence, punishment, semiconductor, China

basic rule of international affairs is for David not to challenge Goliath
to a duel.1 Absent luck, divine intervention, or a brilliant strategy,
weak combatants rarely prevail over their much stronger adversaries.
In situations where one side is vastly more powerful than the other, the laws of
power suggest a stable formula for deterrence. As the Athenians explained to the
Melians long ago, “The best recipe for success is to stand up to equals, defer to
superiors, and be moderate towards your inferiors.”2

In his reply to our article, “Broken Nest,” Eric Chan drew on these intuitions
to suggest a simple method of deterring China from invading Taiwan: the
United States should merely establish incontrovertible military superiority
over China and then explain the logic of the Athenians to the Chinese side.3
If such a solution were possible, we would naturally be all for it. We remain
unconvinced, however, such a solution is possible. On the contrary, we are highly
skeptical the United States can practicably regain military superiority in East
Asia such that Washington can ensure Taiwan’s security by simply cowing
Beijing into passivity. In turn, this leads us to doubt the credibility and
long-term effectiveness of any strategy of deterrence that depends entirely upon
US threats of military reprisals. Nothing Chan presented in his reply has moved
us from this position.
In our article, we sought to articulate not just an alternative strategy
for deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but also an alternative logic—
one better suited to a world in which the United States is no longer Goliath. More
specifically, we developed a first-cut proposal for deterrence focused on punishment
(costs to be levied against Beijing in the event of an invasion) rather than denial
(military threats to prevent an invasion from being successful). To be more precise,
we suggested a package of punishments that, if threatened, might “convince
1. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
2 Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, ed. and trans. Jeremy Mynott, (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 384.
3. Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris, “Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan,” Parameters
51, no. 4 (Winter 2021–22): 23–26.
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Chinese leaders invading Taiwan will come at the cost of core national
objectives: economic growth, domestic tranquility, secure borders, and perhaps
even the maintenance of regime legitimacy.”4 Our wager was that, because the
Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy on achieving its ambitious
“China Dream” goals by 2049, CCP leaders will be forced to pursue the
“balance between development and security” their official statements already
call for.5 If it were clear an invasion of Taiwan would destroy any such balance
and jeopardize the core goals, then such an action would only be taken in the most
extreme circumstances.
Our specific proposal comprised four key elements. First, we called for a
robust Taiwanese defense effort that would make Taiwan costly for Beijing
to attack, defeat, and occupy. Second, we argued Taiwan should threaten
China with a preplanned resistance campaign that would drain Beijing of
resources, lives, and prestige even in the event of a successful invasion. Third, we
proposed an organized effort to undermine China’s access to semiconductors,
including the self-destruction of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company facilities and other assets associated with semiconductor
manufacturing, the use of Taiwanese cruise missiles against related targets
on the Chinese mainland, and the enactment of global sanctions aimed at
limiting China’s ability to recover and advance its chip industry. Fourth, we
called for a regional response from US allies that would severely worsen China’s
security environment.
The third pillar of this strategy has attracted more criticism than the
others. Chan, for example, insists China does not value Taiwan because of its
semiconductors and so threatening to destroy Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is
no deterrent whatsoever. Nowhere have we argued China desires Taiwan because
of its semiconductor industry. Rather, our argument is that China has become so
dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductors that Beijing can now be made to fear being
denied access to these technologies. Of course, we are open to debate about how
costly it would truly be for China to be deprived access to Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company chips. We note that according to some news reports,

4. McKinney and Harris, “Broken Nest,” 32.
5. “Full Text of the Chinese Communist Party’s New Resolution on History,” Nikkei Asia (website),
November 19, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-the-Chinese-Communist-Party-s-new
-resolution-on-history.
TOC

Review and Reply

McKinney and Harris 177

US elligence officials believe China’s leaders are concerned about the impact a war
over Taiwan would have on China’s access to semiconductors.6
Chan bristles at the idea the Taiwanese should threaten to “blow up the
one industry that makes them economically relevant on the international
stage.” Yet at the same time, Chan is at ease with the United States threatening
all-out war with China in the event of an invasion. In any case, we disagree
that remaining relevant on the international stage after a successful Chinese
invasion is—or should be—more important to Taiwanese than deterring a
Chinese invasion in the first place. While we accept a willingness to engage in
self-harm may signal desperation, we submit Taiwan’s situation vis-à-vis China is
increasingly desperate and such a signal may actually be necessary to demonstrate
the credibility of Taiwan’s commitment to deterring an invasion. By contrast,
refusing to contemplate threatening targeted economic self-harm, as Chan urges,
telegraphs to Beijing and the rest of the world a dangerous unwillingness to take
risks in pursuit of self-defense—a signal already suggested by the inadequate
condition of Taiwan’s military readiness.7
What about the other three pillars of our proposed strategy? Chan does
not address the first element, aside from arguing “Taiwan has significantly
boosted defense spending.” To buttress this claim, Chan cites an article that
details $9 billion in additional spending to be spent over five years. This works
out as around .002 percent of Taiwan’s GDP over the same period. If Taiwan is
intent on deterring a Chinese attack today, it should be spending in the realm
of 5 percent of GDP on its defense, as it did in the 1980s and 1990s, not the
approximately 2 percent it spends today.8 Additionally, it should not waste these
funds on prestige weapons but instead invest in a large number of small things.9
6. David E. Sanger et al., “Senate Poised to Pass Huge Industrial Policy Bill to Counter China,”
New York Times (website), June 7, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/us/politics/senate-china
-semiconductors.html; see also Craig Addison, Silicon Shield: Taiwan’s Protection against Chinese Attack
(Irvington, TX: Fusion Press, 2001); Elena Yi-Ching Ho, “Semiconductors as a Shield for Taiwan?,” Strategist
(website), March 16, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/semiconductors-as-a-shield-for-taiwan/; and
Joyce Huang, “Can Taiwan’s Silicon Shield Protect It against China’s Aggression?,” Voice of America News
(website), May 10, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_can-taiwans-silicon-shield-protect-it
-against-chinas-aggression/6205660.html.
7. Paul Huang, “Taiwan’s Military Has Flashy American Weapons but No Ammo,” Foreign Policy,
August 20, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/20/taiwan-military-flashy-american-weapons-no
-ammo/; Joyu Wang and Alastair Gale, “Does Taiwan’s Military Stand a Chance against China? Few
Think So,” Wall Street Journal (website), October 26, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-military
-readiness-china-threat-us-defense-11635174187; Kathrin Hille, “Taiwanese Shrug off China Threat and
Place Their Trust in ‘Daddy America,’ ” Financial Times, September 22, 2021; and Yimou Lee and David
Lague, “T-Day: The Battle for Taiwan,” Reuters (website), December 20, 2021, https://www.reuters.com
/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-espionage/.
8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of
Gross Domestic Product, 1988–2020,” n.d., https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20
countries%20from%201988–2020%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf.
9. James Timbie and James O. Ellis Jr., “A Large Number of Small Things: A Porcupine Strategy for Taiwan,”
Texas National Security Review 5, no. 1 (Winter 2021/2022), https://tnsr.org/2021/12/a-large-number-of
-small-things-a-porcupine-strategy-for-taiwan/; and Heino Klinck, Taiwan’s Turn – Deterring and Derailing
an Existential Threat, Information Series no. 508 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2021).
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Regarding the prospect of a resistance movement, Chan states such an
effort would “hold no deterrent power postwar.” This is obviously true. If the
Chinese invade Taiwan then deterrence will have failed by definition. It is also
true, however, that making a credible threat of resistance now might lessen the
chances of an invasion taking place in the future. We agree with Chan that
Taiwanese resistance against an invading Chinese army would be costly, but we
would gently point out threats of war between the United States and China
(Chan’s preferred means of deterrent) would also be enormously costly—including
for the people of Taiwan—if ever carried out. Advocates of a great-power war in
defense of Taiwan frequently overlook this point.
Finally, with respect to our proposals for a stiff regional reaction to a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan, Chan counters that relying on such a response would admit
the United States is not omnipotent in East Asia. This point is not so much
a criticism of our argument as it is a restatement of it. We do indeed fear the
United States lacks the capacity to impose its will unilaterally on Beijing.
This is why we call for a strategy of deterrence enacted in collaboration with
allies and partners, including Taiwan, whose leaders Chan seems to treat as
helpless, scared of bad press, and lacking all agency.
We note with interest that Chan agrees with one of our major arguments
when he writes “a traditional US deterrence-by-denial strategy for the defense of
Taiwan is weakening, and deterrence-by-denial punishment is more compelling.”
If we can put aside the idea the United States can stop an invasion of Taiwan
in its tracks, the question becomes one of what sort of punishments should be
threatened against Beijing so it is deterred from invading Taiwan. We have been
clear about what we would propose in this regard. To his credit, so is Chan.
But we found his answer troubling: “The only response to such an existential
challenge,” he writes, “must be a US demonstration of its ability to destroy the
invasion fleet while systematically grinding the rest of the armed wing of the
CCP, also known as the PLA, to dust.” He goes on to argue the United States
must threaten China with “a global, great-power war of indeterminate length.”
People in Taiwan and the United States alike should find these words chilling.
Chan argues the only way to deter China from invading Taiwan is to threaten the
total destruction of the People’s Republic of China as a party-state. How does
Chan expect Beijing would act if this strategy were implemented? He does not
say. If he did, Chan would be forced to spell out the apocalyptic consequences
of what he is proposing—including for the people of Taiwan, whose island
would be turned into a hellscape.
Whatever conclusions policymakers draw about our proposals—and we
accept reasonable people can disagree on the points raised in our article—
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we strongly urge them to reject Chan’s proposals. We remain unconvinced that
threatening China with World War III is a credible means of deterrence. As
Keith Payne, a former deputy assistant secretary of state, has convincingly
argued, even a latent threat the United States might escalate a conflict
over Taiwan via an uncontrollable chain of events (the threat that “leaves
something to chance”) would only be credible if the United States held a
“perceived advantage” over China, whether in terms of political will, risk
tolerance, or superior military options.10 Yet, the United States does not hold
these advantages over China across the Taiwan Strait. If Chinese leaders—
not unreasonably—come to the same conclusion, they may judge the invasion of
Taiwan to be rational in the near term.
This is why, in the final analysis, incredible threats of war are just another
form of abandoning Taiwan. If adopted, Chan’s proposals would make a Chinese
invasion more likely, not less. We urge policymakers in Washington and Taipei
to focus less on the threat of a ruinous superpower war and more on different
forms of punishment that might be threatened against Beijing to truly reduce
the chances of an invasion.
Jared M. McKinney
Dr. Jared M. McKinney is the chair of the Department of Strategy and
Security Studies at the Global College of Professional Military Education,
Air University, and reviews editor of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.
Peter Harris
Dr. Peter Harris is an associate professor of political science at Colorado
State University and Indo-Pacif ic Perspectives editor of the Journal of
Indo-Pacific Affairs.
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10. Keith B. Payne, The Taiwan Question: How to Think About Deterrence Now, Information Series no. 509
(Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2021).
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ecause there were some people with a military connection involved
in the US Capitol attack of 2021, there has been no shortage of
academics and pundits seeking to use the tragedy to paint the military
as rife with extremists. Parameters hosted one such effort in its Autumn 2021
issue: “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security” by professors Matthew
Valasik and Shannon E. Reid.1 While they do concede “the level and extent to
which support for White power sentiments has infiltrated the US military remains
unclear,” their article still carries great potential to misinform readers.
Specifically, the opening paragraph claims that “[c]urrently, there is an
overrepresentation of military veterans affiliated with far-right groups and
the broader White power movement.” It also asserts that “[m]ost recently,
this affinity was underscored by the disproportionate number of servicemembers,
who participated in the failed attempt to prevent the certification of the 2020
election on January 6, 2021.”
Valasik and Reid cite an April 2021 publication by Daniel Milton and Andrew
Mines of the George Washington University Program on Extremism that examines
the military experience among the “Capitol Hill Siege Participants.”2 What they fail
to tell readers is that Milton and Mines provide a critical caveat to their assessment—
they explicitly warn that “simply comparing the number of individuals with military
experience to the proportion of veterans in the broader U.S. population is misleading.”
It is misleading, Milton and Mines tell us, because there is “no reason to think
the arrestee population should be a representative sample of the U.S. population.”
Furthermore, they point out that because the arrestees are “overwhelmingly male” a

1. Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid, “The Alt-Right Movement and US National Security,” Parameters
51, no. 3 (Autumn 2021), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/3/.
2. Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines, “This Is War: Examining Military Experience among Capitol Hill
Siege Participants,” (Washington, DC: George Washington University/Combating Terrorism Center
at West Point, 2021), https://ctc.usma.edu/this-is-war-examining-military-experience-among-the-capitol-hill
-siege-participants/.
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“better comparison for the proportion of individuals with military experience is not
with the overall proportion of veterans in the US population, but with the proportion
of male veterans.”
Consequently, comparing the number of male veterans in the general
population with the number of male veterans arrested in the US Capitol attack
of 2021 causes Milton and Mines to conclude there “actually is a very slight
underrepresentation of veterans among the January 6 attacks.” Yes, that is right,
an underrepresentation. Additionally, as of this writing ( January 29, 2022),
the George Washington University Program on Extremism reports 87
people with some military connection have been accused of involvement in
the Capitol attack.
Here’s what these observations mean in terms of the overall population
of active duty and veterans. According to a 2021 Pew Research Center report,
there are approximately 19 million veterans.3 Combined with the 1.3 million
active-duty troops there is a total of about 20 million people in the United
States with a military connection. What these numbers demonstrate is this:
99.99999 percent of Americans with a military connection were not charged
with any crime in connection with the Capitol attack. Put another way,
the percentage of veterans who were charged is so infinitesimal as to be
statistically insignificant.4 The statistical insignificance is just as stark with respect
to the active-duty force: only one person of the 1.3 million has been charged.
Notably, in January 2022, the George Washington University Program
on Extremism issued a new report updating the one Valasik and Reid cited.5
It acknowledged the earlier report generated intense media scrutiny
regarding alleged attack participants who purportedly had military or law
enforcement backgrounds. With the benefit of additional data, the program
issued a corrective.
A year after January 6, evidence from the cases to date show that
neither of these affiliations characterize a large proportion of the
defendants . . . 82 (11 percent) of the defendants had some confirmed
form of prior US military service; the vast majority of this category is
former military as opposed to active-duty servicemembers.6
3. Katherine Schaeffer, “The Changing Face of America’s Veteran Population,” Pew Research Center
(website), April 5, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/05/the-changing-face-of-americas
-veteran-population/.
4. Schaeffer, “Changing Face”; and Will Kenton, “Statistical Significance,” Investopedia (website),
April 18, 2021, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/statistically_significant.asp.
5. Bennett Clifford and Jon Lewis, “This is the Aftermath: Assessing Domestic Violent Extremism One Year
after the Capitol Siege” (Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2022),
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/This%20is%20the%20Aftermath.pdf.
6. Clifford and Lewis, “This is the Aftermath,” 15.
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As a result, Bruce Hoffman, a senior fellow for counterterrorism and
homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations, praised the new report
saying it “dispels misinformation surrounding Jan. 6, like exaggerations
of the role that active military service members played in the insurrection.”7
What has even less supporting data is the suggestion that the military
is infested with White supremacists. To their credit, Valasik and Reid
concede “little is known about the current prevalence of White power
sympathies,” but point to Military Times polls as showing the “trend is
moving in a concerning direction.” The most recent finding of these polls,
the Military Times claims, is that “[r]oughly 31 percent of troops (57
percent of minorities) said they have seen signs of extremist behavior
in the military.”8
Actually, the Military Times polls really cannot tell readers much about
the prevalence (or not) of White supremacy. Why? They ask a single
question on the topic: whether the respondent had “personally witnessed
white nationalism or racism within the ranks of the military.” 9 The
inclusion of the word “or” makes it impossible to differentiate between
“white nationalism” and “racism.” The two terms do not necessarily
mean the same thing (hence the poll’s use of both in the question), and
it is possible some White troops believe they are victims of racism and
responded accordingly. 10
Regardless, even if all polltakers understood the question as referencing
anti-Black racism, the Military Times responses—to include the separate
minority respondent figures—show the prevalence of such perceptions
to be decidedly less than what polls show about civilian society. For
example, polls show in the United States generally, “the vast majority
(71 percent) of Black Americans say they’ve experienced some form of
racial discrimination or mistreatment during their lifetimes.”11
7. Caitlin Kitson, “Extremism Program Releases Report Cataloguing Demographics of Jan. 6 Defendants,” GW
Hatchet (website), https://www.gwhatchet.com/2022/01/18/extremism-program-releases-report-cataloguing
-demographics-of-jan-6-defendants/.
8. Leo Shane III, “Troops: White Nationalism a National Security Threat Equal to ISIS, al-Qaida,”
Military Times (website), September 3, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress
/2020/09/03/troops-white-nationalism-a-national-security-threat-equal-to-isis-al-qaeda/.
9. Leo Shane III, “Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism Up Again in Poll of Active-Duty Troops,” Military
Times (website), February 6, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06
/signs-of-white-supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-of-active-duty-troops/.
10. “Whites Believe They Are Victims of Racism More Often than Blacks,” Social Work Today (website),
n.d., https://www.socialworktoday.com/news/dn_060311.shtml.
11. On related issues, see “Poll: 7 in 10 Black Americans Say They Have Experienced Incidents of
Discrimination or Police Mistreatment in Their Lifetime, Including Nearly Half Who Felt Their Lives
Were in Danger,” Newsroom, Kaiser Family Foundation, June 18, 2020, https://www.kff.org/racial-equity
-and-health-policy /press-release/poll-7-in-10-black-americans-say-they-have-experienced-incidents-of-discr
imination-or-police-mistreatment-in-lifetime-including-nearly-half-who-felt-lives-were-in-danger/.
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Space limitations preclude a further dissection of the Valasik and Reid
article, but let’s be clear about something: the military, like American
society in general, needs to stamp out racism and White supremacy.12 In this
respect, I believe Valasik and Reid have some ideas worth pondering.
Exaggerating the problem beyond what the data show, however,
dangerously erodes public confidence in the armed forces, diminishes the
propensity of minorities to join, and gives succor to America’s enemies
around the world.

Charles J. Dunlap
Major General Charles Dunlap retired from the Air Force in 2010 after
more than 34 years of service. He is a graduate of St. Joseph’s University,
Villanova Law School, and the National War College. He teaches at Duke
Law School and is the executive director of its Center on Law, Ethics and
National Security. His 1992 essay, “The Origins of the American Military Coup
of 2012,” was selected for the fortieth anniversary edition of Parameters.

12. Charlie Dunlap, “Is It Really True That the Active Duty and Veteran Ranks Are Rife with Extremists?
Get the Facts before You Decide,” Lawfire (blog), December 10, 2021, https://sites.duke.edu
/ lawfire / 2021 / 12 /10 / is-it-really-true-that-the-active-duty-and-veteran-ranks-are-rife-with-extremists-get
-the-facts-before-you-decide/.
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A

s the authors of “The Alt-Right Movement and US National
Security,” we appreciate the time and effort spent by retired Major
General Dunlap to respond with his insights into the article.
While we can understand his concern about misrepresentation or overemphasis
on the involvement—or risk of involvement—of active-duty or discharged
servicemembers in the White power movement, he is missing the broader
perspective the article emphasizes, namely, “that the number of individuals with
military experience among the January 6, 2021, perpetrators is concerning.”1
As of today, the number of individuals with military experience who have been
arrested for attacking the Capitol has only increased, representing 120 of the 753
individuals, or 15.9 percent of those charged in federal court.2 Furthermore, it is
naive to assume these 120 individuals represent the entirety of active or discharged
servicemembers who participated in Capitol attack of 2021.

The overarching goal of our article was to reinforce Secretary of Defense
Lloyd Austin’s assertion that extremism is “not new to our country, and sadly,
not new to our military” and provide practical strategies that better equip the
US military to frustrate the recruitment efforts of White power Domestic
Violent Extremists (DVEs) at attracting members from their ranks.3 Refreshingly,
on December 20, 2021, the Department of Defense updated the language
of Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06, defining “active participation”
in “extremist group(s)” more broadly and potentially facilitating the ability for
the US military to begin rooting out support for White power DVEs by
active-duty servicemembers.4

1. Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines, “This Is War: Examining Military Experience among the Capitol Hill
Siege Participants” (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2021), 42.
2. Michael A. Jensen, Elizabeth Yates, and Sheehan Kane, “Radicalization in the Ranks: An
Assessment of the Scope and Nature of Criminal Extremism in the United States Military” (START: National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park, Maryland, 2022), https://
www.start.umd.edu/pubs/Final%20Report%20for%20SAF%20CDM.pdf.
3. “Video: A Message from the Secretary of Defense on Extremism,” DOD News (website),
US Department of Defense, February 19, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article
/Article/2509632/a-message-from-the-secretary-of-defense-on-extremism/.
4. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06, https://www.esd.whs.mil
/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/132506p.pdf.
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While updating and implementing Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06
is a much-needed starting point for addressing sympathy toward White power
DVEs by active-duty servicemembers, Major General Dunlap is correct in
pointing out the fact that the majority of servicemembers arrested (91 percent)
were discharged from the US military and had been, on average, “separated from
military service for nearly 15 years.”5 This fact further reinforces our argument
the US military should be making a concerted effort to support servicemembers
as they exit the armed forces, particularly if the act of leaving is not voluntary,
as this transitional phase may put them most at risk as “disillusionment,
trauma, lack of opportunities, and removal of the rules and safeguards” make
them vulnerable to the pull of White power DVEs.6
Our position is concentrated on the need for the US military to confront
this problem head on finally. Similar to focusing on the risk factors associated
with mass shootings, gang-related violence, or even suicide, it does not involve
the majority of citizens in society, but a minority. Yet the behavior of that
minority produces serious consequences for the rest of us. So we can all agree
within the whole of the US military and its veterans, the involvement of
individuals in the White power movement may be small, but the risk to those
who are involved and to those who come in contact with them is important. The
Capitol attack of 2021 is one example of the reasons we should all be concerned
about the interaction between the White power movement and the US military.
It was not a one-off event (though it was certainly one of the most dramatic in
recent history) and we can also look at the Oklahoma City bombing and a range
of smaller tragedies.7
In an unpublicized Pentagon report from October 2020, a range of
concerning behaviors were discussed about how military members interacted
with neo-Nazi and White power propaganda. For example, a Florida National
Guard member is a cofounder of Atomwaffen Division, and another Atomwaffen
Division member was removed from the Marines after his participation at the
Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Three self-proclaimed Bugaloo
Bois, an Army Reservist and two veterans, were arrested for planning to incite
5. Jensen, Yates, and Kane, “Radicalization in the Ranks,” 20.
6. Matthew Valasik and Shannon E. Reid, “The Alt-Right Movement and National Security,” Parameters 51,
no. 3 (Autumn 2021), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/3.
7. Kathleen Belew, Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 135–55; William Branigin and Dana Priest,
“3 White Soldiers Held in Slaying of Black Couple,” Washington Post (website), December 9, 1995, https://www.
washingtonpost.com /archive /politics /1995 /12 /09 / 3-white-soldiers-held-in-slaying-of-black-couple / 1f11ca
9f-9fe2-4e28-a637-a635007deeaf/; Matt Kennard, Irregular Army, 45; Arno Michaelis and Pardeep
Singh Kaleka, The Gift of Our Wounds: A Sikh and a Former White Supremacist Find Forgiveness after Hate
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018); Michael A. Peters and Tina Besley, “White Supremacism: The
Tragedy of Charlottesville,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 49, no. 14 (2017): 1309–12; and Paul Szoldra,
“These Are the Faces of Extremism in the Military: It Only Takes One to Wreak Havoc in the Ranks,”
Task & Purpose (website), April 23, 2021, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-military-extremism/.
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violence at a Black Lives Matter protest. These are just a small subset of cases
which underscore the need to have a better understanding of the depth and
breadth of the White power problem in the US military.
Major General Dunlap’s rebuttal also ignores the ongoing recruitment of active
and discharged servicemembers by these groups. Groups like The Base explicitly
worked to screen for new members with military experience. The Southern
Poverty Law Center reviewed audio recordings between members of The Base
and 100 prospective recruits.8 Of these 100 recruits, 20 percent reported they
were active duty or had military experience. This concern was also highlighted
in the Pentagon report stating: “Despite a low number of cases in absolute terms,
individuals with extremist affiliations and military experience are a concern
to US national security because of their proven ability to execute high-impact
events.”9 This is the double-edged sword of the interaction between the White
power movement and the US military. The White power movement has elements
which attract members of the US military, and these groups also actively look
to exploit that attraction. This process has repeated itself as we shifted through
different periods of active military action and removal of troops from long-term
deployments.10 As Kathleen Belew has repeatedly discussed, the disillusionment
and anomie that was present after the Vietnam War was a critical element in the
growth of the White power movement in the early 1980s.11
While our article was not intended to be an indictment of the US military, it
is focused on the need to meet a well-documented problem head on. Ignoring
the serious problem caused by the small proportion of active and discharged
servicemembers who are involved in, or being recruited by, the White power
movement just because the majority of servicemembers are not involved
is short-sighted and dismissive. The consequences of membership in these
groups can be life-altering and damaging to the individuals and their families
and the broader military community. To dismiss anyone who is involved in
this movement as unimportant for prevention and intervention does a major
disservice to individuals who have placed their livelihoods in the hands of
the US military.

8. Samantha Springer, “Secret Tapes Show Neo-Nazi Group The Base Recruiting Former Members
of the Military,” NBC News (website), October 15, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/secret
-tapes-show-neo-nazi-group-base-recruiting-former-members-n1243395.
9. Dan De Luce, “Pentagon Report Warns of Threat from White Supremacists within the Military,”
NBC News (website), February 25, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/pentagon-report-warns
-threat-white-supremacists-inside-military-n1258871.
10. Valasik and Reid, “Alt-Right Movement,” 6–7.
11. Belew, “Bring the War Home,” 20–23.
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he article, “The Battalion Commander Effect,” is a helpful,
additional step in addressing one possible correlate of lieutenant
retention, arguing for its role as key determinant in junior officer
stay-or-leave decisions—while simultaneously advocating for the role of retention
in senior officer promotion decisions. At face value the article oversimplifies,
given several possible methodological issues, while making a leap to promotion
board determinations. Analyses should be expanded, with detailed quantifiable
results provided before any serious discussion of policy implications (for
example, promotion board decisions affecting former battalion commanders),
are undertaken. Methodological concerns, including possible omitted variable
bias, should be addressed to confirm validity, before far-reaching implications for
practice are drawn.1

Expanding analysis “out” would include both company and brigade commander
effects, in addition to the current battalion commander effects. Expanding it
“down” would add more refined assessments of battalion commander effectiveness;
some via Officer Evaluation Reports, others potentially via “360 evaluation”
of leaders. Once done, detailed results, including regression coefficients and
p-values, could be included in tabular form, for example, in an appendix if
preferred due to space constraints. Showing the relative effect, and power, of
each is key to a more complete understanding of the battalion commander effect.
That battalion commanders have a major effect on lieutenant retention in
relation to other factors is undisputable. They do, after all, “check the box” on
the lieutenant’s evaluation, from “Most Qualified” to “Unqualified.”2 By the
1. Humbeto Barreto and Frank M. Howland, “Omitted Variable Bias,” in Introductory Econometrics:
Using Monte Carlo Simulation with Microsoft Excel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and
Kevin A. Clarke, “The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research,” in
Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 4 (September 2005): 341–52, https://doi.
org/10.1080/07388940500339183.
2. Headquarters Department of the Army, Revised Officer Evaluation Reports, April 1, 2014,
Implementation.
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major promotion board, likely future battalion commanders have already been
earmarked. Junior officers through the rank of captain also know if they are
“going places,” or will be left behind, as a direct function of those assessments.
During years of working officer retention in the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Army/G-1, with officer analysis at the year-group level of detail,
I noted many former officers from my West Point class who, on discerning
they would not be battalion commanders, left service after company commands
and moved on to rewarding careers in the private sector. This is not unusual,
among service academy graduates—they are prized by industry, too, given the
breadth and depth of academic and leadership training: if they leave early.
That specific behaviors and overall effectiveness (apparently not measured
or employed) of battalion leaders can also be a major correlate of retention
(not a predictor, though, as the authors note) is also not in dispute. Alongside
other “leadership” variables, the singular battalion commander effect measured
generically in the study may well diminish—and significantly. Likewise it could be
shown to be stronger still for “good” battalion commanders versus weaker ones, if
such variables were measured and included in analysis.
Leadership variables (for example, additional independent variables in
regression equations) might include tactical and technical proficiency via the
leader’s professional standing, as measured by evaluations at the time those
lieutenants were assigned; the same is true for leader interpersonal qualities (for
example, “people skills”) and sincerity—does the leader act without pretense?
If these qualities were added to the study, greater value could be obtained and
the variables could eventually become points on a “talent checklist” that could
more effectively assess the impact of a commander.
Hence, more could be done with a statistical sample of 1,745 former battalion
commanders and their 36,032 lieutenants. Roughly 20 lieutenants per former
battalion commander can provide significantly more by way of insight than the
study reveals, via interviews and focus groups to expand the basic findings.
Details of the additional empirical tests that were mentioned on other leaders
need to be included in the article; it appears company commander impacts may
have been included, but details are not provided. Brigade-level leadership does
not appear to be included in the analysis at all. Independent variables used in
the Spain, et al., study, in addition to former battalion commander, included
officer commissioning year (year group), post, branch, source of commission,
gender, race/ethnicity, age, commission source quality, marital and child status,
and graduation from prestigious tactical schools (for example, Airborne and
Ranger schools). Instead, more evaluation by way of so-called lateral comparison
of battalion commander effect to company and brigade commander effect can,
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and should, infuse the analysis and discussion and enhance construct validity.
Are we measuring what we think we are measuring(?)—that is, decision to leave
service, as a function of leadership, and whose leadership? Such “apples-to-apples”
comparison is essential.
In summary, the most important implication of the study for practice,
assessing battalion commanders on officer retention, could well be based on a
false set of assumptions (for example, that it was the battalion commander and
his effects driving losses). This common misperception ended many promising
careers in an earlier day, when reenlistment rates were a criteria for evaluation
for both battalion and company commanders. Ironically, this was the period
of the “hollow Army,” with enlisted cohort high-school graduation rates at a
low point for the volunteer Army, and bottom quartile on the Armed Forces
Qualification Test at a record high. The Atlantic article, “Why Our Best Officers
Leave,” notes correlates from weak generalship to bureaucratic management
that stifle initiative and entrepreneurship.3 Finally, service academy graduates do
leave active duty at a relatively high rate. Given the cost to produce these
officers, which is higher than for other commissioning sources, there is
another field for further study.4
Next steps should include expanding analysis as indicated and conducting
structured interviews with high-performing battalion commanders and focus
groups with their junior officer cohorts, following the formers’s change of
command. A plausible addition to the body of work—and easy to implement—
would be a survey of all lieutenants and junior captains leaving active duty and
their reasons for resigning. Questions could be formed under an organizing
scheme that focuses on Army, local command climate (battalion, brigade, and
installation), private sector, and personal (for example, family).
There are a number of ways to pinpoint the problem of junior officer
retention. As the US Army moves back into a period of relative stability without
war and the drawdown effects that have followed three times in the last 50
years—after Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the war in Iraq—the time to do so is
at hand.

3. Tim Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving,” Atlantic (website), January/February 2011,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/why-our-best-officers-are-leaving/308346/.
4. Kyle Rempfer, “Service Academy Graduates Could See Longer Military Obligations,”
Military Times (website), July 15, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/07/15/service
-academy-graduates-could-see-longer-military-obligations/.
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W

e thank our colleague for both his distinguished Army career and
his thoughtful and comprehensive review of our manuscript. Also,
we are grateful for Parameters providing us the space and audience to
engage in this important dialogue. We humbly offer the following response.
The purpose of our study was to empirically investigate the anecdotal
relationship between battalion commanders and their lieutenants’ retention (for
example, BCE), and our analysis found there was, in fact, a statistically significant
correlation between them. Our colleague argues our analysis would be improved
if we included leadership-related variables about the battalion commanders,
such as sincerity, people skills, and tactical and technical competence. We
agree these variables (and several others) could be mechanisms of a battalion
commander’s influence on his or her lieutenants, but we are not aware of a
reasonable mechanism to get these data in sufficient numbers of former battalion
commanders to test them statistically. He also argues brigade and company
commanders may similarly influence lieutenants’ retention decisions and
should be included in the analysis. This is certainly plausible. We decided not to
include brigade commanders since they have relatively infrequent interactions
with lieutenants and, therefore, likely slight influence over their propensity to
continue to serve. In retrospect, we could have included brigade commanders
in our analysis and let the statistics confirm (or deny) this.
Regarding including company commanders in our analysis: we did not
include them and believe not doing so was wise. First, the climates company
commanders set are influenced significantly by their battalion commanders,
but not vice versa. So, an empirical analysis that included both company and
battalion commanders in the same regression would likely obscure each
variable’s predictive effect. Second, company commanders lead roughly three to
six lieutenants each, which is not a large enough group size to test empirically
with statistical confidence. Ultimately, we worked to avoid over-specifying our
regression by identifying a small, yet meaningful, subset of variables for our
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analysis, given it was both impractical and unwise to measure and include every
contextual variable.
We agree readers would benefit from more statistical evidence of our
findings, such as tabular lists of regression coefficients, p-values, and other
data customarily depicted in papers based on empirical analysis. However, at
the time of our submission, Parameters restricted authors to two or fewer
graphics. We understand Parameters is in the process of adding a feature,
which will allow future authors to include hyperlinks to additional online
content, which is welcome news for researchers who wish to publish in
Parameters. Earlier in our careers, we were frustrated to learn many scholarly
publications charge fees to practitioners to download their articles (for example,
“Early Predictors of Successful Military Careers among West Point Cadets,”
Military Psychology, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/08995605.2020.180128
5) which severely reduces the likelihood of Army leaders reading, sharing,
discussing, and challenging their ideas. This is one of the reasons we targeted
the open-access Parameters for our research, and we are grateful for its refereed
peer-reviewed publication of our article.
Based on his cautionary experiences of watching the Army evaluate
commanders according to their reenlistment rates, our colleague suggests the
Army should be wary of using the BCE as an evaluation criterion for senior
officers. We acknowledge the evidence we found on the BCE is more correlative
than causal in nature. This is one of the reasons our paper suggests the BCE not
be singularly considered as the definitive measure of leadership (or lack thereof ),
but as one of several informing assessments that can better contextualize
leaders’ influence from many perspectives and within context. We encourage
future researchers to investigate the BCE’s causal chain by using various
empirical techniques to help establish causality, such as using an instrumental
variable. Regardless of whether the Army decides to use the BCE to inform
senior officer promotion and selection decisions (performance feedback), it
should certainly establish a mechanism to provide BCE data to officers to
encourage them to reflect on how they are treating/leading their lieutenants
(developmental feedback).
Finally, our colleague’s suggestion the Army give all departing lieutenants
formal exit interviews is wise, and we have advocated for this for some time
(for example, “Making Exit Interviews Count,” Harvard Business Review,
2016). The Army agrees, and it employed an exit interview survey until recently.
Additionally, in 2020, the Army implemented the Department of the Army
Career Engagement Survey (DACES), which is e-mailed to every soldier
every year during his/her birth month. Interestingly, the Army received as
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many DACES responses in its first two months as it had received exit interview
responses in the previous two years, so the Army recently wound down its exit
interview survey and uses the DACES for the same purpose. The DACES
data is likely more valid as it allows for longitudinal perspectives on the same
population leading to their exits (or retention), while exit interview data are
gathered once during an emotional time.
As we had hoped, the BCE paper has the Army talking. An Army
component commander to a Department of Defense combatant command
shared it with his generals at his recent command conference. At least two
of the branch schoolhouses are sharing it at their colonel- and lieutenant
colonel-level pre-command courses. We have had the opportunity to present
it to the brigade and battalion command teams of an Army division and to a
forward-deployed general staff. To start these conversations, we invited the
participants to list the names of the lieutenants who served in their companies
when they were company commanders. We then requested they identify one
third of those lieutenants as high-potential (HIPO). Next, we asked them to
mark whether each lieutenant stayed in the Army long enough to be a company
commander. Finally, we asked them to calculate their Company Commander
Effect (CCE) and CCEHIPO. Most of them completed our request, and then the
conversation about the BCE and BCEHIPO really flowed. Some of them responded
with, “But I don’t know if LT Smith or LT Nguyen stayed in or got out.” Those
commanders may have other issues.
Overall, our colleague’s feedback is very well taken, as our profession
encourages this sort of dialogue. His comments add to a conversation that
already includes significant responses from current and former officers. Much
reaction has been in the form of, “Yes! My battalion commander was terrible,
and he/she influenced me to get out,” or “My commander was inspirational
and, look at me, I’m still here after 20 years.” We have also received a
moderate amount of pushback, some of it similar to our colleague’s comments
on potential omitted variable bias.
Interestingly, we have been asked, “Is there an equivalent of the BCE on
junior enlisted soldiers?” We believe it might be the platoon sergeant effect
(PSE), because a platoon sergeant is typically a sergeant first class, the first senior
non-commissioned officer rank, tenured in the organization (for example,
selected by a Department of the Army centralized selection board) and able
to remain in the Army until well after minimum retirement age. A platoon
sergeant is also two supervisory levels above most of his or her junior enlisted
soldiers, similar to a battalion commander being two supervisory levels above
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his or her lieutenants. We would encourage future empirical research on this
hypothesized PSE.
Again, we thank our colleague for his important contribution to this
valuable conversation. As our nation’s threat environment grows ever
more complex, quality leaders will become even more important than
they were in the past. The Army’s success crucially depends on ensuring
its best lieutenants decide to stay. If the BCE idea helps senior officers
think more about how they are impacting the retention of their junior
officers, especially their highest potential ones, our future Army stands to be
even more ready to fight and win.

Everett Spain
Colonel Everett Spain, US Army, is the head of the Department of Behavioral
Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. He holds a
DBA from Harvard University.
Gautam Mukunda
Dr. Gautam Mukunda, research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School Center
for Public Leadership, is the author of Picking Presidents: How to Make the Most
Important Decision in the World (forthcoming) and Indispensable: When Leaders
Really Matter (2012).
Archie Bates
Colonel Archie Bates, US Army, is the director of the Management Program
at the United States Military Academy. He holds a PhD from the University
of Maryland.

Hear our authors provide further insights at:
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/decisive/

Read the genesis article at:
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
/vol51/iss3/10/
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Article Submissions
Content Requirements
Scope
Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address strategic issues regarding US
defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest standards of
research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or instructional recommendations must be
included. For more information, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu.

Audience
US Army War College graduates, other senior military officers, policymakers, and members of
academia concerned with national security affairs.

Clearance
Members of the US military and employees of the US Department of Defense must provide a
memo from the local Public Affairs Office stating a submission is appropriate for public release
(see AR 360-1, ch. 6).

Concurrent Submissions
Submissions must not be available on the Internet or be under consideration with other
publishers until the author receives notification the submission will not be published or until the
work is published through the US Army War College Press.

Formatting Requirements
Length
Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only): 20,000 words (15,000-word
main text, 5,000 words in the foreword anwd executive summary).
Articles: 5,000 words or less.
Commentaries: 2,500 to 3,000 words.
Book reviews: 800 to 1,000 words.

File Type
Text must be provided in a single MS Word document (.doc).
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Visual Aids
Charts, graphs, and photographs may be provided to clarify or amplify the text. Tables must
be presented in the body of the Word document. Microsoft-generated charts and graphs must
be submitted in Excel. And photos must be provided as .jpg images of not more than 9MB
(at 300 dpi). If any table, chart, graph, or photograph has been previously published, written
permission from the copyright holder to republish the content must be included with the submission.

Citations
Use the Chicago Manual of Style format to document sources. Indicate all quoted material by
quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent
with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy
explanatory footnotes are discouraged and will be edited.

Submission Requirements
Address
usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil

Include
For each contributor, provide the following information: full name, mailing address, phone number,
e-mail address, areas of expertise, and a brief biography or curriculum vitae.
Attach all files, including graphics.
For book reviews, include the author, editor, or translator’s name, the book’s title, the publisher,
and the publication date.
Abstract requirements, approximately 200 words, including the following information:
a. What is the thesis/main argument of the piece in one sentence?
b. How does this piece differ from what has already been published on the topic?
c. What methodology and sources are/will be used?
d. Why will this piece be of interest or useful to the readers of the USAWC Press, who are
mainly policy and military practionners?

Timelines
Receipt
Please allow 1 business day for confirmation of receipt.

Review
Articles: 4 to 6 weeks.
Monographs (accepted from US Army War College faculty and staff only): 10 to 12 weeks.
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Spartans Maintain Airborne Proficiency
Paratroopers from across the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne),
25th Infantry Division, “Spartan Brigade,” conducted an airborne operation
onto Malemute Drop Zone, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska,
July 14, 2021, from C-130J aircraft of the 815th Airlift Squadron. The
Spartan Brigade is the only airborne infantry brigade combat team in the Arctic
and Pacific theaters, providing the combatant commander with the unique
capability to project an expeditionary force by air.
Photo by Major Jason Welch
VIRIN: 210714-A-XI247-004
Photo ID: 6734954
https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6734954/spartans-maintain-airborneproficiency

Back Cover
Indonesia Platoon Exchange 2020: Lightning Academy Green Mile
Soldiers assigned to 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry
Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division and the Indonesian 431st Para
Raider Infantry Battalion executed the Green Mile, a physical endurance
course that concluded their training for the 2020 Indonesia Platoon Exchange
at the 25th Infantry Division Lightning Academy Jungle course on
November 21, 2020.
Photo by First Lieutenant Angelo Meja
VIRIN: 201121-A-PD523-0069
Photo ID: 6438163
https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6438163/indonesia-platoon-exchange-2020lightning-academy-green-mile
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